ANDREW MEDINA v. ANDREW POLLACK

Citation: Not availableDocket: 19-0777

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; July 1, 2020; Florida; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Andrew Medina, a campus security guard, is appealing a non-final order from the Circuit Court regarding a civil suit brought by the personal representatives of Meadow Pollack, a student killed in the 2018 Parkland shooting. Medina argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss the suit, claiming immunity under section 768.28(9) of the Florida Statutes, asserting his actions did not demonstrate willful or wanton disregard for human life.

The appeal centers on allegations detailed in the amended complaint, which recounts the events of February 14, 2018, when Nicholas Cruz arrived at Marjorie Stoneman Douglas High School with a rifle bag and subsequently opened fire. Medina, one of the unarmed campus monitors, recognized Cruz and noted his suspicious behavior, having previously been briefed about him. Medina followed Cruz in his golf cart, alerted another security guard about Cruz's presence, and attempted to locate the armed school resource officer, Scot Peterson, after hearing gunshots. The court determined that the complaint's allegations sufficiently support a finding that could negate Medina's claim of sovereign immunity, leading to the affirmation of the trial court's ruling.

Medina instructed individuals to leave and go to the front of the school just before Cruz opened fire, resulting in the deaths of seventeen students and faculty members. The amended complaint alleges that Medina had a duty to immediately report a potential active shooter scenario, which would trigger a lockdown of the school. Medina did not report a Code Red, claiming he did not visualize a gun or shots fired, and was concerned about causing unnecessary panic. He indicated that he felt compelled to report the suspicious individual rather than confront Cruz directly. The complaint accuses Medina of self-interest and neglecting his responsibilities, describing his inaction as "unforgivably despicable" and demonstrating a "willful and wanton disregard" for safety. Specific allegations against Medina include failing to call a Code Red, failing to identify Cruz as a threat, and not adhering to safety protocols, all of which are said to have contributed to the fatal incident. Medina contended that he deserved sovereign immunity under Florida Statutes section 768.28(9) but the trial court denied this motion, finding sufficient evidence of willful disregard for safety. Medina is appealing this ruling, with the appellate court reviewing the case de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs.

Section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes, protects state officers, employees, or agents from personal liability in tort for actions within the scope of their employment unless they acted in bad faith, with malicious intent, or with wanton and willful disregard for human rights, safety, or property. In evaluating Medina’s alleged conduct, the court referenced the definitions of "wanton" and "willful" as articulated in standard criminal jury instructions. "Wanton" indicates a conscious indifference to consequences, while "willful" denotes intentional and purposeful action.

The complaint alleges that Medina failed to call a Code Red after observing Cruz, who was suspected of a potential school shooting, exit an Uber with a rifle case. Instead, Medina chose to inform a friend in Building 12, motivated by personal concerns about overreacting. This decision allowed Cruz to access the campus and enter Building 12, where the violence began. The court found that Medina’s actions, as alleged, suggest he acted with conscious indifference and intentional failure to act, meeting the criteria for wanton and willful conduct.

Medina argued that the short timeframe—just two minutes—between seeing Cruz and Cruz entering Building 12 precluded the possibility of wanton and willful conduct. However, the court determined that the timeframe was adequate for Medina to consider his response, rejecting his argument. Consequently, the court affirmed the denial of Medina’s motion to dismiss, indicating that while further fact development may alter the outcome, the existing allegations were sufficient to proceed under section 768.28(9). Judges MAY and KUNTZ concurred, noting the decision is not final until any timely filed motion for rehearing is resolved.