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State v. Saltzman
Citations: 128 So. 3d 1060; 2013 La.App. 3 Cir. 276; 2013 La. App. LEXIS 2136; 2013 WL 6926499Docket: No. 13-276
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; October 23, 2013; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
On December 10, 2009, Robyn B. Little Davis and Carol Noland Saltzman were indicted for the first-degree murder of Davis’ husband, William Brian Davis. The indictment was amended to second-degree murder on May 3, 2011, and both defendants pleaded not guilty on November 7, 2011. Jury selection began the same day and concluded on November 10, 2011, during which the testimony of witness Roxanne Baumgarten was recorded. The following day, the State requested a continuance due to the prosecutor's health, which the trial court granted despite defense objections and denied the request to swear in the jury. On November 15, 2011, the defendants filed a motion to quash the prosecution and dismiss the indictment with prejudice, arguing double jeopardy due to the perpetuated testimony and claiming prejudice from the continuance. The trial court denied the motion based on double jeopardy and prejudice. On March 28, 2012, an appellate court denied a writ application from the defendants, instructing the trial court to proceed with the original jury or select a new one if necessary. The Louisiana Supreme Court also denied a writ application on April 18, 2012. The trial court recalled the original jurors on April 23, 2012, but due to several excusals, a new jury was selected. The trial lasted thirteen days, culminating in an 11-1 jury verdict finding both defendants guilty of second-degree murder. The trial court denied their motions for a new trial and post-verdict judgment of acquittal. On August 24, 2012, both defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Defendant-Davis’ attorney subsequently filed a timely appeal, raising nine assignments of error. On July 1, 2009, the body of William Brian Davis was found near a Honda Accord in Calcasieu Parish, with the vehicle’s trunk and doors open, indicating it had been jacked up. The car was registered to Defendant-Davis, who had reported her husband missing. Identification was confirmed through dental records and tattoos. The coroner, Dr. Terry Welke, determined Davis was shot four times, with the death classified as homicide, occurring after 12:00 p.m. on June 29, 2009. The court conducted an error patent review per La. Code Crim. P. art. 920 and found no errors. The sixth assignment of error challenged the sufficiency of evidence, which, if found lacking, would necessitate reversing the conviction. The court emphasized that the standard for reviewing sufficiency claims is to assess whether any rational factfinder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that all crime elements were established, as set forth by the Jackson standard. Appellate courts are not to evaluate witness credibility or reweigh evidence but must review the evidence favorably for the prosecution. The court noted that it may only intervene in credibility determinations to ensure due process, adhering to the principle that factfinders weigh evidence and assess credibility. In cases involving circumstantial evidence, a jury can find a defendant guilty if they reasonably reject the defendant's hypothesis of innocence, provided no other plausible hypotheses raise reasonable doubt. Defendant-Saltzman contends that the State's case against her is weak, lacking proof of her presence, direct involvement, or indirect procurement of the murder of Mr. Davis. She asserts that evidence merely indicates her cell phone might have been in the vicinity at unspecified times. Saltzman claims there is no evidence linking her to the shooting and critiques the reliability of police statements she made weeks after the incident, citing stress and grief as factors affecting her recollection. Saltzman emphasizes that the State has not excluded all reasonable hypotheses of her innocence, including that she was running errands elsewhere during the murder and that another individual, potentially the victim's mistress's husband, committed the crime. Additionally, she notes her lack of motive, as she was not married to the victim, did not benefit from his life insurance, and was not in financial distress. Detective Brent Young testified about the victim's wife, Defendant-Davis, exhibiting distress upon learning of her husband's death and recalling that he was supposed to go boat shopping on the day he disappeared. It was also mentioned that the victim, an insurance agent, often collected premium payments in cash from policyholders. On July 2, 2009, Detective Les Blanchard interviewed Defendant-Davis to gather information about the victim's activities on the day of his murder. Defendant-Davis stated that the victim left for work early that morning, driving her Trailblazer due to issues with his Honda Accord. The victim returned home around 11:00 a.m., and they went boat shopping in Lake Charles and at Jerry’s Marine in Sulphur, returning home between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m. The victim later took his Honda Accord to Beaumont for more boat shopping but never arrived. Aimee Davis, the victim's sister-in-law, confirmed that the victim had called a boat dealership in Beaumont but did not show up. Defendant-Davis also mentioned she ran errands while the victim was in Beaumont. She revealed that the victim had two life insurance policies totaling $130,000 and disclosed he was having an affair with Fannie Dietz, a coworker, which she confronted. On July 9, detectives searched her residence and Trailblazer, finding a box of the victim's ammunition. In her formal statement on that day, she reiterated her previous account, stating she spoke to the victim once after their boat shopping trip and could not reach him later. After failing to locate him, Defendant-Davis reported him missing to the police. Officer Mark Chatman confirmed he received her report about the missing victim. Additionally, Defendant-Davis noted that before heading out for boat shopping, the victim had gone to Kroger for soup for his sick daughter, Bailey. Catherine Davis, the victim's sister, testified that Defendant-Davis claimed the victim did not return from Kroger. However, in her statement, Defendant-Davis clarified they went shopping after his return from Kroger. Lastly, she mentioned threats from the mistress's husband against the victim. Mr. Guzzardo, district manager for Union National Life, testified that the victim expressed concern about potential retaliation from his mistress' husband, Shane Dietz, regarding job security. Defendant-Davis reported financial distress, including an overdrawn account by nearly $800, unpaid house payments since March, and lack of car insurance, while suspecting the victim gambled more than she knew. Julius Oaties confirmed that both Defendant-Davis and Defendant-Saltzman were former employees, with Defendant-Saltzman terminated in March 2009 and Defendant-Davis one week later. Despite financial issues, the victim was interested in purchasing a $30,000 boat, intending to use an expected settlement for payment. Detective Young became suspicious of Defendant-Davis after analyzing her cell phone records, which indicated she was in the vicinity of the murder around the time it occurred, contradicting her claims of being elsewhere. In her July 13 statement, she reiterated previous details but added that Defendant-Saltzman had used the victim's Honda Accord the night before the murder due to her own car troubles. On the day of the murder, Defendant-Davis claimed she and the victim separated between 2:30 and 3:00 PM, with a phone call to him at 3:00 PM while en route to Defendant-Saltzman’s house. Despite being confronted with cell phone evidence suggesting her presence near the murder scene, Defendant-Davis denied being there, offering no explanation for the phone use. Defendant-Saltzman’s statement corroborated that she was at the Davis home the night before and had taken the Honda Accord the next morning, refueling it before returning it to the Davis residence. Detective Blanchard noted surveillance footage showed Defendant-Saltzman at Shop Rite shortly after 11:00 PM. Defendant-Saltzman drove the Honda Accord to Defendant-Davis's