Commonwealth v. Montgomery, D., Aplt.

Citation: Not availableDocket: 4 EAP 2019

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; July 21, 2020; Pennsylvania; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Darren Montgomery, reviews an appeal stemming from a Superior Court order that reversed a Court of Common Pleas decision. The critical facts involve Officer Robert McCuen observing Montgomery with a firearm visibly protruding from his waistband. The court emphasizes that under Pennsylvania law (18 Pa.C.S. 6106), carrying a visible firearm without a license is not illegal, as the statute criminalizes only the carrying of a concealed weapon without a valid license. The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Wecht, critiques the Majority's interpretation, arguing that it improperly equates a visible firearm with a concealed one, thus creating a new, vague standard that risks confusing law enforcement and the public. The dissent insists that the General Assembly's clear language should guide statutory interpretation and warns against judicial modification that could lead to unwarranted arrests and a lack of clarity regarding what constitutes a crime. The opinion underscores the importance of adhering to the statutory language to reflect the General Assembly's intent, even if the outcome is harsh.

A statute's clear and unambiguous terms cannot be overlooked in favor of legislative intent, as outlined in 1 Pa.C.S. 1921(b). Courts can only utilize interpretive tools when a term is ambiguous. The Majority missteps by rejecting the Superior Court's flawed interpretation that any concealment suffices under Section 6106. After doing so, the Majority fails to properly consider the plain meaning of "concealed" as dictated by 1 Pa.C.S. 1903(a) and does not assess the term's ambiguity. Instead, it assumes ambiguity and misapplies the rule of lenity, arguing that applying it would contradict common sense and the statute's purpose. A term is deemed ambiguous only if there are two reasonable interpretations, as established in A.S. v. Pa. State Police. The term "concealed" is defined clearly in dictionaries, including Merriam-Webster, which states it means "kept out of sight or hidden from view." A weapon that is visible does not meet this definition. The Majority's interpretation is further illustrated by comparing it to a partially visible handkerchief, which demonstrates the absurdity of their definition of concealment.

The issue centers on whether an individual has 'concealed' a handkerchief. The Majority opinion would affirm that it has, based on a newly defined interpretation of concealment that includes partial visibility. However, the excerpt argues that this interpretation lacks a common understanding of the term 'concealed,' asserting that both the handkerchief and a gun partially visible in a waistband should not be classified as concealed. The argument emphasizes the importance of adhering strictly to the statutory language used by the General Assembly, which does not include an intent element for concealment. This broad definition of concealment creates ambiguity for law enforcement and gun owners, leaving them uncertain about what constitutes concealment. The excerpt criticizes the Majority for failing to provide clear guidance and for potentially subjecting individuals to unjust arrests based on a flawed interpretation of the law. The author contends that the judiciary cannot modify statutes to achieve reasonable outcomes, highlighting that the General Assembly did not include language to account for attempts or intentions to conceal. Thus, the mere visibility of parts of a firearm should not lead to a classification of 'concealed.'

Concealment, as required by Section 6106 of the Crimes Code, necessitates that a weapon be actually concealed; mere intent to conceal is insufficient for a violation. For instance, a motorist who intends to exceed the speed limit but does not do so is not in violation of the Motor Vehicle Code. Similarly, if a weapon is visible, the statute is not violated, even if the individual intended to carry it concealed. The legal principles of actus reus (the act) and mens rea (the intent) must coexist for a crime to be prosecutable. The dissent critiques the Majority's interpretation, asserting that it improperly avoids addressing the clarity of the term "concealed." Even if the term is deemed ambiguous, the dissent argues that traditional canons of construction do not support the Majority’s interpretation. Legislative intent is determined by considering the statute's purpose, the context of its enactment, and the mischief it aims to remedy. The General Assembly's goal in enacting Section 6106 was to protect the public from individuals carrying hidden weapons without a license, as visible weapons do not pose the same risk of ambush. The dissent emphasizes that the statute clearly differentiates between visible and concealed weapons, asserting that the Majority's interpretation creates an unsupported middle ground that contradicts legislative intent. In this case, since Officer McCuen observed the weapon on Montgomery's hip, it was not concealed, thus not violating the statute.

