Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; March 8, 1988; Federal Appellate Court
Juan Medrano, an immigration inspector, was convicted of conspiracy and multiple counts of selling government property related to the illegal sale of Border Crossing Cards. These cards allow non-resident aliens to enter the U.S. for up to three days without charge. Medrano's appeal challenges the sufficiency of evidence for his convictions, claims of prosecutorial misconduct undermining his right to due process, and asserts that a mistrial declaration subjected him to double jeopardy. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions, except for one count (Count 15), which was reversed due to insufficient evidence of selling government property valued over $100. The facts establish that Medrano's role involved processing applications for Border Crossing Cards, which required personal presentation, documentation verification, and approval procedures.
Medrano was convicted for orchestrating a scheme involving two taxi drivers in Juarez, Mexico, where he provided individuals seeking Border Crossing Cards with pre-dated stamped application forms. Applicants would bypass standard procedures, going directly to Medrano, who approved their applications after conducting a computer check, leading to the issuance of temporary and subsequently permanent Border Crossing Cards. Medrano received $50 per application from the cab drivers, while customers paid over $100 for the entire process, except in one instance. He faced an indictment for conspiracy to accept a bribe, thirteen counts of accepting bribes, and thirteen counts of selling government property. After a mistrial, he was convicted on one conspiracy count and thirteen counts of selling government property, receiving a two-year concurrent sentence.
On appeal, Medrano argued the evidence was insufficient for his conspiracy and government property charges. The elements of conspiracy require proof of an agreement between parties to commit an offense and an overt act in furtherance of that agreement. Medrano contended that the evidence provided by a cab driver’s testimony did not establish an agreement. However, the court noted that evidence such as a witness's attempt to pay Medrano directly, along with his acceptance of lists and payments from the cab drivers and violations of departmental rules, demonstrated a coordinated effort. The court concluded that this evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed between Medrano and the cab drivers, thereby upholding his conviction.
Under Section 641, the government must establish four elements to prove the offense of sale of government property: (1) the property belonged to the U.S.; (2) Medrano sold, conveyed, or disposed of it; (3) he acted willingly and knowingly without authorization; and (4) the property’s value exceeded $100. Medrano disputes two of these elements: the claim that he 'sold, conveyed, or disposed' of Border Crossing Cards and the assertion that their value exceeded $100.
Medrano argues that he lacked authority over the permanent Border Crossing Card and that approving a temporary card application does not equate to selling property. However, evidence shows that a temporary card grants similar rights as a permanent card and essentially guarantees the applicant a permanent card within 90 days. Although Border Crossing Cards are issued free, Medrano charged a fee for approving applications of unqualified applicants, effectively selling a package that included a temporary card leading to a permanent card. The court determined that Medrano's actions constituted 'selling, conveying, or disposing' under Section 641, consistent with precedent that actual property loss need not be proven.
Regarding the value of the property, Medrano claims the temporary cards were worth less than $100, as he only received $50. However, the court concluded that he was selling a package deal, and the value should be assessed based on the entire transaction culminating in the issuance of a permanent card. Value under Section 641 is determined by market forces, supported by evidence that the applicants paid over $100 for the package deal, except for one case which requires reversal.
Medrano also raises a double jeopardy claim, asserting that a mistrial declared after twelve hours of deliberation in his first trial bars a second trial under constitutional protections.
Great deference is granted to a court's decision to declare a mistrial, as established in Arizona v. Washington. A retrial is permissible when the court thoughtfully considers alternatives without acting hastily. In Medrano's case, a mistrial was declared after the jury reported being deadlocked three times. The judge polled the jury, which indicated that some jurors believed a verdict could still be reached, but ultimately, the jury confirmed their inability to break the deadlock, justifying the mistrial declaration.
Medrano contended that his due process rights were violated due to improper prosecutorial remarks made during closing arguments, which referenced evidence not presented in court. The trial judge did not formally rule on the objection raised by defense counsel, leaving the issue open to the jury. The criteria for assessing prosecutorial misconduct focus on whether the remarks were improper and if they prejudicially impacted the defendant's rights. However, the prosecutor's comments were deemed a direct response to defense arguments questioning witness credibility. The remarks suggested that defense counsel had the opportunity to use the reports for impeachment, and it was concluded that they did not infringe on any substantial rights of Medrano.
The court affirmed Medrano's conviction on one count of conspiracy and eleven counts of selling government records but reversed one conviction for insufficient evidence. The ruling was made by a District Judge from the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation. The relevant statute cited was 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641, outlining penalties for theft or unauthorized disposal of government property. Furthermore, defense counsel had made statements during closing about the credibility of witnesses, framing them as deceptive. Finally, the government dropped Count 24 of the charges.