residence, after which Defendant-Davis took her back home. Defendant-Saltzman stated she remained at home until Defendant-Davis returned to pick her up for errands later that afternoon. Due to being unprepared, they left an hour later, first visiting the dry cleaners and then Albertsons. Initially, Defendant-Saltzman claimed Defendant-Davis drove during the errands but later corrected herself, asserting that she drove instead. They returned to the Davis residence around 5:00 or 5:30 p.m. On the following Tuesday, when the victim was reported missing, Defendant-Saltzman drove around looking for him, including at Calcasieu Point, a location near the murder scene. She claimed she hadn't considered the proximity of Calcasieu Point to the crime scene. Detective Blanchard informed her that the victim’s body was found less than a mile from there. During an interview on July 13, 2009, Defendant-Saltzman, who had lived with the Davises for three years, denied any knowledge of the victim's death. When Detective Blanchard suggested she might have had knowledge of the murder, she expressed her ignorance and requested to leave the interview. Stephanie Wells, who lived with the Davises, testified that she had eye surgery the day the victim disappeared. She noted seeing Defendant-Saltzman’s car parked in the grass before her surgery but did not see it upon returning around 10:30 a.m. Defendant-Davis was home when she returned, and shortly after, the victim arrived, asking Wells to watch his daughter while he and Defendant-Davis went boat shopping. Wells never saw the victim again after that. She attempted to contact him between 3:00 and 3:30 p.m., but her call went to voicemail. She then sent a text at 3:42 p.m. about the child's illness. Detective Young confirmed that the victim's cell records showed the call went to voicemail, followed by Wells's text. Wells received a call from Defendant-Davis at 3:50 p.m., during which she assumed both were still together. Wells recalled that Defendant-Davis mentioned picking up Defendant-Saltzman for errands, and both returned around 5:00 or 5:30 p.m. Wells observed that Defendant-Davis was distraught upon being informed of the victim’s death. Lastly, she noted that Defendant-Saltzman’s Jetta was parked on the grass when she left for her surgery that morning. Ms. Wells recalled that she did not see the victim’s Honda when she left but noticed it upon her return, while believing Defendant-Saltzman’s Jetta was no longer there. After entering the house, she could not track vehicle movements. Kelsey Little, the daughter of Defendant-Davis, arrived at the Davis residence around 7:30 a.m. on the day of the victim’s murder, slept until about 2:00 p.m., and later left with her boyfriend, returning home around 9:00 p.m. Kelsey reported that Defendant-Davis informed her the victim had not returned from work and was unreachable. Upon being notified of the victim’s death, Defendant-Davis exhibited distress. Babette Bartholomew, Defendant-Davis’ mother, testified to depositing $4,000.00 into Defendant-Davis’ account near the time of the victim’s disappearance, under the impression that police advised against using the account because of the ongoing investigation. Bartholomew was unaware of the victim’s death when she made the deposit but later mentioned to police that she thought the account might be frozen. At trial, she stated the deposit occurred before the victim's death, while Detective Young noted a discrepancy, as the deposit was made on July 1, 2009, the same day the victim's body was discovered. Fannie Dietz admitted to having an affair with the victim for about a year and a half, ending in March 2009 after confrontation by Defendant-Davis. Both Fannie and her husband Shane corroborated that Shane confronted the victim but denied threats. Detective Young noted that Fannie’s cell phone records placed her in the Iota and Crowley area on June 29, while Shane’s records indicated he was not in Lake Charles that day, though both had gaps in their call logs. Detective Blanchard testified that Detective Young confirmed Shane's alibi through his boss, who stated Shane was at work during the victim's disappearance. Deputy Matt Vezinot observed that the victim's vehicle had tire issues, with lug nuts removed from one tire and the spare tire on the ground. To prevent further damage, Vezinot replaced the damaged tire with the spare, which was then examined by Southern Tire Mart's manager, Billy Carnahan, who found no defects. Carnahan noted that new tires could leak if improperly sealed but also acknowledged that tires can go flat without visible damage. Lynn Miller from the Southwest Louisiana Crime Lab examined fingerprints from the crime scene, identifying only Defendant-Davis’ fingerprint on the sun visor mirror. DNA analyst LeAnne Suchanek could not obtain a blood sample from the decomposed victim but found DNA on the victim’s belt, fingernails, a bottle cap, and driver’s license, concluding they belonged to an unidentified male, likely the victim. She noted that no female DNA was found on the recovered items. Testimony regarding the victim's firearm revealed he carried a Springfield XD 9-millimeter handgun, as confirmed by various witnesses, including Jody Baiamonte and the victim’s son, Justin Little. Expert Douglas Lancon analyzed two projectiles from the victim's body, determining they were fired from the same gun and were consistent with Federal’s hydroschock design, though multiple manufacturers could have produced the weapon. Crime scene reconstruction expert George Schiro stated that the victim’s Honda Accord was not muddy, indicating it arrived before rain fell on the murder day. Meteorology reports from Lake Charles Airport noted that rain began at 3:45 p.m. on the day of the murder and continued until 7:00 p.m. Evidence found near the victim’s vehicle included a live round, which Mr. Schiro suggested might indicate the shooter’s unfamiliarity with the firearm, potentially leading to mishandling of the weapon. He hypothesized that the victim was shot in the back while bending over and may have been shot again after turning around, with the final shot to the head. Mr. Schiro analyzed the type of ammunition found at the scene, specifically Hydra-Shoks, and concluded it was probable the victim was shot with his own gun, as this type of ammunition is typically associated with law enforcement or shooting enthusiasts. He noted the presence of Hydra-Shok rounds in the victim’s possession and acknowledged that a definitive determination would require examination of the victim’s firearm. On re-direct, Mr. Schiro emphasized that Hydra-Shok ammunition is rarely seen outside specific contexts, further supporting his opinion regarding the gun. He also opined that aspects of the crime scene, particularly the tire incident, appeared staged. He cited the recent purchase and functional condition of the tire as evidence, questioning whether it was deflated intentionally for deceptive purposes. Mr. Schiro mentioned Mr. Davis’ possession of a compressor, which could have been used to inflate a truly flat tire instead of changing it. During cross-examination, Mr. Schiro recognized the potential for crime scene contamination to hinder investigations, referencing prior testimony by Deputy Roxanne Baumgarten about contamination issues in this case. Deputy Baumgarten noted a failure to follow proper evidence handling protocol, as evidenced by conflicting photographs of the Honda Accord's trunk being both open and closed. He raised concerns about Deputy Vezinot placing an allegedly defective tire into the trunk without appropriate protection, which could have led to contamination of the evidence. Mr. Schiro concurred on the improper handling of the tire and acknowledged that the victim's body was found in a secluded area with signs of disrobing, suggesting the victim may have been undressing when killed. Despite this, Mr. Schiro maintained that additional context regarding the victim's activities with his mistress would not alter his opinions. Detective Young investigated the whereabouts of Defendant-Davis on the victim's disappearance date, obtaining a video from Walgreens showing both Defendants entering the store at 8:52 a.m. on June 29, 2009. The video was presented to the jury. Discrepancies in Defendant-Davis’ cell phone records were highlighted, particularly