Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
Watts v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.
Citations: 135 So. 3d 53; 2012 La.App. 1 Cir. 0620; 2013 La. App. LEXIS 1863; 2013 WL 5173864Docket: No. 2012 CA 0620
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; September 16, 2013; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
Defendant-appellant Hebert Brothers Engineers, Inc. (Hebert Brothers) challenges a trial court judgment awarding plaintiffs-appellees, Rosa Lee Watts and her children (the Watts), damages for the survival action of the decedent, Alfred Watts, who died from lung cancer linked to his employment with Hebert Brothers at Dow Chemical Company premises in Plaquemine, Louisiana. Alfred worked for Hebert Brothers starting in 1963, where he was exposed to asbestos in the chlorine plant. After retiring in 1994 due to laryngeal cancer, he was diagnosed with lung cancer in 2001 and died on October 31, 2001. The Watts filed a lawsuit on September 10, 2001, initially naming several defendants, including asbestos manufacturers and Dow, but added Hebert Brothers only in a supplemental petition on August 29, 2003, after dismissing the other defendants. During a seven-day jury trial, the Watts moved for a directed verdict based on the lack of evidence against other entities, which the trial court denied. Hebert Brothers subsequently sought a directed verdict, arguing that the claims were prescribed due to insufficient evidence against anyone other than themselves, but this was also denied. The jury found Hebert Brothers negligent, attributing significant fault for Alfred's cancers to them, and ruled that Alfred was not contributorily negligent despite his heavy smoking and drinking history. The jury awarded $3,625,000 in damages. Prior to the final judgment, the trial court stayed proceedings to address Hebert Brothers' prescription argument. This court granted a writ in part and remanded the case for the trial court to evaluate the merits of the prescription issue that had not been submitted to the jury, allowing for a final judgment to be rendered afterward, which could be appealed by the aggrieved party. A hearing was conducted on the remand, leading the trial court to determine that the Watts’ claims against Hebert Brothers were not prescribed. A final judgment reflecting the jury’s verdict was signed on June 2, 2011, prompting a timely appeal by Hebert Brothers, which contends that the trial court erred in three key areas: 1) ruling that the Watts’ claims were not prescribed; 2) failing to limit Hebert Brothers’ liability to its virile share; and 3) awarding excessive damages for Alfred’s survival action related to his lung cancer. The court acknowledged that more than a year had passed since Alfred's death when Hebert Brothers was added as a defendant, suggesting the claims were prescribed. However, it noted that interruption of prescription against a solidary obligor applies to all obligors and their successors, per Louisiana Civil Code articles 3508 and 1799. Hebert Brothers argued that there was no evidence establishing a solidary relationship with another timely sued defendant, as solidary obligors share liability for the entire performance, relieving others of responsibility upon performance by one. Hebert Brothers did not contest the jury's findings regarding its role in causing Alfred’s cancers or his lack of contributory negligence but claimed the record did not demonstrate Dow's liability, which was necessary to establish a solidary relationship. The record confirmed that all manufacturing operations occurred on Dow's premises, where Alfred handled asbestos, and the law at the time of exposure applies to long-latency occupational disease claims. To prove Dow's liability under strict liability (Louisiana Civil Code article 2317), the limitations of article 2317.1 were deemed inapplicable. In a negligence claim against the owner of a facility utilizing asbestos, the claimant must demonstrate that the facility posed an unreasonable risk of injury, that the owner was aware or should have been aware of this risk, and that the owner failed to ensure safety measures were in place. The owner is not held responsible if they took reasonable actions to mitigate risks but still failed to discover an unreasonable risk of harm. In a strict liability case, the claimant is not required to prove the owner's knowledge of risk but must demonstrate that the item in question posed an unreasonable risk of harm due to its defectiveness. The owner's liability arises from an absolute duty to identify risks associated with the item they control, independent of negligence standards. If the owner fails to discover these risks, they are presumed to have knowledge of them and can be held liable for injuries caused by the unreasonable risk. In this case, the evidence showed that Dow owned the asbestos used by Hebert Brothers’ employees at a chlorine plant. Witnesses, including Charles Snearl and Sirkil Pania, confirmed that Dow directed daily operations and supplied the asbestos. Omer King Hebert, president of Hebert Brothers, stated that their workers relied on Dow’s guidelines, asserting that Dow was responsible for safety at the facility. The consensus among multiple expert witnesses established that asbestos poses an unreasonable risk of harm when inhaled, with no dispute regarding its dangerous nature. Although there was debate over the cause of Alfred's lung cancer, all experts agreed on the harmful effects of asbestos exposure. Hebert Brothers did not contest the acknowledgment that inhaling significant amounts of asbestos is an unreasonable risk. The reasonableness of Dow's conduct regarding asbestos risk management is evaluated based on evidence from Hebert Brothers. Testimonies revealed that Dow implemented safety measures to protect its workers and those of Hebert Brothers from asbestos exposure, with protocols in place at least since the 1980s. However, testimonies from workers like Snearl and Hebert indicated limited personal exposure to safety equipment in the early 1970s. In contrast, Pania detailed significant asbestos exposure while working for Hebert Brothers at Dow from 1963 to 1972, where no protective gear was provided. Laborers regularly handled raw asbestos, leading to dust generation during various processes, including loading, mixing, and cleanup. Although Dow began safety measures in 1974, Pania noted a lack of warnings or safety instructions prior to that. The court