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Norman Jett v. Dallas Independent School District and Frederick Todd

Citations: 798 F.2d 748; 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 29046; 41 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 36,691; 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1076Docket: 85-1015

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; August 27, 1986; Federal Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

In this case, a former athletic director and head football coach filed a lawsuit against a school district and his supervisor, alleging violations of due process, First Amendment rights, and equal protection under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding violations of his constitutional rights and awarded damages. The appellate court reversed the findings related to due process and constructive discharge, concluding that the plaintiff did not have a protected property interest in his position and the evidence of intolerable working conditions was insufficient. However, the court upheld the supervisor's liability for racial discrimination and First Amendment violations, as evidence showed racially motivated actions and retaliation against protected speech. The court found the jury instructions inadequate regarding the school district's liability under Section 1983, emphasizing the need for a clear delegation of policymaking authority for municipal liability. Additionally, the court reversed the liability under Section 1981, clarifying that municipalities cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior basis. The matter was remanded for a retrial on damages concerning the supervisor's liability, while the district's liability was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The court set aside the award of attorney's fees pending the retrial's outcome.

Legal Issues Addressed

Constructive Discharge and Employment Conditions

Application: The court found insufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that Jett was constructively terminated, as the working conditions were not intolerable enough to compel a reasonable person to resign.

Reasoning: Jett's loss of coaching responsibilities did not amount to constructive discharge, as the working conditions were not intolerable enough to compel a reasonable person to resign.

Due Process Rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Application: The appellate court determined that Jett did not have a protected property interest in his position and there was insufficient evidence to support a claim of constructive discharge.

Reasoning: The appellate court reversed the due process violation finding, determining Jett did not have a protected property interest and that the evidence was insufficient to support a claim of constructive discharge.

Equal Protection and First Amendment Violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Application: Liability was upheld against Todd for racial discrimination and First Amendment violations, as Jett demonstrated his prima facie case by showing racially motivated removal and retaliation against protected speech.

Reasoning: The court also held DISD liable due to Superintendent Wright's approval of Todd's recommendation without independent inquiry, emphasizing Wright's exclusive authority in such decisions.

Municipal Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Application: The court found the jury's instructions inadequate for establishing DISD’s liability, as they did not specify the necessary delegation of policymaking authority.

Reasoning: The jury instruction related to municipal liability was deemed inadequate because it did not specify the necessary delegation of policymaking authority.

Respondeat Superior and Municipal Liability under Section 1981

Application: The court reversed liability findings against DISD under Section 1981 by emphasizing that municipal liability requires official policy action, not respondeat superior.

Reasoning: Imposing vicarious liability under section 1981 for specific wrongs would conflict with congressional intent behind section 1983.