Timothy Nelson Evans a/k/a Timothy N. Evans a/k/a Timothy Evans a/k/a Tim Evans v. State of Mississippi

Citation: Not availableDocket: 2017-DR-01385-SCT

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; March 12, 2020; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Timothy Nelson Evans, convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death, sought post-conviction relief on October 5, 2018, after his conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Mississippi on June 15, 2017. His appeal followed a jury's finding of guilt in August 2013, where evidence presented during sentencing included testimony from two mental health experts. The case involved the murder of Wenda Holling, a 72-year-old woman with whom Evans had a prior relationship; he strangled her, stole her credit card, and used it until it was declined. After his apprehension by the U.S. Marshals in Florida, Evans made statements indicating remorse and acceptance of his fate.

The Supreme Court denied his post-conviction relief, concluding that his claims did not demonstrate a substantial violation of rights. Evans's issues included allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding mitigation evidence, failure to object to improper arguments by the prosecution, and lack of communication about a potential plea offer. The court's mandate was issued on October 5, 2017, and the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently denied his petition for certiorari on June 28, 2018.

Evans seeks post-conviction collateral relief, arguing he should be exempt from the death penalty due to permanent mental illness. Procedurally, once a conviction and sentence are affirmed, a petitioner must obtain leave from the court before seeking relief in the trial court, as outlined in Miss. Code Ann. 99-39-7 (Rev. 2015). Leave is granted if the application demonstrates that claims are not procedurally barred and present substantial evidence of a denied right. Well-pleaded allegations are accepted as true, and in capital cases, claims receive heightened scrutiny with doubts resolved in favor of the accused. Harmless errors in other cases can become reversible errors in death penalty cases.

Evans' claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are not procedurally barred since he was represented by the same attorneys at trial and on direct appeal. Ineffective assistance claims require a two-pronged inquiry: the attorney's performance must be shown to be deficient and to have prejudiced the defense. Deficient performance is defined as representation falling below an objective standard of reasonableness, while prejudice is established by showing a reasonable probability that, but for the errors, the trial's outcome would have differed.

Specifically, for claims of failure to investigate and present mitigation evidence, counsel must conduct reasonable investigations or make sound decisions about the necessity of such investigations. The assessment of counsel's decisions must consider the context and whether evidence uncovered would prompt further investigation.

Evans also filed a motion for a psychiatric evaluation to determine his mental state at the time of the incident and his competency to assist in his defense. The circuit court ordered a psychiatric evaluation by the Mississippi State Hospital to be conducted promptly.

Considerable delays in Evans's mental evaluation at MSH were attributed to staffing shortages and a backlog of capital murder cases. The circuit court issued an Amended Order for a mental evaluation, emphasizing the need for timely assessment, including mitigating circumstances. Dr. Storer conducted evaluations of Evans in December 2012 and January 2013, with a comprehensive report delivered by late February 2013. This report detailed Evans’s family background, including a history of alcohol abuse, parental divorce around age seven, and subsequent familial separations. It also noted Evans's relocation to Florida to live with his mother, whom he had not seen for years, and highlighted the physical, emotional, and verbal abuse he suffered from her. Additionally, it mentioned a traumatic burn injury and Evans's early onset of substance use, starting with alcohol at age ten and marijuana in ninth grade.

Evans filed an Ex Parte Motion for funds to conduct a mitigation investigation, citing the need for an expert. The circuit court approved funds for mitigation expert Stacy Ferraro, who later withdrew due to scheduling conflicts. Subsequently, defense counsel indicated that Dr. Zimmermann would take over the mitigation investigation, prompting a new order confirming that Ferraro had not provided any services. Dr. Zimmermann conducted his assessment, resulting in a seven-page Preliminary Psychological Evaluation. His report reiterated key points from Dr. Storer’s findings, including Evans's troubled family dynamics, his childhood anxiety diagnosis, the traumatic burn injury, and significant substance use prior to his arrest, including daily consumption of spirits and marijuana.

