Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; January 7, 2014; Florida; State Appellate Court
Winston Calder appeals his first-degree murder conviction, claiming the trial court wrongly denied his motion to suppress statements made during a videotaped police interrogation after he requested counsel. The court finds that the police did not adequately respect Calder's request for legal representation, and that his later willingness to continue the interrogation was influenced by inappropriate police conduct. As a result, the court reverses the denial of the suppression motion and orders a new trial.
On January 20, 2008, Calder shot and killed his girlfriend, Georgia Lee, during a dispute. He was arrested the following day. After a brief background inquiry, Detective Sessions read Calder his Miranda rights. During the exchange, Calder clearly expressed his desire for a lawyer. Despite this, the detective continued to press Calder, suggesting he could speak without an attorney. When Calder reiterated his preference for legal representation, the detective stated he could no longer talk to him and encouraged him to knock on the door if he changed his mind. This interaction demonstrated a failure to respect Calder's right to counsel, which contributed to the court's decision to remand the case for a new trial.
Calder, during a solitary period in an interrogation room, expressed distress and subsequently requested to speak with a detective. After receiving Miranda warnings, he signed a waiver and confessed to accidentally shooting Lee. The trial court held a hearing on Calder's motion to suppress his statements and determined that he had unequivocally invoked his right to counsel by expressing a desire for a lawyer. The court found that the detective ceased interrogation upon this invocation and that Calder later initiated further conversation. After evaluating the circumstances, the trial court concluded that Calder's waiver of his right to counsel was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, leading to the denial of his suppression motion. Calder contended that his confession violated Miranda rights, arguing that his waiver was not voluntary due to the detective's failure to respect his right to counsel and his persistent encouragement to speak. The appellate court reviews trial court findings with a presumption of correctness, deferring to factual determinations supported by evidence, while applying de novo review to legal applications related to constitutional issues. Both the Fifth Amendment and Florida law guarantee the right to counsel during custodial interrogation, mandating that all questioning cease once a suspect invokes this right.
The suspect cannot be interrogated by authorities until legal counsel is provided, unless he independently initiates further communication. The definition of 'interrogation' includes not only direct questioning but also any police actions likely to elicit incriminating responses. If an accused invokes the right to counsel, any subsequent responses to police questioning can only be admitted if the accused reinitiates discussions and waives this right knowingly and intelligently. The court found that Calder's statement expressing comfort in seeking a lawyer was a clear invocation of his right to counsel, contrary to the state's claim that it was equivocal. Despite Calder’s unequivocal request, the detective continued to question him, attempting to persuade him to speak without legal representation, which constituted interrogation and violated Miranda rights. The detective's comments, suggesting Calder share his side of the story and implying personal benefit from doing so, were seen as likely to elicit incriminating responses. The state’s argument that the detective's remarks were merely clarifications was rejected, as they were found to undermine Calder's right to counsel by failing to respect his invocation.
The state acknowledges a conflict with the precedent set in Black regarding the requirement for police to cease questioning when a defendant unambiguously requests counsel during interrogation, as noted in Serrano. When an officer continues to question a suspect after they have invoked their rights, it constitutes a violation of Miranda rights. In this case, Calder initiated contact with the detective after invoking his right to counsel, raising the issue of whether his subsequent confession was voluntary. Calder argues that the detective's persistent questioning undermined his rights, leading to an involuntary confession despite his reinitiation of communication. The legal principles involved include the necessity for law enforcement to scrupulously honor a suspect's request for counsel and the conditions under which a suspect can voluntarily waive their rights after reinitiating dialogue. A two-step analysis, as established in State v. Hunt, is required to determine if the interrogation continued post-invocation of rights and to assess the nature of the suspect's reinitiation of conversation. If the police failed to honor the right to remain silent, any resulting statements are inadmissible. If the interrogation ceased, the focus shifts to whether the suspect's resumption of dialogue was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The Hunt decision does not specifically address scenarios where a suspect reinitiates conversation after improper police questioning.
The Ninth Circuit's ruling in *Collazo v. Estelle* establishes that a confession can be deemed involuntary if police coercion influences a defendant's decision to waive their right to counsel. In *Collazo*, the defendant's request for a lawyer was met with a warning that it could worsen his situation, leading him to later engage with police after three hours. The court concluded that this interaction was not a voluntary initiation but a result of coercion. Judge Kozinski, in a concurring opinion, suggested that police tactics that pressure a suspect after invoking their right to counsel invalidate any exceptions to the *Edwards* rule, which aims to protect such rights. The current case mirrors *Collazo*, as the defendant’s actions were similarly coerced and not a genuine reinitiation of conversation. In contrast, *Craig v. State* indicates that a voluntary reinitiation can remedy earlier violations, while *Stein v. State* presents a different scenario where the defendant's subsequent actions, despite inappropriate comments from police, were found to be voluntary based on his own admissions. Ultimately, the analysis highlights the critical distinction between voluntary and coerced confessions in the context of police interrogation practices.
In Stein, the officer's comment did not prompt Stein to reinitiate communication. In contrast, in Calder's case, the officer's improper comments following Calder's invocation of his right to counsel were intended to persuade him to resume communication without legal representation. This tactic succeeded, as it emotionally affected Calder and led him to request a conversation with the detective shortly after the initial interrogation ended. While appellate courts must respect the factual findings regarding the interrogation, they can independently review the trial court's legal conclusions about voluntariness. The overall circumstances indicate that Calder's decision to reinitiate the interrogation and waive his right to counsel was not voluntary but rather a result of inappropriate police behavior. Consequently, the trial court erred in denying Calder's motion to suppress his confession, which is deemed a non-harmless error, leading to a reversal for a new trial. The judges concurred, and Calder's argument regarding the detective's reference to the Miranda rights form as a "permission slip" was not addressed.
