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Gaines v. State
Citations: 137 So. 3d 357; 2013 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 60; 2013 WL 3589575Docket: CR-11-0919
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; July 12, 2013; Alabama; State Appellate Court
On August 5, 2010, the Jefferson County grand jury indicted David Lee Gaines for two counts of capital murder related to the shooting of Ericka Jean. Count one alleged that Gaines intentionally murdered Jean by shooting her while she was inside a vehicle, as per Ala.Code 1975 § 13A-5-40(a)(17). Count two charged him with the same offense while he was inside the vehicle, under § 13A-5-40(a)(18). The State dismissed count two prior to trial. On March 11, 2011, the jury convicted Gaines of manslaughter, a lesser-included offense, and he was sentenced to 20 years in prison. The relationship between Gaines and Jean began about a year before her death, during which they had ongoing arguments, particularly over financial matters and the discipline of Jean's children. On the night before her death, a heated argument occurred regarding money, which continued the following day. On the day of the shooting, Shalicia Persons, a witness at a railroad crossing, observed Gaines shooting into the vehicle where Jean was seated. She recognized both Gaines and his car. After the incident, Gaines drove himself and Jean to St. Vincent’s Hospital, where he initially mentioned only his own injury before indicating that Jean had also been shot. Medical examination revealed Jean had sustained six gunshot wounds, primarily to her back, with several being fatal. During the trial, Gaines testified that the arguments were mutual and claimed he never struck Jean, asserting she was the more violent partner. He recounted details leading up to the shooting, including the positioning of his gun in the vehicle and the nature of their argument at the time of the incident. Gaines testified that during a confrontation, Jean attempted to slap him, leading to a struggle over a gun. He claimed that while he was holding her hand, she shot him in the leg, and during the altercation, she fired the gun two more times. After gaining control of the weapon, Gaines shot as he exited the car, asserting he acted in self-defense due to fearing for his life. He did not contact emergency services or go to the nearest hospital, opting instead to drive 30 minutes to another facility without immediately informing staff about Jean, the other shooting victim, being outside. On appeal, Gaines argues that the trial court erred in its jury instruction on self-defense. He contends that the instruction used the phrase "created the controversy" instead of the legal term "initial aggressor," which he believes could mislead the jury regarding the self-defense claim. He also objects to the instruction's assertion that he had a "duty to retreat." The court's self-defense instruction stated that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Gaines did not act in self-defense, outlining three criteria for self-defense claims, including the requirement that the defendant must not have initiated the controversy and must retreat if safely possible. Gaines formally objected to the terminology and requested a clarification on the definition of "initial aggressor," but the trial court did not provide additional instructions. A trial court possesses broad discretion in crafting jury instructions, provided they accurately reflect the law and the case's facts. A judge may clarify legal terms in instructions as long as these explanations do not alter their meaning. While it is preferable to use precise statutory language, strict adherence is not required. Alabama law on self-defense, as outlined in Ala.Code 1975 § 13A-3-23, states that an individual is justified in using physical force to defend against imminent unlawful force, provided they reasonably believe it necessary. If justified, individuals may use deadly force and have no duty to retreat if not engaged in illegal activity. However, those who provoke unlawful force or are the initial aggressor cannot claim self-defense unless they withdraw and communicate this intent, yet are still threatened. The circuit court's jury instruction incorrectly stated that self-defense is unavailable if the defendant "created the controversy," which misrepresents the statute's requirement regarding the initial aggressor. The definitions of "aggressor" and "controversy" highlight that the statute focuses on physical aggression rather than mere initiation of an argument. This erroneous instruction unduly narrowed the scope of the law governing self-defense and could have led the jury to dismiss the defendant's claim if they believed he had initiated a dispute, regardless of its timing relative to the incident. The court found this error not harmless and reversed the circuit court’s judgment, remanding for further proceedings. The discussion of an additional claim regarding the duty to retreat was deemed unnecessary due to the primary ruling. The amendment to the self-defense statute eliminating the duty to retreat, effective June 1, 2006, was also acknowledged.