regarding her claims of calling the victim after their breakup. Records indicated her first call to him was at 5:58 p.m., contradicting her statements. Additionally, a call she made at 3:50 p.m. pinged off a tower south of their claimed locations, raising questions about her movements that afternoon. A surveillance video confirmed that both Defendants were at AAA Cleaners at 4:40 p.m. Detective Young also addressed Defendant-Davis’ assertion of having left multiple voicemails for the victim. Detective Young testified about the cell phone activity of Defendant-Davis and Defendant-Saltzman surrounding the time of the victim's murder. Defendant-Davis claimed to have left numerous voicemails for the victim; however, no such messages were found on the victim’s voicemail during the period from June 29, 2009, at 2:58 p.m. until July 4, 2009, at 9:20 a.m. Defendant-Saltzman stated she was at home on June 29 until running errands with Defendant-Davis, but her cell phone records indicated a call to Defendant-Davis at 1:38 p.m. that pinged off a tower in Hackberry, Louisiana. At 2:41 p.m., Defendant-Davis called Defendant-Saltzman, whose phone pinged off a tower near the Lake Charles airport. A subsequent call at 2:49 p.m. pinged off a tower in Sweetlake, Louisiana, and a call received at 3:01 p.m. pinged off both the airport tower and a tower near Defendant-Saltzman’s residence. On June 28, both defendants claimed to be at the Davis home. However, cell records show Defendant-Davis called Defendant-Saltzman at 5:00 p.m. from a tower in Hackberry, which is near the murder scene. Later, calls on the same date indicated activity near a location where the victim and Defendant-Davis were seen boat shopping. An expert, Special Agent William Shute from the FBI, provided testimony on historical cell site analysis, examining call records and the condition of the cell towers at the time of the crime. Agent Shute explained the process of how cell phones connect to towers and presented findings through a PowerPoint demonstration. Agent Shute provided testimony regarding the limitations of cellular signal representation, explaining that the circles drawn in his demonstration do not accurately depict the radio frequency coverage of cell towers, as cell signals are not perfectly circular but rather more irregular in shape, resembling an ameba. The representation indicates the maximum distance a phone was likely from a tower during testing periods, specifically when signals were dropped. The approximation aims to fairly represent all possible locations of the phone, acknowledging that actual signal coverage could extend further or be closer than depicted. On June 28, the day before the murder, Defendant-Davis made calls using various cell towers. At 5:00 p.m., he called Defendant-Saltzman while utilizing tower 3278, near his residence, and during the call, Defendant-Saltzman's phone connected to Centennial Wireless Cell Site 940, located near the murder scene. At 6:26 p.m., Davis called Saltzman again, with Davis' phone using Sprint Tower 3015, where both were seen shopping for a boat. Saltzman’s phone connected to tower 2610, which serves her residence. At 7:31 p.m. on June 28, Davis made another call using tower 3045, which is close to the murder scene. On June 29, shortly after midnight, both defendants called each other while their phones connected to towers 3278 and 2610, respectively, indicating they were at or near their residences. Later that morning, video surveillance at Walgreens confirmed that both defendants were together there, with Davis' phone again utilizing tower 3278, which also covers Walgreens. Agent Shute noted significant cell site information linking Defendant-Davis to Walgreens. At 11:18 a.m., Defendant-Saltzman was recorded at Shop Rite, followed by a call from Defendant-Davis at 11:25 a.m., with Saltzman's phone connecting to tower 2610 near his home. At 1:38 p.m., Saltzman called Davis, using tower 940, which is also the preferential tower for the murder scene. This tower, 300 feet tall, covers an area up to eight miles, indicating a possible presence at the scene. During the 1:38 p.m. call, Davis utilized tower 2273, near a boat shopping location they visited earlier. At 2:41 p.m., Davis called Saltzman using tower 3015, associated with Jerry’s Marine. Saltzman had moved to tower 2470 by the Lake Charles airport. From 2:41 p.m. to 3:08 p.m., Davis made five calls, all from tower 3015, including one to the victim at 2:53 p.m., both using the same tower. They were seen leaving Jerry’s Marine at 2:55 p.m. Davis's next call at 3:50 p.m. began on tower 4045 and ended on tower 3045, which cannot connect to the murder scene but can be accessed half a mile away. Shute determined that Davis could have been as close as half a mile or up to five miles from the crime scene during this call, indicating mobility. Using mapping software, Shute established a direct route from Jerry’s Marine to the towers used during the 3:50 p.m. call, estimating a distance of 21 miles and a 28-minute travel time, suggesting Davis and the victim could have reached the murder scene by 3:36 p.m. Subsequent calls showed Davis moving east, then southeast, returning toward her residence. At 4:39 p.m., she used tower 2280, covering areas including AAA Cleaners and Albertson’s. Finally, at 9:36 p.m. on June 29, 2009, Davis's call connected to tower 3278, which serves her residence. Agent Shute provided testimony regarding the victim’s cell phone activity, indicating it was used at 3:01 p.m. on the 29th at cell tower 3015, near Jerry’s Marine. An outbound call from the victim's phone occurred at 3:44 p.m., using cell tower 3045, which was the same tower utilized by Defendant-Davis for a call at 3:50 p.m. Shute noted that Defendant-Davis’s phone had also connected to tower 3045 at 7:31 p.m. the previous day. During cross-examination, Shute clarified that while the geographic layout could influence tower range, weather had minimal impact, and the volume of calls on a network does not affect range. Defense counsel highlighted that both the victim and Defendant-Davis were active on their phones near Jerry's Marine shortly before the murder. Shute indicated that Defendant-Davis was likely mobile or within overlapping tower coverage based on her phone's activity on June 27th. He testified it would take approximately twenty-eight minutes to drive from Jerry's Marine to the crime scene at the speed limit, with a shorter time possible if speeding. The defense introduced evidence showing that the Black Bayou Bridge was closed to road traffic from 3:31 p.m. to 3:47 p.m., confirmed by bridge operator Allyson Bailey. Shute acknowledged this closure was not considered in his analysis, and during re-direct, he was asked about a call from Robyn Davis’s phone at 3:08 p.m., which also used tower 3015. Shute confirmed that this tower covers a wide area, suggesting the call could have originated from the edge of the tower's coverage. A conversation reveals a timeline and analysis of travel times relevant to a murder investigation. Key points include: - A journey from Jerry’s Marine to the outer edge of a specified sector on Interstate 10 takes approximately six minutes. - From a certain location near Interstate 10 to the murder scene, the estimated travel time is twenty-two minutes at the speed limit. If a call at 3:08 p.m. initiated travel, arrival at the scene could occur by 3:30 p.m., potentially before a pontoon bridge opens, depending on speed. - A two-second call from the victim’s phone at 3:44 p.m. is discussed, with possibilities of it being a misdial or due to loss of signal if the phone was submerged in water. It is noted that the victim’s cell phone was not found at the crime scene. - Agent Shute estimates a twenty-three-minute drive from the murder scene to AAA Cleaners, where the defendants were seen at 4:22 p.m., indicating they could have arrived there after traveling from the crime scene around 3:50 p.m. - The defense presented its expert, John Minor, who criticized Agent Shute's report for bias and explained differences between live tracking and historical cell site analysis, highlighting the varying coverage capabilities of cellular networks. Minor emphasized that live tracking provides greater accuracy compared to historical analysis. The accuracy of cell site technology is influenced