found sufficient evidence supporting strict custodial liability against Dow under Louisiana Civil Code article 2317, as Pania's testimony confirmed that Dow owned the hazardous asbestos, the exposure occurred on its premises, and Dow did not take reasonable preventative measures. Hebert Brothers raised concerns regarding the directed verdict motions, indicating inconsistencies in the positioning of fault attribution after the evidence presentation. Arguments presented by the Watts before the trial court were deemed non-evidentiary, leading to the court's denial of their motion for a directed verdict. This denial indicated the existence of evidence concerning the fault of other entities. The legal framework allows for alternative theories of liability, as permitted under La. C.C.P. art. 892, and the Watts showed no prejudice from Hebert Brothers' inconsistent positions. Consequently, the trial court found sufficient proof of Dow's liability, confirming a solidary relationship with Hebert Brothers, which rendered the Watts’ claims timely. The trial court upheld the jury’s damage award to the Watts without adjusting Dow's assigned fault, governed by prior law due to the significant asbestos exposure occurring before Louisiana's Comparative Fault Law was enacted. The Watts contended that Hebert Brothers waived their right to a reduction for Dow's virile share since the jury was not asked to determine Dow’s fault. However, neither party requested this, thus waiving their rights per La. C.C.P. art. 1812A. The judgment could only be reduced by the virile share of released joint tortfeasors if their liability was established. The Watts named thirteen settling defendants at trial, including Dow, but failed to prove their liability, preventing any reduction based on their shares. Despite this, the trial court's finding of Dow’s fault was deemed valid, leading to a conclusion that the total damages awarded to the Watts should be halved to reflect Dow's virile share. The judgment was amended accordingly to award the Watts fifty percent of their total damages, accounting for Hebert Brothers' liability. Hebert Brothers challenges the trial court's judgment concerning the jury's award of $2,750,000 for Alfred's lung cancer, arguing that this amount is excessive and should be reduced to a maximum of $2,000,000. The award breaks down into $750,000 for physical pain and suffering, $1,000,000 for mental anguish, and $1,000,000 for loss of enjoyment of life. Hebert Brothers does not contest the jury's award for Alfred's laryngeal cancer. The trial court's determination of damages is considered a finding of fact, with significant discretion granted to judges and juries in such assessments, as per La. C.C. art. 2324.1. Under the manifest error standard, an appellate court can only reverse a trial court's finding if there is no reasonable factual basis for it and if the fact finder is clearly wrong. The court must avoid re-weighing evidence or substituting its own findings, focusing instead on whether the trial court's award constitutes an abuse of discretion based on the specific injuries and their impacts. In reviewing the case, the appellate court found no abuse of the jury's discretion. Alfred, diagnosed with lung cancer at 69, had previously battled laryngeal cancer, which limited his ability to communicate. Post-diagnosis, his condition deteriorated significantly, requiring his family to assist him with basic needs. Testimonies from Alfred's treating physician and his daughter illustrated a stark decline in his quality of life, emotional state, and engagement in activities, particularly in the last weeks of his life. The court concluded that the jury's award was supported and should not be disturbed. Alfred's decline due to lung cancer was described by his family as a profound transformation from a proud man to an infant-like state, leading to emotional and physical suffering. His daughter, Helen, testified about his intense pain, loss of dignity, and inability to communicate verbally after losing his voice box. Despite his condition, Alfred adapted to nonverbal communication until he became too weak to express himself. The jury awarded the Watts $750,000 for Alfred's physical pain, $1,000,000 for mental anguish, and $1,000,000 for loss of enjoyment of life. The trial court's judgment was amended to reduce the damages to half for Hebert Brothers Engineering, Inc., while affirming all other aspects. The lawsuit was initiated by Alfred and Rosa Lee, and after Alfred's death, Rosa Lee and his surviving children were substituted as plaintiffs. During the appeal, the issue of whether the Watts' claims were timely was debated, with the trial court finding substantial evidence of Dow's solidary liability, although Hebert Brothers argued that the wrong standard of proof was applied. The appellate court chose not to classify the procedural basis for the timeliness of claims, focusing instead on the merits of the evidence presented. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the evidence, when considered in its entirety, demonstrates that the fact or cause in question is more likely true than not. The standard of proof by substantial evidence is recognized as a more rigorous requirement. Although Hebert Brothers maintain that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies, there are doubts about whether the trial court applied a heightened burden of proof, yet any potential error did not prejudice Hebert Brothers, rendering this argument without merit. Additionally, the record supports a finding of Dow’s liability due to negligence, as there exists a general duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent harm to others. Evidence shows significant asbestos exposure that substantially caused Alfred's injury, linking Dow’s failure to act reasonably as a cause-in-fact of the harm, with the risk of developing laryngeal and lung cancers falling within Dow's duty of care. Hebert Brothers’ argument regarding the Watts' failure to sufficiently plead a solidary relationship with Dow is unsupported, as Dow was not a defendant when the Watts filed the supplemental petition, and no liability against Dow was alleged in the supplemental claims. Evidence presented at trial not included in the pleadings serves to expand those pleadings and is treated as if it had been properly raised. The record contains unobjected evidence supporting a solidary relationship between Hebert Brothers and Dow, further negating their contention.