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Robert Edward Gura v. Charles Williams, Superintendent

Citation: Not availableDocket: 18-1088

Court: West Virginia Supreme Court; March 13, 2020; West Virginia; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Robert Edward Gura appeals the Circuit Court of Ohio County's November 15, 2018, order that denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Gura argues that the circuit court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing or providing funds for an expert, and contends that the court lacked jurisdiction due to the absence of a civil case number assigned by the circuit clerk. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the parties' briefs and the appeal record, finding no substantial legal question or prejudicial error, and thus affirms the circuit court’s order. 

Notably, Gura was involved in a violent incident in May 2008, leading to charges including attempted murder. During his defense, an evaluation by Dr. Thomas R. Adamski concluded that Gura was competent to stand trial and understood the wrongfulness of his actions, despite his claims of memory loss regarding the altercation. The victim's testimony during the trial indicated that Gura attacked her after a dispute over money. Gura's trial commenced in May 2009, and the appropriate public officer was updated as Gura was transferred to Huttonsville Correctional Center, aligning with procedural rules.

The victim attempted to leave but refused to give the petitioner $5. The petitioner then threatened her with a knife, inflicting a gash on her neck and finger before stabbing her in the chest. After the attack, he forced her to stay in the bathroom for an hour and attempted to coerce her into lying about the stabbing. Despite threats, the victim revealed to the police that the petitioner was the assailant. Both the petitioner and the victim had consumed alcohol that night. Law enforcement testimony indicated that the petitioner was coherent and able to respond appropriately during interactions with the police, suggesting he was not impaired. The petitioner’s wife corroborated that he was intoxicated but coherent and capable of normal behavior. During the trial, the petitioner’s counsel requested a voluntary intoxication instruction, arguing that the level of intoxication could negate specific intent. However, the trial court determined there was insufficient evidence of impairment to justify such an instruction and denied the request. The jury acquitted the petitioner of first-degree robbery but convicted him on other charges. At sentencing, the court imposed a life sentence with mercy for attempted murder, along with additional sentences for malicious assault and assault during the commission of a felony.

The trial court mandated that the sentences run consecutively, and the petitioner’s appeal was denied by this Court. In July 2010, the circuit court appointed counsel for the petitioner to seek habeas corpus relief. After several counsel appointments and withdrawals, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in November 2015, addressing mental competency, jury instructions, and ineffective assistance of counsel. In September 2016, the petitioner requested funds to hire Dr. Bobby A. Miller for an evaluation concerning diminished capacity, along with a motion to relocate for the evaluation. The habeas court denied these requests in January 2018, citing a prior evaluation and lack of legal basis for a new one. The court also found that the trial court had adequately handled jury instruction requests. In February 2018, another funds request for hiring an expert related to ineffective assistance of counsel was denied, along with the habeas corpus petition itself. The habeas court determined that the trial court had appropriately reviewed evidence concerning voluntary intoxication and found no need for a diminished capacity instruction. Furthermore, the petitioner did not demonstrate that the absence of an expert would have changed the trial outcome. The habeas court concluded that the issues raised did not meet the criteria for habeas corpus or constitutional significance and found the petitioner could not satisfy the Strickland/Miller test’s second prong. Due to an unexplained delay, the petitioner’s counsel did not receive the order until August 2018, prompting a request for the habeas court to re-enter the order for appeal, which was completed on November 15, 2018. The current appeal is reviewed under a three-prong standard: abuse of discretion for the final order, clearly erroneous for factual findings, and de novo for legal questions.

Petitioner challenges the habeas court's decision not to conduct an evidentiary hearing or provide funds for expert testimony related to his diminished capacity defense and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. He asserts two main arguments: first, the habeas court erred in denying his requests for funding for an expert witness to support his claims; second, the court should have held an evidentiary hearing to evaluate his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 

The court found no merit in petitioner's arguments. It stated that he did not cite any legal authority entitling him to expert witnesses in habeas proceedings or requiring the court to provide funding. The only supporting case cited by the petitioner pertained to trial proceedings, not habeas corpus, and therefore was not applicable. The court highlighted that under Rule 10(c)(7) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, arguments must be adequately supported with citations to the record and legal authority, which the petitioner failed to do.

Additionally, the court noted that under W.Va. Code 53-4A-7(a), a petitioner is not automatically entitled to a full evidentiary hearing in habeas corpus cases. A hearing is only warranted if there is probable cause to believe the petitioner may be entitled to relief on claims that have not been previously adjudicated or waived. The decision to conduct a hearing is within the court's discretion, which the court exercised appropriately in this case. Thus, the court declined to find any error in the habeas court's rulings.

If the facts are sufficiently developed before trial, a court may forgo an evidentiary hearing in a habeas proceeding and rule on the merits based on the existing record. The petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not fully pursuing a diminished capacity defense, asserting that an evidentiary hearing was necessary for the habeas court to address this issue. Although the trial counsel attempted to include a diminished capacity or voluntary intoxication instruction, the petitioner claims the failure to present expert testimony constituted ineffective assistance. He contends that the Strickland/Miller test is met because he was prejudiced by his counsel's shortcomings and that there is a reasonable chance he could have been convicted of a lesser offense if the defense had been presented.

The Strickland/Miller test requires showing that counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficiency affected the outcome of the case. Failure to satisfy either prong undermines a habeas claim. However, the habeas court determined that it had sufficient factual basis to deny relief without a hearing. Prior to trial, the petitioner's counsel requested a competency evaluation due to his history of substance abuse and intoxication at the time of the incident. The evaluation, conducted by Dr. Adamski, concluded that the petitioner was competent to stand trial and could appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions, despite his history of alcohol use and bipolar disorder. Consequently, the trial court found insufficient evidence to support a diminished capacity instruction, a decision the habeas court upheld.

Testimony during the trial indicated that the petitioner was coherent and responsive, demonstrating clear communication abilities. The habeas court concluded that even if expert testimony on the petitioner's diminished capacity due to voluntary intoxication had been presented, the substantial contrary evidence would not have altered the trial outcome. The petitioner did not fulfill the Strickland/Miller standard for ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he failed to prove that his counsel's performance was deficient, as counsel had sought an evaluation of the petitioner’s criminal responsibility and had appropriately requested a jury instruction on diminished capacity. The court found that the counsel's actions were reasonable and did not constitute ineffective assistance, as the counsel did not show a viable defense based on intoxication.

Additionally, the petitioner could not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the trial outcome would differ had counsel acted differently, given the substantial evidence against the notion of criminal irresponsibility due to intoxication. The habeas court also noted that the petitioner’s speculation about a lesser-included offense conviction did not satisfy the second prong of Strickland/Miller. The court ruled that it was within its discretion to deny the claim without an evidentiary hearing, as the necessary facts were already established at trial. The petitioner’s assertion that the habeas court erred in finding no constitutional magnitude issues was rejected, as the court had correctly applied the law regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. Consequently, the circuit court's order denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was affirmed.