Georgia Department of Transportation v. Carol Joy Thompson

Citation: Not availableDocket: A19A1912

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; March 13, 2020; Georgia; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Motions for reconsideration must be filed in the clerk’s office within ten days of the decision date to be considered timely. In the case of Georgia Department of Transportation v. Thompson et al., the Court of Appeals of Georgia addresses an interlocutory appeal concerning negligence claims from Carol and John Thompson, who are suing the Georgia DOT following a collision that resulted in severe injuries to Carol and their two children.

The appeal concerns the trial court's denial of DOT's motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. The court reviews the motion de novo, focusing on legal aspects, while factual findings are upheld if supported by evidence. The incident occurred on June 16, 2014, when Carol's vehicle was struck by another vehicle that lost control while trying to avoid a turning vehicle in a left-hand passing lane on Cleveland Highway.

The Thompsons allege negligence on DOT's part regarding the highway's design and maintenance, claiming insufficient sight distance, inadequate speed warnings, and improper shoulder slope. They submitted an affidavit from engineer Herman Hill, who stated that DOT failed to maintain safe sight distances and was aware of prior accidents without taking corrective action.

DOT moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the claims were protected under the discretionary function and design exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity as defined by the Georgia Tort Claims Act. The trial court, however, found that while shoulder maintenance might invoke the discretionary exception, the Thompsons provided sufficient expert testimony to challenge DOT’s compliance with maintenance standards and engineering practices. Consequently, DOT's appeal contests this ruling, emphasizing that sovereign immunity shields state agencies unless explicitly waived by legislative action.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity mandates strict adherence to the conditions outlined in the statute waiving such immunity. The Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA) establishes that the state is only liable for tort actions within specified limitations. Although the GTCA allows for a waiver of sovereign immunity, this waiver is constrained by specific exceptions. Any lawsuit that falls under an exception may be dismissed due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The burden of proof lies with the party claiming the waiver of immunity.

Under the GTCA, the state waives its immunity for torts committed by state officers and employees while performing their official duties. However, exceptions to this waiver include the design exception, which states that the state is not liable for losses stemming from construction plans that comply with accepted engineering standards, and the discretionary function exception, which protects the state from liability for actions that require policy judgment by state officers.

Determining whether the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) is entitled to sovereign immunity based on these exceptions is a preliminary issue for the trial court. In this case, expert testimony indicated that the Cleveland Highway was originally designed in 1922 and redesigned in 1973, creating potential visibility issues for vehicles turning left onto Jess Helton Road. The expert argued that the redesign did not adequately address sight distance, leading to non-compliance with the relevant engineering standards, and that vehicles in the left passing lane would not have sufficient stopping sight distance given the speed limit.

Hill's deposition revealed that, according to 1965 AASHTO standards, the minimum stopping sight distance at the accident location was approximately 410 feet, which was met. A vehicle traveling at 50 mph requires 350 feet, while one at 60 mph requires 475 feet. On the date of the Thompsons’ accident, Hill noted that the measured sight distance for northbound drivers was around 500 feet, exceeding the minimum standard. He acknowledged the presence of warning signs instructing to "merge left," but clarified that these did not indicate the potential for left turns onto Jess Helton Road. A "standard T" yellow diamond warning sign was in place, but it could mislead drivers due to another intersection prior to Jess Helton Road.

Hill stated that these signs complied with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), having been placed over 500 feet back. After the Department of Transportation (DOT) moved to dismiss, the Thompsons submitted a second affidavit from Hill, where he asserted that the roadway was negligently designed due to a lack of warning for drivers in the passing lane about potential left turns. He also noted that the right shoulder had significant deterioration. Notably, Hill revised his views on sight distance, now distinguishing between "stopping sight distance" and "decision sight distance," the latter being necessary for recognizing hazards in a visually cluttered environment. He claimed that 750 feet of decision-making sight distance was required, though this was not established in AASHTO standards until 1984.

Hill criticized the existing signage as a "man-trap," suggesting it misled drivers and failed to warn them of the left turn lane's presence. He indicated that the lack of appropriate warnings contributed to an incident where a vehicle, after passing another, could not safely return to the right lane due to insufficient time and poor shoulder maintenance. Consequently, the driver overcorrected after leaving the roadway and collided with an oncoming vehicle.

The design of the roadway did not meet the engineering standards in effect at the time, lacking adequate warnings and traffic control devices for left-hand turns, despite knowledge that vehicles would use the left lane to turn and pass. Specifically, it was suggested that the design should have included double warnings for left-turning traffic and a flashing beacon to alert drivers of the intersection and potential left turns. Additionally, evidence showed that the right shoulder had a significant drop of over two inches from the pavement, contributing to a vehicle's overcorrection and subsequent collision. Expert testimony from Hill indicated that this shoulder deterioration violated DOT Maintenance Standard 305, which mandates repairs for such conditions.

The Department of Transportation (DOT) argued that the trial court incorrectly assigned the burden of proof regarding sovereign immunity, asserting that the plaintiffs must provide expert testimony to demonstrate that the design did not comply with engineering standards. The trial court, however, determined that the Thompsons met their burden of proof through Hill's testimony, which indicated DOT's design malpractice. The court also noted that DOT failed to provide testimonial evidence to counter Hill's claims, leading to the denial of DOT's motion to dismiss based on jurisdictional grounds. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that the Thompsons had presented sufficient evidence indicating a waiver of sovereign immunity.

The trial court erred in two significant ways while evaluating DOT’s motion to dismiss. Firstly, it incorrectly assessed the Thompsons' claims as “not frivolous” and misapplied the standards related to the expert affidavit required under OCGA 9-11-9.1, which is a pleading requirement rather than an evidentiary one. The court's ruling erroneously relied on the evidentiary standards of OCGA 9-11-56, despite precedents indicating that a defective expert affidavit may still satisfy the pleading standards. This distinction is crucial, as a complaint with an inadequate expert affidavit may be dismissed under OCGA 9-11-12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, while a complaint lacking a waiver of sovereign immunity is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under OCGA 9-11-12(b)(1). 

Secondly, the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof to DOT, asserting that DOT had not provided sufficient testimonial evidence. The burden lies with the Thompsons to demonstrate that DOT's actions fall outside the scope of sovereign immunity, as clarified in Balamo. The Thompsons must provide expert testimony or competent evidence showing non-compliance with accepted engineering standards to avoid immunity under OCGA 50-21-24(10). DOT's motion should have been evaluated under a preponderance of the evidence standard, placing the burden of proof on the Thompsons. Consequently, due to these misapplications of the law, the order is vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for reconsideration under the correct legal standards. The remaining errors raised by DOT are deemed moot.