by the radiation footprint, which varies based on location and density of cell sites. In suburban and urban areas, cell sites are closer together, resulting in a smaller operational range—typically between 1 to 15 miles depending on the environment. Mr. Minor contends that the carrier network, rather than the cell phone, determines the tower to which the phone connects. He explains that cell phones continuously monitor nearby signals every 6 to 12 seconds to connect to the best available signal permitted by the network. However, various factors can affect this registration, including network congestion, maintenance issues, geographical features, and interference, which Agent Shute did not fully consider in his analysis. Mr. Minor emphasizes the importance of maintenance records, which were not reviewed, and asserts that weather conditions, such as heavy rain and lightning, impact network performance and signal propagation. He also notes that network adjustments occur when cell sites malfunction, potentially altering the phone's geolocation. Additionally, reduced population density during events like hurricanes can decrease network load, further affecting connectivity. Mr. Minor asserts that the Hackberry tower's effective range is ten to twelve miles, exceeding Agent Shute's estimate of eight miles. He explains that calls can connect from the outer edge of this range, and fluctuations in call traffic, such as those caused by shift changes at nearby refineries, may result in unusual tower usage. Consequently, a phone pinging the Hackberry tower does not necessarily indicate the user's location in Hackberry. Mr. Minor mentions that the airport tower is slightly over twelve miles from Hackberry and that its frequencies can overlap, allowing calls from areas south of Country Club Road in South Lake Charles to connect to the Hackberry tower, potentially including Defendant-Saltzman, who may have pinged the tower while located north of Agent Shute’s estimate. Mr. Minor emphasizes that based on the available facts, Defendant-Davis was likely in her neighborhood when she made a call at 3:50 p.m. He criticizes Agent Shute's analysis, stating it was complicated by a sixteen-minute road closure due to bridge work. Mr. Minor acknowledges that his analysis is imprecise, admitting he did not conduct any testing or know if a shift change occurred at the plants or if any network issues were present during the incident. He describes his twelve-mile coverage estimate as merely an approximation and lacks knowledge about the populations in Hackberry, Lake Charles, or Sulphur. Background information reveals that Justin Little, Defendant-Davis’ son, was aware of the victim's affair with Fannie Dietz, as he worked with the victim and noted an increase in the victim's video poker activities in the months leading up to his death. Justin recognized Defendant-Davis as a frequent video poker player shortly before July 11, 2009, and shared details about her previous marriage to Andrew Little, who died in 2008, highlighting that they had been separated since 2000 but remained legally married for insurance purposes. Justin was aware that Defendant-Davis had life insurance on Andrew but was unaware of the policies' values or the disbursement of funds. A recorded jail conversation between Justin and Defendant-Davis was played for the jury, in which she mentioned that other inmates had higher bonds than hers without having committed murder. Justin clarified that this was a joking exchange and not an admission of guilt regarding murder. He directly asked Defendant-Davis if she was involved in Andrew's murder, to which she responded no. Kelsey, Defendant-Davis' daughter, indicated to police that she was the beneficiary of her father Andrew Little's life insurance and received all the money. She initially believed there was only a $25,000 policy but later discovered a $100,000 policy when cleaning her father's house. Kelsey described her mother’s financial behavior as suspicious, citing the purchase of a Trailblazer, a boat for Andrew, and various home renovations, all made with cash. She characterized Defendant-Davis as unfair to others and expressed uncertainty about the total life insurance payout. Detective Young reviewed the financial records of the Davis family, revealing overdraft charges and frequent gambling-related withdrawals, including a notable transaction at a casino shortly after Andrew's body was found. Initially, Detective Blanchard identified two life insurance policies totaling $130,000. However, further investigation uncovered two additional policies worth $100,000 and $250,000, with the Farm Bureau policy established in September 2004. Defendant-Davis was identified as a fiancé with a wedding planned for December 18, and held a $250,000 State Farm insurance policy established on April 8, 2005, with ownership transferred to him on August 10, 2006. Additionally, a $100,000 State Farm policy was opened on September 30, 2004, listing him as a beneficiary. A Prudential policy, opened on October 29, 2004, had an initial amount of $50,000 with an extra $150,000 for accidental death; Defendant-Davis became a beneficiary after the removal of the spouse, Maria. Detective Young confirmed the existence of four insurance policies totaling $645,000. During the defense's case, John Bloxom testified that he reported seeing a red truck near Wagon Wheel Road the day before a body was discovered on July 1, 2009. He noted the truck's doors were open and mentioned infrequent vehicle sightings in that area. Detective Young did not follow up on Bloxom’s report, citing victim phone records suggesting the victim had died by Monday. Mark Fontenot, a friend of both the victim and Defendant-Davis, recounted a conversation with the victim on the morning of June 29, where they discussed looking at boats. Fontenot received a call from Defendant-Davis that evening, inquiring about the victim, and later attempted to contact the victim when he learned of his disappearance. In closing arguments, the prosecution contended that Defendant-Saltzman misrepresented her whereabouts on June 29, alleging she was driving the victim's Honda Accord and coordinating with Defendant-Davis to determine their schedules. The State argued that instead of returning home, the Defendants directly drove to Wagon Wheel Road, where the victim was ultimately murdered. The jury was faced with conflicting narratives regarding the victims' movements leading up to the murder. The State contended that taking a direct route to Wagon Wheel Road was logical due to the closure of the pontoon bridge and the requirement for the Honda Accord to be parked there prior to heavy rains, which occurred between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m. The absence of mud under the car indicated it was parked before the rain began. The State argued it would have been quicker for Defendants Davis and the victim to travel directly from Jerry’s Marine to Wagon Wheel Road rather than making a detour to switch cars at their residence. Cell phone records allegedly placed the Defendants near the murder scene both the day before and the day of the crime, contradicting their claims about their whereabouts. Additionally, the projectiles found at the crime scene were matched to ammunition found at the Davis home, a type often associated with law enforcement and gun enthusiasts. The State suggested the flat tire at the scene appeared staged. Inconsistencies in the Defendants' accounts regarding the return of the victim's Honda Accord and their failure to mention being together at Walgreens on the morning of the murder raised suspicion. Defendant Davis misled police about the victim’s whereabouts, claiming he did not return from a trip to Kroger, while also providing conflicting statements to the victim’s sister and her daughter. The State asserted a motive for Defendant Davis stemming from her knowledge of the victim's affair with Fannie Dietz, alongside her financial difficulties, including job loss and gambling debts. The State noted discrepancies in her statements regarding the victim's life insurance. Furthermore, the close relationship between the Defendants, their gambling habits, and Defendant Saltzman's financial dependency on Davis were highlighted. Evidence of Defendant Davis’s behavior, such as gambling shortly after her husband's