Shirley Marrical v. The Detroit News, Inc., Robert Sage

Citations: 805 F.2d 169; 6 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 860; 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 33512Docket: 85-1559

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; November 11, 1986; Federal Appellate Court

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Robert Sage, Deputy Chief Prosecutor for Wayne County, appeals the denial of his motion for summary judgment in a libel case brought by Shirley Marrical, who alleges that Sage made false and defamatory statements about her during the prosecution for her son's alleged kidnapping. Marrical's claims include libel, slander, defamation of character, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, stemming from Sage's reported description of her as "a holy terror" to a journalist. The case was removed to federal court following a petition from The Weekly World News, which claimed its connection to the case was independent of the allegations against the other defendants.

The district court denied Sage's summary judgment motion on January 16, 1985, stating that his alleged comment was unrelated to his prosecutorial role and did not serve the public interest, thus disqualifying him from absolute immunity under Michigan law. Although the court acknowledged that Sage and the other defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, it also denied Sage's subsequent motion for reconsideration, finding no new grounds for altering its prior ruling. The court noted that a related Michigan Supreme Court decision did not affect its conclusions regarding Sage's immunity. Sage subsequently filed a notice of appeal following the denial of his reconsideration motion.

Sage appeals the denial of his motion for summary judgment based on claims of absolute immunity, asserting it is immediately appealable. He cites Michigan case law, specifically *Payton v. Wayne County*, which grants prosecuting attorneys absolute immunity from defamation claims for media statements made during ongoing criminal proceedings. Additionally, he references *Ross v. Consumers Power Co.*, arguing he qualifies for absolute immunity as a high executive official or as a lower-level official acting within his authority and in good faith. Sage also claims he is entitled to qualified immunity and argues that Mrs. Marrical is libel-proof.

Marrical contends Sage's appeal is untimely, having been filed beyond the 30-day limit under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a), and argues that his motion for reconsideration was also untimely and did not toll the appeal period. Despite this, Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4) states that timely motions under Rules 52(b) or 59 toll the appeal period for all parties, which applies in this case since the defendants were joined in a single action. Sage’s notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of the district court's decision on the reconsideration motions, rendering it timely.

Marrical further argues that the denial of immunity claims is not appealable prior to final judgment. As a federal court in diversity jurisdiction, the court adheres to state substantive law to prevent forum shopping and ensure equitable law administration. The court notes that while federal procedural rules govern appeals, the collateral order doctrine allows for interlocutory appeals only if state law extends a substantive right to officials to be free from litigation burdens. The court finds no indication that Michigan law provides such a right, concluding that it does not support interlocutory appeals based on immunity claims. The court refrains from deciding on the existence of qualified or absolute immunity under Michigan law.

Interlocutory orders pose the risk of piecemeal appeals, which can hinder the effective administration of justice and prolong litigation, leading to increased costs and delays for the parties involved. This issue is particularly relevant in cases against government officials, where the potential for abusive delays due to absolute and qualified immunity can obstruct plaintiffs seeking redress for governmental abuses. Both congressional and judicial policies generally discourage piecemeal appeals, with the Supreme Court noting that exceptions to this policy, such as the collateral order doctrine, are limited. The collateral order doctrine allows certain appeals that resolve claims independent of the main action to be considered immediately, particularly when denying review would prevent any future review. The Supreme Court has confirmed that claims of qualified immunity fit within this doctrine as they protect the defendant's right to avoid the burdens of trial. However, the specific scope of immunity for state officials under Michigan law is less clear, as the state legislature chose not to grant immunity to individual officials, instead allowing for their legal representation and settlement of claims. Thus, individual immunity remains primarily defined by judicial interpretation rather than statutory law.

Individual immunity for official actions under Michigan law encompasses immunity from liability, as established by the Michigan Supreme Court in *Ross*, which referred to official immunity explicitly as immunity from liability. Judges, legislators, and top executive officials enjoy absolute immunity from tort liability while acting within their official capacities. In contrast, lower-level officials and employees are granted immunity only when acting within the scope of their authority, in good faith, and performing discretionary acts. The court clarified that while immunity from liability is retained, immunity from suit may be waived, highlighting a distinction between the two concepts.

The Michigan Supreme Court's examination of immunity did not imply an intention to provide immunity from suit alongside immunity from liability. The purpose of individual immunity is to allow decision-makers to act without fear of lawsuits from those adversely affected by their decisions, and the court has chosen not to frame immunity parameters based on whether the actions were governmental functions. Moreover, the court did not indicate that the need to avoid trial burdens was a reason for granting immunity. 

Michigan courts have explicitly chosen not to follow federal standards regarding immunity, as seen in *Ross*, which seeks to protect policy-making officials more comprehensively. Absolute immunity is granted to high-ranking officials, while lower-level officials receive qualified immunity under specific good faith and scope of authority conditions. The assessment of immunity under federal law does not align as straightforwardly as Michigan's approach, which differentiates itself from federal immunity doctrines.

In Tocco v. Piersante, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's summary judgment favoring a state prosecutor based on immunity, emphasizing that while federal law provides a well-developed doctrine of immunity, it has not been specifically adopted in Michigan. The court concluded that federal developments offer limited guidance for Michigan's immunity doctrines, particularly in distinguishing between immunity from suit and immunity from liability. The court expressed reluctance to extend the category of immediately appealable interlocutory orders without a clear justification from Michigan courts regarding the extension of individual immunity protections.

Circuit Judge David A. Nelson dissented, noting that Michigan courts have recognized a distinction between immunity from suit and liability concerning state sovereign immunity, but acknowledged that it is uncertain whether individual judges and prosecutors are entitled to immunity from suit under Michigan law. He referenced historical case law that supports immunity for judicial and prosecutorial actions to prevent the burden of trials on officials performing their duties.

The excerpt also cites Judge Learned Hand's rationale for immunity, stating that subjecting officials to trial risks would deter them from fulfilling their responsibilities. This reasoning has been echoed in Michigan case law, highlighting the necessity of immunity to allow decision-makers to act without fear of litigation from those adversely affected by their decisions.

Ross highlights the principle that individual immunity enables officials to perform their duties without the fear of lawsuits undermining their actions. He references Judge Cooley's ruling in Wall v. Trumbull, which asserts that judicial officers are protected from lawsuits for actions taken within their jurisdiction, provided that such jurisdiction is not exceeded. This "complete" immunity, historically granted to judges and prosecutors, results in immediate dismissal of complaints alleging tortious conduct in their official capacities. This concept is supported by precedents such as Yaselli v. Goff and Gregoire v. Biddle. The author expresses confusion over the possibility that Michigan courts might reject these established legal principles and asserts a belief that Michigan law protects prosecutors from being tried for their official actions, advocating for the acceptance of the interlocutory appeal in this context.