McLaughlin v. Lara

Citations: 133 So. 3d 1004; 2013 WL 6925433Docket: Nos. 2D13-1684, 2D13-4631

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; December 26, 2013; Florida; State Appellate Court

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Diana McLaughlin, a medical doctor and licensed attorney, initiated two legal proceedings after being sued in 2010 for allegedly failing to timely diagnose a condition in a minor's eye, leading to significant vision loss. Despite having medical malpractice insurance from MAG Mutual Insurance Company, McLaughlin became dissatisfied with her defense and sought to represent herself and her professional association. The trial court deemed her participation disruptive, issuing an order that limited her involvement. In response, McLaughlin filed a petition for a writ of common law certiorari, claiming her right to self-representation was infringed upon, which was initially dismissed but later reconsidered.

While the case was under review, MAG Mutual informed the court that the underlying trial had settled, prompting MAG Mutual to intervene in the certiorari proceeding. Dr. McLaughlin opposed the settlement, arguing that it could not proceed without her consent. The trial court ultimately allowed MAG Mutual to intervene, denied McLaughlin’s objections, and approved the settlement. Following the settlement, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their lawsuit against her. McLaughlin subsequently appealed the trial court's orders regarding the settlement objection and approval.

The court found that McLaughlin was not aggrieved by these orders and lacked the right to appeal, as the order denying her objection was neither a final nor an appealable interlocutory order under Florida appellate rules. Thus, the court concluded that her arguments regarding the lack of consent to the settlement did not render her aggrieved for the purposes of appeal.

In Baron v. Provencial, 908 So.2d 526 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), it is established that orders compelling a party to sign a release or make a payment against their will may be appealable. Conversely, in Geico Cas. Co. v. Lopez, 988 So.2d 162 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), it is noted that an order enforcing a settlement usually results in an appealable final judgment. However, in the case concerning Dr. McLaughlin, the order enforcing the settlement did not require any action or payment from her, nor did it necessitate her signing a release or stipulating to a dismissal; the case was voluntarily dismissed without a final judgment.

Regarding the order approving the minor's settlement, it is explicitly appealable, as per Fla. RApp. P. 9.170(b)(10). The purpose of such an order is to protect the interests of the minor and ensure the legality of any releases provided on their behalf, rather than to safeguard any rights of the defendant, Dr. McLaughlin. Since Dr. McLaughlin was not legally aggrieved by the court's approval of the settlement funded by MAG Mutual, and the plaintiffs had the right to dismiss their claims against her without her consent (Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a)), she could not demonstrate any grievance related to appealable orders.

The court indicated that if Dr. McLaughlin believes MAG Mutual breached its obligations, her recourse lies in pursuing a separate claim against MAG Mutual, rather than obstructing the settlement process with her patient’s family. The trial court had no basis to resolve any disputes between Dr. McLaughlin and MAG Mutual, and the settlement did not impede her potential claims against MAG Mutual. Consequently, case number 2D13-4681 is dismissed as an appeal from nonappealable orders, and case number 2D13-1684 is dismissed as a moot certiorari proceeding due to the voluntary dismissal in the trial court. Judges Khouzam and Sleet concurred with the decision.