death and requesting a significant deposit into her account related to the investigation before the victim was found, suggested further guilt. Lastly, the State claimed both Defendants acted as alibis for each other. Defendant-Davis contends that there was sufficient time for him and the victim to travel from Sulphur to the murder scene, with timelines suggesting they could arrive before the murder occurred. However, Defendant-Saltzman challenges the State's narrative, highlighting that the victim's cell phone was detected north of the pontoon bridge at 3:44 p.m., when the bridge was closed to traffic, making it implausible for the phone to have moved from the murder scene to that location within the given timeframe. Saltzman argues that if the cell phone evidence is credible enough for a murder conviction, it should similarly discredit the State's timeline. Agent Shute, the State's cell phone expert, confirmed that the cell tower servicing the victim's phone was north of the murder scene, but he indicated that a signal was detected just south of the pontoon bridge, suggesting the phone could have been near the murder scene. The murder site lies south of the bridge, and it was necessary for the victim and Defendant-Davis to cross the bridge to reach it. The Defendants further scrutinize the State's case by noting the ambiguity surrounding the victim’s time of death, which Dr. Terry Welke estimated as post-12:00 p.m. on June 29, 2009. They also argue that the rainfall data used to establish timelines was based on a different location, potentially skewing the timeline. Additionally, Saltzman raises suspicions about Shane Dietz, the victim's mistress's husband, claiming he had both motive and opportunity to commit the murder. Although Detective Young stated that Dietz’s cell phone records exonerated him, Saltzman highlights gaps in those records and mentions that a truck similar to Dietz's was seen near the murder scene the following day. Defendants argued during closing statements that Defendant-Davis's attire when leaving Jerry's Marine—white capri pants and flip flops—was inappropriate for committing a murder in a muddy cow pasture. They proposed several alternative scenarios for the victim Brian Davis's death, including the possibility of a monetary transaction gone wrong, a drug deal, or a jealous partner's attack. Both Defendants were convicted of second-degree murder, which necessitates proof of intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, or engagement in a related offense. Evidence included the victim's death from four gunshot wounds, indicating the Defendants' intent to kill. The primary legal question was whether the Defendants were the murderers, with the state required to eliminate any reasonable doubt of misidentification. The court distinguishes between direct and circumstantial evidence, noting that circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. In this case, direct evidence linked Defendant-Davis to the victim shortly before the murder, indicated her financial motive through substantial life insurance proceeds, and revealed her knowledge of the victim’s infidelity. Both Defendants provided inconsistent alibis supported by surveillance footage, which showed them at Walgreens on the morning of the murder, contradicting their statements about their activities leading up to the crime. The jury assessed this evidence and the contradictions in the Defendants' testimonies. The jury received direct testimony from the victim's sister and Kelsey Little, both stating that Defendant-Davis claimed the victim had not returned home after leaving for Kroger and work, respectively. Evidence indicated that the Honda Accord used in the case had no tire defects and was free of mud, suggesting it arrived at the murder scene before a rainstorm. The timeline of the murder was established, including the departure times from Jerry's Marine. Furthermore, Hydra-Shock ammunition was discovered at both the murder scene and the victim's residence. Cell phone records placed both Defendants near the murder scene on the days surrounding the murder, contradicting their claimed locations. The close friendship between the Defendants was noted, alongside financial reliance of Defendant-Saltzman on Defendant-Davis. Testimony revealed that Defendant-Davis' mother deposited money into his account, claiming it was due to the police freezing his account amid the investigation. The jury heard the Defendants’ accounts of their whereabouts and expert testimony suggesting they could feasibly remain in their claimed locations while making calls. Additionally, the victim’s affair with Fannie Dietz was mentioned, including cell phone records linking her and her husband to the area. Unidentified male DNA was found at the scene, but no female DNA was present. Ultimately, the jury dismissed the Defendants' claims of innocence and found the evidence sufficient to support their conviction, aligning with precedents where reasonable rejection of innocence hypotheses leads to a presumption of guilt. This case parallels another where the evidence was deemed sufficient for a murder conviction based on circumstantial details. Circumstantial evidence indicated that bullets found in Jones’ trunk matched those used to kill victim Lioy, and cell phone records placed Jones and the victim in proximity when the body was discovered. The court concluded that the combination of direct evidence—showing Lioy left Shreveport with Jones and Ms. Foster—and circumstantial evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones killed Lioy with intent to kill or cause great bodily harm. The possibility of another individual intervening was deemed insufficient to undermine the jury's finding of guilt. Similarly, the evidence against Defendants Davis and Saltzman supported a finding of their involvement in the victim's murder with specific intent. Louisiana law defines all participants in a crime as principals. Evidence revealed that Defendant-Davis was with the victim shortly before the murder, and both defendants communicated frequently on the days surrounding the crime. They provided inconsistent alibis, and cell phone records placed them near the murder scene. Defendant-Saltzman was seen with Davis on the day of the murder and was observed driving the victim’s car afterward. Additionally, Davis had financial motives linked to life insurance policies and a personal relationship with the victim. The jury reasonably dismissed the defendants' claims of innocence, leading to their conviction for second-degree murder. In Assignment of Error Number One, Defendant-Saltzman contended that the trial court erred by not swearing in the jury as required by Louisiana law and granting a continuance after the trial began. The court found this assignment to lack merit. The trial commenced on November 7, 2011, with jury selection concluding on November 10, 2011. During jury selection, testimony from State witness Deputy Baumgarten was recorded. After the jury was selected, the State requested a continuance due to prosecutor Rick Bryant's health, which the trial court granted despite defense objections and declined to swear in the jury. The trial court subsequently held hearings on January 6, 18, and 24, 2012, regarding the Defendants' motion to quash and dismiss the charges, asserting that double jeopardy had attached due to the perpetuated testimony and prejudice from the continuance. The trial court denied the motion. The Defendants sought review of this denial on February 24, 2012, but the court ruled on March 28, 2012, that the trial court's action was a recess rather than a continuance, making the Defendants' arguments moot. The court instructed the trial court to proceed with the trial expeditiously with the original jury if feasible; otherwise, a new jury panel should be summoned since jeopardy had not attached. A subsequent writ application by the Defendants was denied by the supreme court on April 18, 2012. The ruling emphasized that pre-trial decisions are afforded great deference, and without new evidence, prior objections may be rejected unless clearly erroneous. No additional evidence was found to support the defendant’s allegations of prosecutorial misconduct related to his pretrial motions. The defendants did not demonstrate that the court’s pretrial ruling was clearly erroneous or