Trial commenced in 2013, during which evidence was presented regarding Evans' mental state at sentencing. Dr. Storer testified that Evans had a full-scale IQ of 87, indicating he was not intellectually disabled, and described his troubled childhood marked by parental divorce and emotional abuse. Evans began substance abuse early, with alcohol use at age ten and marijuana at sixteen, which contributed to his criminal history. Dr. Storer diagnosed him with alcohol dependence, substance abuse, and conversion disorder, noting possible extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the offense, although he could not corroborate Evans' claims about his background. 

Dr. Storer highlighted the instability in Evans' childhood, including substance abuse by both parents and verbal violence at home. Following his parents' divorce when Evans was six, he initially lived with his father but later moved back with his mother, who was emotionally abusive. Despite his attempts to contact family members for corroboration failing, Dr. Storer found Evans' testing efforts valid and indicated familiarity with substance abuse treatment programs. 

Dr. Zimmermann, who conducted a separate mental evaluation for mitigation, concluded that Evans was likely abusing or addicted to substances and detected cognitive and possible anxiety disorders, including PTSD. However, he also noted that further testing was needed for definitive diagnosis. Both experts agreed that Evans did not suffer from a mental disease or defect that impaired his understanding of his actions or the difference between right and wrong at the time of the crime.

In the penalty-phase closing argument, Evans's counsel argued that mitigating factors outweighed aggravating factors, advocating for life imprisonment without parole. Key mitigating points included Evans's extreme mental and emotional disturbance due to intoxication and his desperate circumstances stemming from a troubled family background marked by mental illness and substance abuse. Evans's childhood experiences, including being moved from Michigan to Florida, lack of parental guidance, early substance use starting at age ten, and limited education were highlighted as contributing to his severe substance abuse.

During sentencing, the jury was instructed to consider one aggravating circumstance: that the crime was committed for pecuniary gain during a robbery. They were also directed to evaluate mitigating circumstances, including Evans's mental disturbance at the time of the offense and various aspects of his personal history, such as family trauma, emotional abuse, and early substance use. Ultimately, the jury found insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravator, resulting in Evans's death sentence.

Evans contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately present and explain the significance of available mitigating evidence. He specifically claims that counsel did not investigate thoroughly, failed to retain a mitigation specialist, and did not obtain expert testimony on the link between trauma and violent behavior. Evans argues that this lack of a cohesive mitigation case, which inadequately addressed his severe childhood trauma and its connection to his crime, constituted deficient performance and prejudice under the standards set by Strickland v. Washington.

Evans presents affidavits from his biological brother Douglas Roy Evans and psychologist Robert G. Stanulis, PhD, to support his claims. Douglas states he was not contacted by Evans's trial defense team, indicating he could have provided crucial information about their family's history of alcohol abuse, parental neglect, and emotional trauma. He details their tumultuous upbringing, including their parents' divorce, their mother's abusive behavior, Evans's early alcohol use, and a traumatic burn injury. He suggests their mother likely drank during pregnancy, impacting Evans's development.

Dr. Stanulis, with extensive experience in psychological evaluations, assessed Evans in 2018 and found significant neurocognitive deficits, PTSD, attachment disorder, and alcohol abuse stemming from multiple traumatic experiences. He criticizes the prior evaluations by Dr. Storer and Dr. Zimmermann for failing to recommend necessary neuropsychological testing, which could have documented Evans's brain injury and mental state during the offense. Stanulis concludes that these psychological factors, combined with significant emotional disturbances, contributed to Evans's loss of control and violent actions, interpreting them as a symbolic attack on his mother.

Evans argues that his unique circumstances and history were inadequately presented at trial, lacking impactful psychological evaluations and a thorough background investigation. He believes that if his brother had been consulted and expert testimony on his trauma had been provided, there was a reasonable chance that at least one juror would have viewed his case differently.

Evans argues that violations of his state and federal rights have rendered his conviction and sentence unconstitutional, warranting an evidentiary hearing under Miss. Code Ann. 99-39-27(5) (Rev. 2015). He emphasizes the importance of corroboration in relation to Doug's affidavit, contending that the prosecution exploited the absence of factual support for the weak conclusions of Dr. Storer and Dr. Zimmermann. In response, the State claims that Evans' arguments lack merit, asserting that two experts provided sufficient testimony in mitigation, and that the need for an additional mental health expert is subjective and relates to trial strategy. The State further argues that even if trial counsel's investigation was lacking, it is unclear what new information would have been uncovered, noting that Evans has had ample time to conduct an independent investigation but has only presented limited affidavits. The State believes that the information Evans criticizes trial counsel for not uncovering was largely known and presented to the jury, thus failing to demonstrate any resulting prejudice to Evans.

