State of Iowa v. Mariana T. Lesnic

Citation: Not availableDocket: 18-1857

Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa; March 3, 2020; Iowa; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Mariana Lesnic was convicted of first-degree murder after a jury trial. She appealed her conviction, sentence, and judgment, asserting three main errors by the district court: (1) failing to suspend proceedings for a second competency evaluation under Iowa Code chapter 812; (2) ruling that she was competent to represent herself; and (3) not assessing her ability to pay restitution. 

The case originated on September 6, 2017, when Lesnic shot Ernest Kummer at a rest area on Interstate 80 and subsequently called 911. Police found a loaded handgun in her purse and discovered Kummer deceased in his semi-truck, with gunshot wounds to the head. Following her arrest, Lesnic requested to represent herself, prompting the appointment of attorney Eric Tindal to assess her competency. 

A competency evaluation by Dr. Abraham Assad concluded that Lesnic was competent to stand trial and to waive her right to counsel, despite showing signs of adjustment disorder with anxiety. Dr. Assad noted her reluctance to discuss her mental health and her dissatisfaction with Tindal's approach. During the competency hearing, Lesnic struggled to grasp court procedures and evidentiary rules but insisted on self-representation. The court ultimately found that she knowingly accepted the risks involved and appointed standby counsel to assist her. 

The appellate court affirmed Lesnic's conviction but vacated part of her sentence, reversed another part, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Attorney Andersen expressed concerns regarding Lesnic's competency during a case management conference prior to trial, citing interview materials from the State indicating that Lesnic's ex-husband, son, and ex-boyfriend believed she might have an undiagnosed paranoid delusional disorder. Lesnic dismissed these opinions as irrelevant since she had not communicated with those individuals and contended that they did not alter her statements to Dr. Assad. The trial court determined these statements did not necessitate a new competency hearing, allowing the trial to proceed.

During the trial, Lesnic did not present an opening statement, introduced no evidence beyond her own testimony, and did not object to the State’s evidence or question the jury instructions. She concluded with a brief closing statement and did not pursue any post-trial motions. Lesnic was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole, along with financial restitution to the victim's family and the Crime Victim Assistance Program.

Lesnic appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by not ordering a competency evaluation after the case management conference and again before sentencing. The appellate review focuses on whether a substantial question regarding competency existed at any relevant time. Due process mandates that a competency evaluation is necessary if specific facts suggesting a mental disorder are presented. Iowa law requires the court to suspend proceedings to assess these claims if a defendant or their attorney raises such concerns. The appellate court will review the trial court's actions de novo, ensuring that the law was correctly applied and that findings are supported by substantial evidence.

The applicant must demonstrate probable cause for a competency hearing, which a court may initiate on its own if specific facts warrant it, per Iowa Code § 812.3(1). A competency hearing is generally required when there is reasonable belief, based on the record, that a substantial question regarding the defendant's competency exists. Relevant factors include the defendant’s irrational behavior, demeanor during trial, and any prior medical opinions regarding competency (Jones v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265, 270; State v. Edwards, 507 N.W.2d 393, 395).

In the case of Lesnic, the trial court did not err in refusing to order a new competency hearing despite family claims of a potential undiagnosed mental disorder, as these claims were unsupported by medical professionals and contradicted by existing medical evaluations. A history of mental illness alone does not necessitate a competency hearing under Iowa law or due process, as established in Einfeldt, 914 N.W.2d at 783 n.3. 

Lesnic also argued that her behavior during self-representation indicated incompetency, which should have prompted the court to order a competency evaluation prior to sentencing. However, the court found that her previous mental health treatment demonstrated insight into her condition, undermining claims of incompetency based solely on ineffective self-representation. The key focus of competency assessments is whether the defendant can appreciate the charges, understand proceedings, and assist in their defense (Iowa Code § 812.3(1)). Dr. Assad’s report confirmed Lesnic's competence to stand trial and waive counsel, and her conduct during trial was deemed professional, further supporting the trial court's decision not to mandate additional evaluations.