unjust, leading the court to uphold its prior decision regarding the trial court's discretion in granting a continuance. A new argument raised on appeal claimed that the trial court's granting of a continuance was mischaracterized as a recess. However, the court determined that the continuance was a postponement of the already commenced trial, lasting five and a half months, rather than a temporary adjournment as defined by Louisiana law. The determination of prejudice from the delay is crucial; regardless of the terminology used for the delay, reversible error exists only if the defendants can show they were prejudiced. The defendants referenced a previous case, State v. Hedgspeth, to argue the continuance should be deemed an “illegal dismissal,” but acknowledged that proving prejudice is necessary for this claim to result in reversible error. Defendant-Saltzman claims prejudice due to the trial court's decision to grant a continuance after jurors were selected and testimony from a key witness had begun. This continuance allowed the State to address noted deficiencies in their investigation, including crime scene integrity issues and the need for expert testimony. Saltzman argues that this delay prejudiced his defense by giving the State additional preparation time, similar to a rejected argument in Hedgspeth v. State, where the court ruled that the right to a trial before a selected jury does not apply if jeopardy has not yet attached. The current court emphasized that the jury had not been sworn, allowing the State to seek a fair prosecution. The trial judge deemed DNA results critical to the case, and the backlog at the crime lab necessitated the continuance. Defense counsel agreed to the new trial date, and the court noted that denying the continuance could have led the State to nolle prosequi the charges, which would delay proceedings further. The case references support the conclusion that the continuance was not an abuse of discretion and that the additional preparation time does not warrant reversal of the ruling. The trial court determined that the state's failure to timely request a continuance did not prevent the reinstatement of charges after the prosecutor entered a nolle prosequi following the denial of a motion for a continuance on the original trial date. The Defendants did not demonstrate prejudice from the trial court granting the continuance, even if it might be deemed an "illegal dismissal." Double jeopardy had not yet attached, as it only occurs in jury trials once the jury is sworn, per Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure articles 592 and 790. Additionally, Deputy Baumgarten testified about potential evidence compromise at the crime scene, and the Defendants benefitted from additional DNA testing conducted after the continuance, which revealed no female DNA on the tested items, favoring the female Defendants. The Defendants sought a reversal of their convictions and a new trial as a remedy for alleged trial delays, but this would merely provide the state another opportunity to retry them. They also argued that the trial court erred by not swearing in the jury after selection. The Defendants insisted on swearing the jury to avoid jeopardy attachment, while the State opposed this to protect against double jeopardy. The trial court ruled against swearing the jury, emphasizing the implications of jeopardy attachment. The Defendants did not cite any authority to support their claim of error, although a similar case, State v. Tuckson, illustrated that the state successfully argued against swearing the jury in to avoid double jeopardy when the jury had not been sworn together. The state refiled charges against the defendant on the same day after an initial case. The defendant's motion to quash, citing double jeopardy, was denied by the trial court. Following a trial, the defendant was convicted and appealed, arguing the court erred in denying the motion based on double jeopardy. The court of appeal determined that double jeopardy did not attach because the jury was not sworn in accordance with La.Code Crim. P. art. 790. The primary issue was whether the trial court mistakenly refused to swear in the jury immediately after selecting alternate jurors. The court found no reversible error, noting that both the defense and the state could challenge jurors for cause before the jury was sworn. The trial court's practice of delaying the swearing of the jury until trial readiness was acknowledged as common to avoid issues from unforeseen circumstances. The appeal also raised concerns about the state dismissing and refiling charges to secure a trial continuance. The court noted that different procedural avenues, such as requesting a trial continuance, were available to the state if witnesses were unavailable but found no abuse of discretion in proceeding with the trial. The court rejected the defendants' claims of prejudice from not being tried by the original jurors, stating they failed to demonstrate that the outcome would have differed. Additionally, the defendants objected to the trial judge's off-the-record discussions with jurors during a recess, claiming it was presumptively prejudicial. However, the jurors addressed were not those who ultimately convicted the defendants, and thus, no prejudice was found. As a result, the court concluded that the assignment of error lacked merit in all respects. Defendants argue that the trial court erred by not recognizing prejudice and denying their Motion to Quash/Dismiss. They previously filed this motion, which was denied, and sought appellate review, resulting in a denial of their writ application but allowing them to re-urge their claim of prejudice. The Defendants reiterated their arguments with increased specificity, citing a precedent that indicates an erroneous continuance or recess causing prejudice may constitute reversible error. They claim that the continuance allowed the State to send additional evidence for testing, which, contrary to their argument, ultimately benefited them since no female DNA was found on those items. The Defendants assert that the continuance enabled the State to improve its credibility with the jury concerning its investigation lapses, which was crucial given the circumstantial nature of the case against them. They contend that the second trial afforded the State an opportunity to rectify prior mistakes, particularly highlighting discrepancies in Deputy Baumgarten's testimonies regarding crime scene management and evidence handling, asserting that these changes demonstrate the prejudicial impact of the continuance. Deputy Baumgarten acknowledged procedural failures that compromised the evidentiary value of the crime scene, indicating poor investigative practices by the police. Deputy Baumgarten expressed concerns regarding the potential transfer of evidence from a "defective" tire placed in the trunk of a Honda Accord, emphasizing the impact of police activities on the crime scene's evidentiary value. Defendant Saltzman contended that Baumgarten appeared to have reviewed her earlier videoed trial testimony to mitigate damaging admissions made during the first trial. The State did not utilize the videoed testimony but presented Baumgarten live during the second trial, where references to the first trial were prohibited. This situation allegedly disadvantaged the Defense by allowing Baumgarten to prepare and alter her testimony, creating unfairness and confusion for the jury when the Defense had to impeach her with transcripts from the previous testimony. Defense counsel argued that they should have been allowed to cross-examine Baumgarten only once in front of the jury. The Defense also claimed that new DNA evidence, revealing unidentified male DNA on various items linked to the victim, was disclosed too late in the trial for adequate testing, complicating their defense strategy. Expert Ms. Suchanek suggested that the most likely DNA donor was the victim, noting that the unidentified male DNA could belong to anyone and that no female DNA was found at the scene. The inconclusiveness of Ms. Suchanek's testimony regarding unidentified male DNA and her definitive statement that no female DNA was present at the crime scene indicates that the Defendants were not prejudiced by subsequent DNA testing. The Defendants assert that the State gained an advantage