Estate of Robert W. Kerwin

Citation: 2020 ME 116

Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine; October 1, 2020; Maine; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Sandra K. Smith appeals a Knox County Probate Court judgment that partially granted her petition for property discovery under 18-C M.R.S. § 3-110 but restricted the examination of Lorraine C. Kerwin. Smith contends her notice of appeal was timely filed and argues the court erred in limiting the scope of the examination. The court affirmed the judgment, noting that Smith's appeal was indeed timely.

The facts are largely undisputed. Robert W. Kerwin, the decedent, had a daughter, Smith, from a prior marriage and married Lorraine C. Kerwin in 2005. In 2006, they established a trust to hold real estate in Knox County, with Lorraine as trustee. The decedent's will stated that property not in the trust would transfer to it upon his death but made no provisions for Smith.

After the decedent's death in 2018, Lorraine applied for informal probate and became the personal representative of the estate. Smith filed a claim regarding the real estate in February 2019, which Lorraine disallowed in March. Smith subsequently filed a petition for property discovery, alleging the real estate transfer to the trust was due to undue influence or fraud, requesting Lorraine to testify under oath and produce documents related to a coin collection and the real estate transfer.

On September 11, 2019, the Probate Court partially granted Smith's petition but limited her examination of Lorraine concerning the decedent's decision to transfer the property to the trust. The court cited the historical case O’Dee v. McCrate, which emphasized an executor's limits on examination about conveyances prior to the testator's death. The court expressed reluctance to grant broad examination due to the time elapsed since the events in question and indicated its authority to impose reasonable limits under Maine Rules of Probate Procedure.

The court held a hearing on November 20, 2019, where Lorraine was examined. At the hearing's conclusion, Smith confirmed it was her final chance to question Lorraine. Smith filed a notice of appeal on December 9, 2019, regarding the final judgment from the November hearing and the September procedural order. The Supreme Judicial Court required Smith to clarify the justiciability of her appeal, considering the ambiguity of whether a formal order had been issued on November 20, before permitting the appeal to proceed.

Smith filed a motion in the Probate Court for clarification that the hearing on November 20 concluded the proceedings. The court granted this motion on February 10, 2020, stating that the November 20 hearing regarding Lorraine C. Kerwin's examination on Smith's property discovery petition marked the end of the proceedings, making all related orders final. 

The key issue is the timeliness of Smith's appeal from a final judgment. There is disagreement between Smith and Kerwin about what constitutes the final judgment; Smith claims it was the oral conclusion of the November 20 hearing, while Kerwin asserts it was the September 11 order. Generally, appeals must be made after a final judgment, which is defined as a decision that resolves all matters before the court. Probate proceedings are unique, with each petition initiating an independent proceeding, and an order addressing the petition's matters is considered final even if other proceedings are pending.

The court examined the nature of the docket entry and determined that the November 20 hearing represented the completion of the independent proceedings initiated by Smith's petition. The September 11 order, which anticipated further hearings, did not conclude the matter. The Probate Court confirmed that no further hearings would occur during the November 20 hearing. Smith's appeal was filed within twenty-one days of this hearing, rendering it timely under M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1). 

Furthermore, even if the docket entry lacked clarity regarding finality, Rule 2B(a)(1) of the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure allows an appeal notice filed before a docket entry to be treated as filed on that date. Thus, Smith's appeal remains timely. 

Lastly, the appeal's merits will be addressed, with Smith arguing that the Probate Court incorrectly believed it needed to exclude examination questions about real estate conveyances made to the person in trust by the testator before their death, as indicated by the court's reference to a historical case.

Smith filed a petition under 18-C M.R.S. 3-110, which allows the court to summon individuals suspected of concealing or fraudulently receiving property of a decedent for examination under oath, and to produce related documents. This appeal addresses a specific legal issue related to probate courts and the statute's historical context, confirming that 3-110 serves as a discovery mechanism. The court has discretion over discovery scope, which is reviewed for abuse of discretion. A party challenging a discovery order must demonstrate both judicial error and prejudice to the case outcome.

The Probate Court referenced the O’Dee case to support its discretion, rejecting Smith's claim that the court had to grant or deny the discovery petition without determining its scope. The statute explicitly allows the court to command appearances and examinations, indicating the court's authority to limit the scope of discovery. The court acknowledged its ability to grant or deny the petition and exercised this discretion by imposing certain restrictions. The limitation on discovery was not deemed an abuse of discretion, leading to the affirmation of the judgment.