The Majority's apprehension centers on the possibility that the General Assembly's intent to inform the public about dangers could be undermined if a weapon is carried with only a small portion visible. Despite this concern, the interpretation of "concealed" must adhere to its plain meaning, which is generally understood as being entirely hidden. The Majority fails to define "concealed" or address any potential ambiguity, neglecting the principle that the legislature's language should not be disregarded to solve societal issues. The consequence of a narrow interpretation, where minimal visibility avoids prosecution, stems from the legislature's unambiguous wording. The General Assembly has the authority to draft laws as it sees fit, while the role of the courts is solely to interpret these laws without approval or disapproval.

The interpretation that "concealed" could include visible elements undermines the statutory intent, transforming the offense from "carrying a concealed weapon without a license" to merely "carrying a weapon without a license." This shift is not within the courts' power to enact. The rule of lenity, which mandates that penal statutes be strictly interpreted, supports this view, yet the Majority argues against it by suggesting that strict application would contradict common sense and the statute's objective. However, the rule of lenity is essential for ensuring due process, as noted by the Supreme Court, which emphasizes that individuals should not have to guess what constitutes prohibited conduct. Ignoring this principle not only compromises Montgomery’s rights but also creates uncertainty for all Pennsylvanians regarding the distinction between concealed and visible firearms. The Majority's argument lacks sufficient support, as the statute's purpose is to alert the public when a weapon is carried without a permit, which is effectively achieved when the weapon is visible, regardless of how much is exposed.

The excerpt emphasizes that a crime related to firearm possession occurs only when a weapon is not visible to the public. If a firearm is visible, no offense is committed. The Majority's assertion that the rule of lenity does not apply is contested; it argues that it is not unreasonable to refrain from prosecuting individuals who have not violated the explicit terms of the statute. The legislative intent behind Section 6106 is clearly focused on penalizing the carrying of concealed weapons without a valid license. The argument posits that a person cannot be prosecuted simply based on assumptions about their intent to conceal a weapon.

The excerpt critiques the Majority's interpretation of "concealed," arguing that it introduces ambiguity and uncertainty regarding what constitutes concealment, which undermines due process. It highlights that such vagueness fails to provide clear guidance for law enforcement, gun owners, and the judiciary, leaving them to guess what level of visibility constitutes "concealed." The author asserts that the legislature has the authority to define the scope of its criminal statutes, and judicial interpretations should not expand this definition without clear legislative intent.

Furthermore, it defends the purpose of preliminary hearings, stating that the Commonwealth must present sufficient evidence for each crime charged, despite the low evidentiary threshold. The excerpt critiques the Majority's vague definition of "concealment," stating that it lacks clarity and consistency with the legislature's intent, thereby rendering it unworkable. The passage questions how concealment can be properly understood if it does not equate to either complete invisibility or even partial concealment.

The statutory crime of carrying a concealed weapon is defined in a binary manner: a firearm is either concealed or it is not, with no ambiguity in the term's meaning as understood by the General Assembly and in common language. The Majority's interpretation suggests a hybrid standard where concealment is based on a subjective assessment of how much of the firearm is hidden, which undermines the clear statutory requirement that the gun must be actually concealed. This approach introduces confusion and violates due process by allowing juries to determine the meaning of the law retrospectively, rather than providing clear legal standards for individuals to understand what constitutes a crime. 

The testimony of Officer McCuen indicated that the firearm was visible, contradicting the requirement for concealment. Additionally, the act of Montgomery hiding the gun after the fact does not affect its visibility at the time of possession. The statute explicitly requires that the gun be concealed on the person, not in a separate location, further reinforcing that the crime was not committed if the weapon was visible. By interpreting "concealed" to allow for visible firearms, the Majority effectively alters the statutory definition, leading to a new crime that was not legislated. The dissent emphasizes adherence to the plain meaning of the statute and warns against judicial reinterpretation that undermines the legislature's intent.