during the first trial by learning about defense witnesses, allowing the State additional time to prepare. They also claim that deputies contaminated the crime scene and coordinated testimonies to benefit the State’s case. However, these claims of prejudice are insufficient to overturn the Defendants' convictions. The critical evidence against the Defendants included their inconsistent statements to police and cell phone records placing them near the murder scene both before and on the day of the crime. This evidence was available in both trials, and thus, the trial court's decision to grant a continuance/recess did not result in prejudice warranting reversal. In response to Assignment of Error Number Four, the Defendants argue that the trial court erred by not granting their motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. The State contends that judicial efficiency supports the court's prior ruling that double jeopardy did not apply. The appellate court, maintaining deference to its pre-trial ruling, found no evidence that it was erroneous or unjust. Additionally, the Defendants raised concerns regarding the trial court's failure to swear the jury as required and the dismissal of jurors, claiming these actions violated their constitutional rights. However, the court previously ruled on the swearing issue in Assignment of Error Number One, finding no error. The original jury was not sworn due to the release of three jurors for hardship reasons, a decision that neither party objected to. Therefore, this assignment also lacks merit. In Assignment of Error Number Five, the Defendants argue that the trial court erred by not requiring the State to present a theory of the case during its opening statement. Defendants argue that the prosecution's theory of the murder was not disclosed until closing arguments, which they claim prejudiced their defense. They reference La. Code Crim. P. art. 766, stating that the prosecution is required to explain the nature of the charge and the general evidence it intends to present during its opening statement. The prosecution described the victim's condition and circumstances surrounding his death, including details about his missing person report, witness interviews, and investigations, such as reviewing surveillance footage and cell phone records. The prosecution also highlighted significant findings, including the victim's substantial life insurance policy and inconsistencies in Defendant-Davis' cell phone records. Despite these details, Defendant-Davis' counsel argued that the prosecution failed to outline a clear theory of the case, which the trial judge rejected. Defendant-Saltzman also expressed concerns about potential unfair surprise due to inadequate disclosures. The Defendants contend that the prosecution's failure to provide a comprehensive opening statement regarding their theory of the case and the evidence to be used compromised their ability to prepare a defense. Defense counsel faced challenges in cross-examination due to the State's inadequate opening statement, which failed to outline how the murder was committed, including the type of weapon used, the number of shooters, or any activities at the crime scene. The prosecution only stated that Bryan Davis was shot four times without providing a coherent theory or details regarding the murder, allowing for a shift in the State’s strategy during the trial. This lack of clarity resulted in a “trial by ambush” for the Defense, who argued that the State's opening did not address the law of principals or conspiracy, which were crucial to the case and later featured heavily in the closing argument. The Defense cited La. Code Crim. P. art. 766 and referenced Louisiana Supreme Court cases, such as State v. Silsby, which established that an inadequate opening statement can constitute a reversible error. In Silsby, the court ruled that a confession should have been excluded because it was not mentioned in the opening statement, emphasizing the need for the prosecution to clearly present the nature of their evidence. The statutory amendments to La. Code Crim. P. art. 333, which preceded art. 766, underscored the requirement for the prosecution to disclose the nature of its evidence to ensure fairness in the trial process. The prosecuting officer in this case has acted with fairness but has erred by relying on outdated legal theories not applicable to the current statutory framework in the state. The cases Silsby and Ducre are distinguished from the present matter, as they focused on La.Code Crim. P. art. 333, concerning the necessity of opening statements. In Ducre, the state’s failure to provide any opening statement was deemed a reversible error. In contrast, La.Code Crim. P. art. 766, applicable here, allows the prosecution to provide a general overview of its case without detailing every piece of evidence or naming all witnesses. The purpose of article 766 is to prevent surprise and enable defense preparation. The Fifth Circuit has upheld that the sufficiency of an opening statement is at the trial judge's discretion and should not be overturned unless there is a clear abuse of that discretion. In this case, the defendants did not object to the evidence presented, nor did they demonstrate any surprise or prejudice regarding the evidence or the reliance on cell phone records, which they anticipated by introducing their own expert witness. The Defendants argue that the State's inadequate opening statement prejudiced their case by preventing them from introducing crucial photographs at trial. These photographs show co-defendant Carol Saltzman in the driver's seat of an identical Honda Accord, positioned such that she could not reach the gas pedal or brake, relevant only if the State alleged that Saltzman drove the car to the murder scene. However, the State did not assert this claim in its opening statement or during its case in chief, only revealing it during closing arguments. This delay left the Defendants unable to introduce the photographs without appearing to concede to the State's theory, which would undermine their defense. Despite the Defendants' claim that the State's failure to present its theory early hindered their ability to utilize the photographs, evidence presented during the trial indicated that the Defendants were aware of the State's theory regarding Saltzman's involvement with the Honda Accord. Testimony from Agent Shute detailed cell phone activity linking Saltzman to the murder scene, and multiple witnesses discussed her use of the vehicle on the day of the crime. Consequently, the court found that the Defendants were sufficiently notified of the State's theory prior to the prosecution's case. Furthermore, the jury would likely not interpret the introduction of the photographs by the defense as an admission of facts not already suggested by the evidence. The issue of whether the seats in the victim’s vehicle had been adjusted was raised during the State’s case, indicating that the topic had been sufficiently explored. Cell phone evidence placed the Defendants near the murder scene both the day prior and the day of the incident, alongside inconsistencies in their statements. This led to the conclusion that the introduction of certain photographs would not have changed the jury's verdict, and the trial judge did not err in overruling the Defendants’ objection to the State's opening statement, rendering this assignment of error meritless. In Assignment of Error Number Seven, the Defendants contended that the trial court improperly allowed testimony from Agent William Shute, an expert in cell site analysis. However, it was determined that the trial court acted correctly in accepting Agent Shute as an expert witness. Prior to his testimony, a Daubert hearing was conducted. Agent Shute, a special agent with the FBI, has over twelve years of experience in using cellular technology for investigations, primarily focusing on historical cell site analysis, which involves analyzing call detail records to map cell site coverage. Agent Shute holds over 800 hours of training from the FBI and private companies in cellular technology and radio frequency theory, which is essential for understanding cell phone operations and communications. He collaborates with major cellular providers and has developed a specialized course on historical cell site analysis, taught