Both factors indicate a lack of probable cause for a further competency hearing regarding Lesnic. The examination of Lesnic’s conduct during the trial reveals she did not desire assistance from counsel; however, there is no evidence she suffered from a mental disorder that impaired her understanding of the proceedings. Lesnic did consult standby counsel about preemptory strikes and her limited but relevant questioning of State witnesses demonstrates engagement. Her testimony was presented logically, supporting the conclusion that the trial court acted correctly in not scheduling an additional competency hearing.

Lesnic contends the trial court failed to adequately investigate her competency for self-representation, citing insufficient initial inquiry and her trial behavior as evidence of her alleged mental incapacity. She seeks either a remand for a new trial or for a full investigation into her mental health to determine if she was competent to represent herself. The right to self-representation is guaranteed under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, but states can restrict this right if the defendant lacks the capacity to conduct a defense without counsel. The trial court must assess a mentally ill or incapacitated defendant's ability to self-represent, especially if previously deemed competent to stand trial.

Lesnic claims the trial court's competency investigation was inadequate due to her inconsistent statements regarding her mental health history. However, the court had ordered a psychiatric evaluation to determine her competency under the Edwards standard. Dr. Assad, the evaluator, concluded she was competent for self-representation, noting her inconsistent history and guardedness. His evaluation remains the sole medical evidence concerning her mental health and ability to self-represent.

Dr. Assad noted that individuals may exhibit guardedness for reasons unrelated to mental illness, attributing her own guardedness with those in the legal system to cultural factors. During a competency hearing, the trial court extensively questioned Lesnic regarding her understanding of court procedures and self-representation, emphasizing the risks of proceeding without legal counsel. The court expressed serious concern about Lesnic’s lack of legal knowledge, urging her not to represent herself, yet she insisted on doing so despite the warnings.

Upon review, the court found that it had adequately assessed Lesnic's competency to waive her right to counsel and represent herself. Lesnic later argued that evidence from a case management conference and her trial conduct indicated her incompetence, claiming the trial court erred by not ordering another competency hearing. However, the court noted that the individuals who provided statements during the conference were not medical professionals and their motives were questionable, especially since Lesnic had not been in contact with them for some time. Their lay opinions were insufficient to prove that Lesnic had a severe mental illness preventing her from self-representation, especially in light of Dr. Assad’s evaluation.

The court also found that Lesnic’s performance during the trial did not demonstrate a severe mental illness. Her lack of engagement in trial activities, such as asking questions or making objections, was cited as evidence of incompetence. However, the court rejected the notion that poor trial skills equated to incompetence for self-representation, asserting that self-represented defendants often perform worse than attorneys, and this standard should not dictate findings of incompetence.

The Edwards inquiry focuses on the defendant's competence to represent themselves, not on their lack of legal skill. The defendant's choice to self-represent, even if detrimental, must be respected due to the fundamental principles of law. Competence is assessed based on the defendant's ability to perform basic tasks necessary for their defense, irrespective of any mental impairment. Lesnic had standby counsel available during her trial and her limited use of this assistance does not indicate a mental illness that would compromise her self-representation ability. The trial court is best suited to evaluate a defendant's mental capacity on a case-by-case basis. After reviewing the circumstances, it was concluded that Lesnic was competent to represent herself and did not exhibit signs of a mental disorder that would affect her understanding of the proceedings.

Regarding restitution, both parties agree that the trial court's restitution order should be vacated and remanded due to its lack of knowledge about the final restitution amount at the time of ordering payment. Lesnic contends the court failed to evaluate her reasonable ability to pay costs before imposing them. The Iowa Supreme Court stipulates that a final restitution order should only be made once all restitution items are presented and assessed against the offender's ability to pay, which may require updated financial information. Therefore, the restitution portion of the sentencing order is vacated, and the case is remanded for the trial court to finalize the restitution order and determine Lesnic’s ability to pay. The conviction is affirmed, while the sentence is partially vacated, reversed in part, and remanded.