Jennings v. State

Citations: 127 So. 3d 263; 2013 WL 221461; 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 25Docket: No. 2011-KA-01313-COA

Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi; January 21, 2013; Mississippi; State Appellate Court

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Toney Jennings was convicted of statutory rape and resisting arrest, receiving a fifteen-year sentence for the rape (with five years suspended) and six months for resisting arrest. He appeals the statutory-rape conviction on four grounds: the involuntariness of his confession, entitlement to a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), the verdict being contrary to the weight of the evidence, and the claim that the youth court had exclusive original jurisdiction.

On June 9, 2010, a thirteen-year-old girl, J.S., reported that Jennings, then sixteen, coerced her into his grandmother’s house, attempted to rape her, and was subsequently confronted by law enforcement. Jennings resisted arrest but was apprehended. During interrogation, after being read his Miranda rights, Jennings initially denied inappropriate contact but later admitted to having sexual intercourse with J.S., leading to a written confession.

DNA evidence presented at trial indicated the presence of male semen on a vaginal swab taken from J.S., with markers consistent with Jennings's DNA profile. Jennings challenged the voluntariness of his confession, arguing the trial court erred in not granting his motion to suppress it. The court stated that the state must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the confession's voluntariness, relying on the testimony of law enforcement to establish that it was made without coercion or threats.

Detective Perrigin transported Jennings to the sheriff's department, where he provided Jennings with a printed Miranda waiver, reading it aloud while Jennings followed along. Jennings confirmed his understanding and signed the waiver without appearing under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and he did not request an attorney or express a desire not to give a statement. Lieutenant Perkins, present during the questioning, corroborated that Jennings appeared to understand the waiver and was not coerced. Jennings asked for clarification on what an attorney was but did not ask further questions. He later claimed this inquiry constituted an ambiguous request for legal representation, referencing Edwards v. Arizona, which emphasizes the need for additional safeguards when a suspect asks for counsel. However, Jennings did not formally invoke his right to counsel.

The State needed to demonstrate that Jennings's confession was voluntary, which it did through testimonies from Detective Perrigin and Lieutenant Perkins, both asserting that the confession was made without threats or coercion. The trial court found no clear error in denying Jennings's motion to suppress his confession.

Jennings also contended that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), which assesses the legal sufficiency of evidence supporting a guilty verdict. He was convicted of statutory rape under Mississippi law, which defines the crime when an adult engages in sexual intercourse with a child under fourteen, who is at least twenty-four months younger than the adult and not their spouse. The evidence included Jennings's confession, J.S.’s detailed testimony, and physical evidence such as blood-stained clothing, along with DNA evidence that did not exclude Jennings as the perpetrator, establishing sufficient grounds for the conviction.

J.S., born on November 19, 1996, was thirteen years old on June 9, 2010, while Jennings, born on February 22, 1994, was almost thirty-three months older. J.S. confirmed she was not Jennings's spouse. The evidence presented was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find Jennings guilty of statutory rape beyond a reasonable doubt. Jennings argued for acquittal or a new trial, claiming the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, particularly due to the lack of corroboration of J.S.'s testimony and her impeachment. The court noted it would only disturb a verdict in exceptional cases where the evidence heavily favored acquittal, emphasizing that all evidence should be viewed favorably to the verdict.

Despite J.S. showing confusion during her testimony, attributed to her young age and mental capacity, she clearly recounted events involving Jennings. The State provided corroborating evidence, including bloody underwear and medical testimony indicating J.S. had been bleeding upon arrival at the hospital. DNA evidence also linked Jennings to the crime, and Jennings admitted seeing J.S. bleeding. The court concluded that upholding the guilty verdict would not result in an unconscionable injustice.

Jennings also contended that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for dismissal or transfer to youth court. Youth court jurisdiction is limited to cases involving specific classifications of children, while the circuit court has jurisdiction for crimes punishable by life imprisonment or death. Jennings, charged with statutory rape at age sixteen, faced a charge under section 97-3-65(l)(b), which could result in a life sentence or a minimum of twenty years for adults.

Statutory rape under section 97-3-65(1)(b) can result in a life sentence for adults, placing such cases under the original jurisdiction of the circuit court, as established by section 43-21-151. The Mississippi Supreme Court has determined that charges involving potential life sentences, like statutory rape or murder, fall exclusively within the circuit court's jurisdiction, rendering the Youth Court Act inapplicable (Smith v. State, 534 So.2d 194, 195 (Miss.1988)). The judgment from the Lowndes County Circuit Court is affirmed, which includes a conviction for resisting arrest with a six-month jail sentence and a $500 fine, as well as a fifteen-year sentence for statutory rape (ten years to serve, five years suspended, and five years of post-release supervision) with a $2,400 fine, all under the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Costs of the appeal are charged to Lowndes County, with several justices concurring and one not participating. Victim initials are used to maintain anonymity, referencing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).