Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi; December 9, 2013; Mississippi; State Appellate Court
Michael Hugh Alexander purchased a six-month automobile insurance policy for his 2003 Chevrolet Malibu through Fred Watson and Granite State Insurance Company, effective August 29, 2007, with a renewal date of August 28, 2008. AIG, which provided the policy, sent a notice dated July 17, 2008, stating that the policy would not be renewed due to a change in their coverage offerings. Alexander was involved in an accident on September 23, 2008, and AIG denied his claim, asserting that the policy was not in effect at that time. Alexander claimed he did not receive the non-renewal notice until after the accident, although he acknowledged receiving notices postmarked September 24 and October 1, 2008.
On February 26, 2010, Alexander filed a complaint against AIG and other defendants for negligence, breach of contract, fiduciary duty, and fraud. The defendants denied the claims, and both AIG and Granite State filed for summary judgment, which the circuit court granted on June 25, 2012, citing valid proof of mailing of the non-renewal notice and Alexander's failure to rebut this evidence.
Alexander appealed the summary judgment, contending that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding his receipt of the non-renewal notice and the negligence of the agent. He also argued that an amendatory endorsement was required under the policy. The court affirmed the summary judgment, concluding that no genuine issue of material fact existed. The standard for reviewing summary judgment is de novo, requiring that evidence is viewed favorably to the nonmovant and that specific facts must be presented to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial as per M.R.C.P. 56.
The circuit court's determination that a bulk mail certificate served as conclusive evidence of Alexander's receipt of notice was contested. AIG's summary judgment motion was supported by a United States Postal Service certificate indicating that a notice of non-renewal was mailed to Alexander’s policy address on June 17, 2008. The court referenced Mississippi Code Annotated section 83-11-9, which allows a certificate of mailing to serve as sufficient proof of notice, but acknowledged that this does not definitively prove receipt. The Mississippi Supreme Court's ruling in Carter v. Allstate Indemnity Co. clarified that while the certificate raises a presumption of receipt, this presumption can be rebutted, though mere denial of receipt is inadequate to create a triable issue of fact.
Alexander argued he provided enough evidence to counter the presumption of receipt, citing an affidavit from his mother, Childa Stevens, who claimed she did not receive the notice until October 1, 2008. However, records indicated that Stevens had received prior notices regarding premium payments at the same address before the non-renewal. Additionally, two notices of non-renewal were submitted, postmarked September 24, 2008, and October 1, 2008. When Stevens contacted AIG, the automated system incorrectly indicated that coverage was still active, but no AIG representatives confirmed this after the non-renewal date. The circuit court ultimately concluded that Alexander did not present adequate evidence to challenge the presumption of notice, affirming that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the policy's status at the time of the accident.
The circuit court correctly determined that the certificate of mailing served as conclusive evidence of notice receipt. Alexander contended that AIG was required to issue an amendatory endorsement due to an underwriting change affecting single-vehicle policy coverage. The court found this argument unpersuasive, noting that the non-renewal of the policy eliminated any need for AIG to amend it. According to AIG, it would be illogical to require an endorsement for a policy no longer in force, as endorsements are meant to modify existing policies. The court agreed, citing that endorsements exist to adjust the terms of active policies.
In response to AIG's summary judgment motion, Alexander claimed there were genuine material facts in dispute. However, the court had previously established that Alexander did not sufficiently contest the presumption of having received timely notice regarding the non-renewal. Regarding the alleged failure to notify Renasant Bank, the lienholder, the relevant Mississippi statute mandates notice to both the insured and named loss payee at least 30 days before non-renewal. AIG maintained that it was unaware of any lienholder since none was listed in the insurance application, and Alexander admitted he did not inform his agent of any lienholder. The agent also confirmed the application process included inquiries about lienholders, emphasizing that without such information, no notification could be sent to a lienholder.
The application for insurance did not include a section for listing a lienholder, nor did the applicant, Alexander, provide information about one. Watson, the agent responsible for the application, testified that he typically inquired about lienholders separately and forwarded that information to AIG or GuideOne, but he could not recall if Alexander had mentioned a lienholder in this case. Although AIG denied that Watson was their agent, he compiled and submitted the application and received a commission from the sale, which qualifies him as an agent under Mississippi law. Knowledge obtained by an insurance agent in the course of their duties is typically attributed to the insurance company. However, Watson did not confirm awareness of any lienholder. A potential piece of evidence suggests Watson may have known Renasant Bank was the lienholder, as another version of the application contained the lienholder’s details handwritten on it. This version was sent to the bank for verification, but Watson has not verified that the handwriting was his. Despite this ambiguous evidence, there was no lienholder named in the insurance policy itself, and Alexander did not provide evidence to the contrary. As the insured, Alexander had a duty to read the policy, which he admitted he did not do, despite the fact that the absence of Renasant Bank as a lienholder could have been easily noticed. Under Mississippi law, an insured’s knowledge of a policy is imputed regardless of whether they actually read it.
Renasant Bank was not a party to the legal action, and the lack of notice to the bank only grants it a cause of action, not Alexander. AIG's argument is supported by case law, specifically Bryce v. St. Paul Fire, Marine Ins. Co., which establishes that failure to notify a mortgagee does not invalidate the cancellation of a policy for the insured. Consequently, the circuit court's ruling favoring AIG is upheld, as Alexander did not sufficiently challenge the presumption of having received notice. The absence of notice to Renasant Bank regarding non-renewal does not afford Alexander any rights concerning the policy. Alexander also claimed that agent Watson was negligent in not adding coverage for the Malibu; however, the insurance application clearly indicated only the Malibu was insured. Alexander admitted he did not read the application or policy, and as per legal precedent, he is deemed to have knowledge of the contract terms regardless. Thus, no material fact dispute exists regarding the policy's coverage representation. The circuit court's judgment is affirmed, with all appeal costs assigned to Alexander. The details reveal that Alexander's policy was obtained through Watson, a captive agent who also worked with non-standard insurers, and the coverage was underwritten by Granite State, collectively referred to as AIG.
The notice issued by the insurance company adhered to policy requirements, mandating that a non-renewal notice be mailed to the insured at least thirty days prior to the policy's expiration, unless due to nonpayment. Alexander's complaint involved multiple parties, including Career General and AIG's successor, 21st Century. United Postal Service Form 3877, dated June 17, 2008, confirmed that 5,331 items were mailed that day, including Alexander’s policy details, with a cancellation date of August 28, 2008. This form serves as proof of mailing and complies with the Postal Service’s Domestic Mail Manual, which allows various forms for certifying bulk mailings. The trial court ruled that the defendant's log sheet was a valid certificate of mailing under Section 83-11-9, which lacks specific requirements for mailing certificates. The court's interpretation, as noted in Carter, establishes that proof of notice is deemed sufficient unless strong evidence suggests otherwise, without necessitating definitive proof of receipt by the insured. Alexander's insurance policy was linked to his mother’s address in Okolona, Mississippi, where he had not resided since 1998, and he acknowledged that his mother had been responsible for premium payments. He admitted to not reading the insurance application or policy and that no payments had been made since July 27, 2008. Although he received copies of notices in September and October, these do not indicate that the original notice was not sent. Alexander also raised a point regarding notice to a lienholder, which is addressed in a separate section concerning arguments against summary judgment. As of June 22, 2010, Alexander owed $769.63 on a vehicle loan due on September 5, 2010.
