Department of Health v. Bayfront Medical Center, Inc.
Docket: No. 1D11-5676
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; November 29, 2012; Florida; State Appellate Court
The Florida Department of Health appeals a Final Order from the Division of Administrative Hearings that invalidated its rule for allocating trauma centers in Florida. Shands Jacksonville cross-appeals the denial of attorney fees. The administrative law judge found the rule inconsistent with the Department’s rulemaking authority, leading to the affirmation of the order. Four trauma centers challenged the rule under sections 120.56(1) and (3) and 120.52(8) of the Florida Statutes, claiming it was an invalid exercise of legislative authority. The rule, purportedly authorized by section 395.405, was defended by Blake Medical Center and Regional Medical Center Bayonet Point, which had pending trauma center applications. After a hearing, the judge deemed the rule invalid for exceeding the legislative authority but did not find it arbitrary or capricious, a determination with which the court disagrees. The court affirms the invalidity based on the rule exceeding the Department's authority, noting that factual findings are reviewed under the competent substantial evidence standard, while legal interpretations are reviewed de novo. The definition of “invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority” includes criteria such as failure to follow rulemaking procedures, exceeding authority, vagueness, and being arbitrary or capricious. A rule is arbitrary if unsupported by logic, and capricious if adopted without reason.
A grant of rulemaking authority is essential but insufficient for an agency to adopt a rule; it must also have a specific law to implement. Agencies are restricted to adopting rules that implement or interpret the specific powers and duties outlined in the enabling statute. They cannot adopt rules solely based on general legislative intent or relatedness to the enabling legislation's purpose. The authority to create administrative rules must derive from explicit powers or duties within the enabling statute; otherwise, such rules are invalid.
In the Final Order, the judge determined that rule 64J-2.010 could not be justified by the cited statutes (sections 395.401, 395.4015, and 395.402) because these statutes do not provide valid rule-making authority, particularly since the rule has not been updated since 1992, despite significant statutory amendments in 2004. The rule fails to comply with the updated requirements of section 395.4015 regarding the establishment of trauma regions that align with regional domestic security task forces and does not reflect the 2004 amendments to section 395.402, which mandated a completion of an assessment of Florida’s trauma system by February 1, 2005. Although the Department recommended reducing the nineteen trauma service areas to seven regions based on the 2005 assessment, the rule remains unchanged. Additionally, the rule's assertion of implementing section 395.405 is merely a general authority to enforce necessary rules and does not constitute valid rule-making authority. Consequently, the judge correctly ruled that rule 64J-2.010 contravenes the Department’s rulemaking authority and is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative power. The remaining arguments on appeal were rejected, and apart from the finding of the rule being arbitrary and capricious, the final order was affirmed. Judges Padovano and Clark concurred, while Judge Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part.