to over 1500 investigators. He clarified that cell phone technologies are based on scientific principles governing radio communications, and emphasized the significance of understanding these technologies for effective analysis in investigations. Agent Shute requires both call detail records and mapping software to conduct a historical cell site analysis. An expert in historical cell site analysis must possess knowledge of cell phone network operations, experience with call detail records, and practical skills in geolocating phones associated with individuals. Agent Shute of the CAST team utilizes cell technology daily for locating victims and fugitives, having successfully used it to find an abducted child using only the kidnapper’s call detail records. He tracked the kidnapper's route on Interstate 1-20 in South Carolina and estimated their speed based on cell site data, which resulted in the child’s recovery by the Georgia Highway Patrol within seven minutes of the predicted crossing time. Agent Shute has provided analysis in over 1,000 cases, over 100 of which involved court testimony, and has been qualified as an expert in about fifteen states. In his recent testimony, he employed an engineering cell phone and an ICS-2 apparatus to assess signal strength and determine the appropriate cell site connections. He visited various cell towers to ensure accurate orientation and tested locations where both the victim and defendants were present. Shute explained that cell phones engage in a process called "stacking and racking," constantly evaluating their environment to connect to the cell site with the best signal, known as the "serving cell site." This site isn’t necessarily the closest tower; it can vary based on location and tower height. Shute asserted the reliability of this technology, stating its effectiveness in solving crimes and recovering individuals. Agent Shute testified that the CAST team regularly reviews each other's work and conducts practical exercises using actual phones to train new members. He stated that call detail records align with team locations and that historical cell site analysis is widely accepted in law enforcement. During cross-examination, he acknowledged the technology combines scientific principles with specialized knowledge and asserted that the procedures are consistently applied by law enforcement. Shute claimed the technology is accurate, with no error rate, since connectivity is binary—either a cell phone connects to the network or it does not. He noted that the cell phone towers relevant to the case have remained unchanged since 2009. Regarding peer review, Shute indicated that the analysis he employs undergoes frequent reviews by cell phone companies and other organizations he trains. He clarified that the tracking conducted in a South Carolina abduction case was historical rather than live-time, explaining that each call creates a historical record. Defense counsel pointed out a previous case, United States v. Attains, where no peer review was conducted at the time of the ruling. Shute commented on signal strength from towers, stating it generally remains stable but can be altered, with minimal weather impact. Defense arguments focused on questioning Shute’s qualifications, asserting that his methodologies are merely investigative techniques lacking scientific basis. They contended that the state failed to demonstrate that Shute's methods had been adequately tested or peer-reviewed, thereby not satisfying Daubert criteria. The trial court ultimately accepted Agent Shute as an expert, despite defense claims that the requirements for expert testimony under Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 702 were not sufficiently met. The Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the Daubert test to evaluate the reliability of expert scientific testimony, as established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. This test applies to testimony based on scientific, technical, and specialized knowledge. The discretion to accept or reject an expert lies with the trial court, and its decisions are upheld unless there is an abuse of discretion. The Daubert factors for assessing expert testimony include testability, peer review, the known or potential rate of error, and general acceptance within the scientific community. In the case at hand, despite the defendants' claims that Agent Shute's methodology was untested, evidence showed it had been effectively utilized in apprehending fugitives and missing children. Agent Shute's methods were peer-reviewed, had no rate of error, and were accepted in law enforcement. The acceptance of his testimony by a Utah district court was deemed persuasive. Additionally, the Fifth Circuit upheld the admissibility of expert testimony in historical cell site analysis, countering claims that it lacked scientific reliability. Agent Creasey, another expert in the field, demonstrated his extensive experience and training, indicating that the methodology is established and accepted in federal courts. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Agent Shute to testify as an expert in historical cell site analysis. Assignment of Error Number Eight presents the Defendants' claim that the trial court incorrectly permitted George Schiro to provide expert testimony suggesting that the victim may have been shot with his own gun. The Defendants contend that Schiro lacked the necessary qualifications, especially since the State's ballistics expert refrained from making such a claim. Defense counsel argued before trial that Schiro's opinion was speculative and unsupported, emphasizing that he was not a ballistics expert and could not reach conclusions beyond what was established in Mr. Lancon's report. Despite initial hesitations, the trial court allowed Schiro to testify, during which he indicated that the evidence suggested a probability the victim was shot with his own gun, referencing specific ammunition types found at the scene. The State clarified that there was no definitive knowledge regarding the origin of the gunshot. On cross-examination, Schiro confirmed that his opinion was influenced by Lancon's report, which did not definitively link the bullets to a specific firearm. Schiro maintained that the evidence supported the possibility that the victim's gun was involved but acknowledged that it could also originate from other sources, emphasizing the speculative nature of his conclusions. Overall, while Schiro's testimony was based on his crime scene investigation experience, there was minimal evidence to substantiate his qualifications in ballistics. Mr. Schiro, a witness with over 100 crime scene visits, was deemed qualified to testify regarding the rarity of Hydra-Shok ammunition in his investigations, noting its prevalence primarily in law enforcement and among shooting enthusiasts. His assertion about the victim being shot with his own gun was found to be ambivalent and inconclusive, particularly after cross-examination, as he indicated that determining the gun's ownership was impossible without the actual weapon. The court determined that Mr. Schiro's testimony did not violate any legal principles regarding expert testimony, as it was not unduly prejudicial, did not encroach upon the jury's role, and did not bolster any witness's credibility. The testimony did not lead to a "battle of the experts," especially since the State's ballistics expert, Douglas Lancon, suggested that multiple manufacturers could have produced the victim's gun without confirming it was indeed the victim's. Regarding Assignment of Error Number Nine, the Defendants contended that the requirement for ten out of twelve jurors to concur for a verdict compromised their right to a unanimous verdict, as they were convicted by an 11-1 vote. The court found that this issue was not raised during the trial, rendering it waived and thus not subject to review. The Louisiana Supreme Court has previously upheld the constitutionality of non-unanimous jury verdicts in non-capital cases. Consequently, this assignment was deemed without merit. The conviction of defendant Carol Noland Saltzman was affirmed, with a dissenting opinion noted from Judge Conery. Additionally, discrepancies in statements regarding the timing of a vehicle's return were highlighted as inconsistent between the defendants.