Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; February 20, 2014; Florida; State Appellate Court
P.I.E. LLC's appeal against the dismissal of its amended complaint with prejudice has been partially affirmed and partially reversed. The appellate court upheld the dismissal of count II but reversed the dismissal of count I, which pertained to a claim under the Bert J. Harris, Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act. The trial court had dismissed count I on the grounds that the claim was untimely, applying a one-year time limit from when a governmental entity first applied a law or regulation to the property.
P.I.E. purchased about fifty acres in DeSoto County for $1,250,000 in September 2005 and intended to use it for excavation and development. After submitting an excavation permit application in October 2006, the county commission denied the permit on February 27, 2007, citing various concerns. The formal written resolution was not issued until March 28, 2007. P.I.E. argues that the one-year deadline for filing its claim should start from the written resolution date, while DeSoto County contends it begins from the date of the oral vote.
The court noted existing ambiguity in the statute regarding when a law is "first applied," referencing prior case law, including Wendler v. City of St. Augustine, which indicated that the one-year period starts when a permit is denied, typically when a written decision is issued. The court emphasized its de novo review of the dismissal order, indicating that the case should proceed for further consideration.
P.I.E. claims that the effective date of County Resolution 2007-12, which applies to its property, is March 28, 2007. While this argument appears reasonable, a factual dispute exists regarding when the county code specifies that a denial of a written permit application takes effect, and potentially, when the ordinance was executed. The court accepts P.I.E.'s assertion that the regulation first applied on March 28, 2007, which allows its legal action to be considered timely. Consequently, the court reverses the dismissal of this count, though it allows DeSoto County the opportunity to develop a factual record and seek summary judgment based on the immediate effectiveness of its ordinances or timeliness of the claim within one year.
Count II of P.I.E.'s complaint, which alleges a taking under the precedent set in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, is affirmed as not stating a valid cause of action. Additional timeliness arguments from DeSoto County are dismissed without discussion, and the court opts not to rule on alternate dismissal grounds presented by DeSoto County that were not raised in the trial court. The decision is reversed and remanded, with concurrence from LaROSE and MORRIS, JJ. The court notes that a previous opinion may suggest a one-year statute of limitations, clarifying that the relevant terminology should distinguish between "action" and "claim."