The State also critiques Dr. Stanulis’s affidavit as an attempt to offer a more technical explanation of known facts, arguing that his diagnoses lack supporting evidence and extend beyond his expertise. It references recent cases, specifically Ronk, where similar issues were raised regarding the adequacy of mitigation investigations. In Ronk, a psychologist acknowledged the necessity for a full mitigation study but did not conduct one, leading to claims of ineffective counsel based on insufficient investigation and expert testimony. Ronk's post-conviction relief petition included affidavits from family members and an evaluation from a developmental psychologist, asserting that had this mitigating evidence been presented, it could have significantly altered the jury's decision.

In Ronk, the Court acknowledged potential deficiencies in counsel's mitigation investigation but found no Strickland-level prejudice due to the new evidence being largely cumulative. While Dr. Garbarino provided a more detailed link between Ronk's behavior and childhood developmental issues, Dr. Smallwood had already addressed similar points. The Court concluded that the new evidence did not significantly alter the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors, and lacked the impact seen in cases warranting post-conviction relief, such as Hutto v. State. In Hutto, the petitioner argued that ineffective assistance of counsel stemmed from failing to present detailed psychological testimony about his trauma, asserting that this would have influenced the jury’s decision. The Court determined that the additional testimony would have been cumulative and did not demonstrate that the outcome would have changed. It reiterated the deference given to trial counsel’s decisions regarding mitigation investigations, noting that Evans’s trial counsel had proactively sought a mental health evaluation and engaged experts who testified about mitigating circumstances at sentencing.

Evans argues in his post-conviction relief (PCR) application that his childhood trauma lacks corroboration, but the Court is skeptical that this absence indicates ineffective trial counsel. Dr. Storer, who evaluated Evans, unsuccessfully attempted to contact various family members and associates for corroborative testimony. He also suggested that Evans answered questions honestly during testing. Although Evans claims the mitigation investigation was inadequate, he only provides a three-page affidavit from Doug and an eight-page affidavit from Dr. Stanulis as additional evidence. The Court contends that the limited mitigating evidence presented at trial stems more from its nonexistence than from trial counsel's performance. 

Despite receiving expert evaluations from Dr. Storer and Dr. Zimmermann, Evans fails to demonstrate any deficient performance by trial counsel concerning the investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence. Claims for additional witness testimonies are generally viewed unfavorably, especially when counsel has secured psychological evaluations. Even if the Court assumed that trial counsel was deficient, the new evidence presented by Evans would not significantly impact the sentencing outcome, as it largely duplicates information already presented to the jury. Doug's affidavit adds minimal detail to Evans's personal history, which was already covered extensively by the expert reports. Furthermore, while new, unheard testimony is not considered cumulative, Doug's speculative claims about potential fetal alcohol exposure do not meet the standards for post-conviction relief.

Defense counsel's performance cannot be deemed ineffective for not identifying a mitigating factor, like organic brain damage, if the defendant fails to demonstrate its existence in any post-trial motions. Despite potential insights from experts, the court found that the evidence presented did not create a reasonable probability that a juror would have reached a different verdict, given the overwhelming guilt of the defendant and the aggravating circumstance of committing a capital offense for pecuniary gain during a robbery. Consequently, the defendant's request to pursue this claim in trial court was denied, as he did not show a substantial denial of state or federal rights.

Regarding the prosecution's closing arguments, the State questioned what sympathy the defendant had shown the victim, asserting that the jury should deliver the same "mercy" the defendant had given the victim. The defendant argued that these statements constituted prosecutorial misconduct by making inflammatory comments and employing a "golden-rule" argument, which asks jurors to empathize with the victim's perspective. However, the court ruled that this argument was procedurally barred due to a lack of objections during the trial. Despite acknowledging that the prosecutor's argument bordered on a golden-rule violation, the court concluded it was not inflammatory enough to warrant intervention by the trial judge, resulting in no plain error.

