United States v. Terrance Jones

Citation: Not availableDocket: 18-35457

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; March 3, 2020; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of Terrance Lee Jones's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his criminal sentence, which had been enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) following his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm. The district court initially ruled that Jones's motion was untimely but acknowledged that Jones's prior conviction for Colorado burglary was not a violent felony under the modified categorical approach, implying he was ineligible for the ACCA enhancement. However, the appellate panel determined that Jones's prior conviction for Colorado second-degree burglary constituted a violent felony, referencing the relevant Colorado statute and the Supreme Court's definition in *United States v. Stitt*. Consequently, the panel did not address the certified question regarding the assertion of actual innocence in overcoming procedural defaults, as they concluded that Jones was properly subject to the ACCA enhancement due to his prior conviction.

A "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) includes any felony classified as burglary. A crime qualifies as burglary if its elements align with or are narrower than those of the generic burglary offense, which involves unlawful entry into a structure with intent to commit a crime. The Supreme Court has clarified that "a building or other structure" can include vehicles designed for overnight use. Courts employ a modified categorical approach to determine if a statute is divisible into different offenses based on whether statutory alternatives carry distinct punishments. If a statute is deemed divisible, courts may refer to limited documents, such as indictments or jury instructions, to ascertain the specific crime and its elements for a conviction.

In the case of Jones, who pleaded guilty in Colorado to second degree burglary as a class three felony, the charge specified unlawful entry into the victims' dwelling. Under Colorado law, second degree burglary occurs when someone unlawfully enters a building or structure with intent to commit a crime. The statute is classified as a class 4 felony, escalating to a class 3 felony for burglaries involving dwellings or the theft of controlled substances. The terms "dwelling" and "building" have specific definitions under Colorado law that include various structures, such as vehicles. The statute exhibits divisibility concerning different penalties for various subsections but is not divisible regarding the types of structures constituting a dwelling. The determination of whether a "dwelling" meets the federal definition of a "building or other structure" hinges on whether it is adapted for overnight accommodation, as established in recent case law.

A "building" under Colorado law (18-4-101) encompasses a wide range of structures, including vehicles designed for overnight accommodation and those meant solely for property shelter. In contrast, the definition of "dwelling" in 18-1-901 refines this concept to include only the generic element. For a vehicle to qualify as a dwelling in burglary cases, it must be specifically adapted for overnight use and regularly utilized for habitation; thus, a vehicle used occasionally by a homeless person or solely for storage does not meet these criteria. The court affirms that Jones's prior conviction for second degree burglary of a dwelling aligns with the Supreme Court's interpretation of burglary, leading to his proper sentencing under 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1).