Jurors should not decide cases based on how they would want a decision made if they or their loved ones were involved, as this creates a false standard for judgments. The use of "golden-rule" arguments is deemed reversible error. In this case, the court found no plain error in the penalty-phase argument suggesting that jurors extend the same mercy to the defendant as he showed the victim. The defendant, Evans, claims ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the prosecution’s "golden-rule" arguments and alleged misstatements of law, asserting that this compromised his constitutional rights to a fair trial. The State counters that this claim was previously raised and rejected on direct appeal, asserting that trial counsel cannot be faulted for not objecting to comments that were not inappropriate. The court acknowledges a strong presumption in favor of reasonable counsel performance and broad latitude for prosecutors during closing arguments. Even if there was deficient performance regarding the failure to object, the court's prior ruling that no plain error occurred negates any Strickland-level prejudice. Consequently, Evans's request to pursue this claim in trial court is denied, as he does not demonstrate a substantial showing of a denial of rights. Claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel in plea negotiations follow the two-part test established in Strickland.

In Missouri v. Frye, the court highlighted the obligation of defense counsel to communicate formal plea offers from the prosecution that may benefit the accused. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel due to a lapsed or rejected plea offer, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that they would have accepted the offer if given effective counsel. Additionally, they must prove that the plea would not have been canceled by the prosecution or rejected by the trial court and that the outcome of the criminal process would have been more favorable through a plea to a lesser charge or a reduced sentence.

In the case, Evans claimed his trial counsel failed to communicate a potential plea offer from the prosecution, arguing that counsel did not foster a viable attorney-client relationship and sought assistance from another attorney to convince him to plead guilty. Affidavits submitted by Evans indicated that his trial attorneys struggled to communicate with him and did not present any plea offer, which he claimed would have motivated him to plead guilty if known. The State contended that no plea offer had been made, despite acknowledging that failure to communicate a plea deal is a recognized error.

The absence of a plea offer is emphasized, with the State arguing that Evans’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel lack merit due to the lack of supporting affidavits from relevant parties, particularly from trial counsel or Davis, who allegedly discussed a plea deal with Ferraro, an attorney who never represented Evans. The court agrees with the State's position, noting the consistent representations made to the trial court indicating no plea offer existed. Evans’s reliance on Ferraro’s affidavit is deemed insufficient, as it does not provide details about the alleged plea offer, and thus fails to create a "bona fide doubt" regarding the existence of a formal offer. The State asserts that it has no record of a plea offer and is unable to conduct discovery until allowed to proceed in court. Consequently, the circuit court finds no deficiency in trial counsel's performance regarding failure to communicate a plea offer, leading to the denial of Evans's request for post-conviction relief.

Regarding Evans's claim of being categorically barred from the death penalty due to alleged permanent mental illness, Dr. Storer's report concludes that Evans was competent and not mentally retarded under relevant legal standards. It noted Evans's intellectual functioning was within acceptable limits, with a full-scale IQ of 87. Pretrial counsel did not contest Evans's competence, and the trial court was vigilant in ensuring his competency throughout the proceedings. The court found no violation of Evans's rights regarding competence to stand trial.

Evans, citing Dr. Stanulis’s affidavit, claims to suffer from multiple psychological impairments and neuropsychological deficits, arguing he should be exempt from the death penalty due to permanent mental illness. He asserts that the rationale for banning the death penalty for intellectually disabled inmates should similarly apply to those with serious mental illnesses or neurocognitive disorders. The State disputes Evans’s assertion of serious mental illness and contends that he is essentially seeking to broaden the definition of intellectual disability, a request previously denied in Dickerson v. State, where the court ruled that mental illness does not exempt a defendant from the death penalty as outlined in precedents like Atkins and Roper. The court emphasized that the U.S. Supreme Court has not recognized mental illness as a basis for exclusion from the death penalty eligibility. Consequently, Evans’s request for post-conviction relief (PCR) is denied, as he fails to show a substantial denial of state or federal rights. The court concludes that Evans’s PCR claims lack merit and formally denies the relief sought.