State v. Purnell

Citation: Not availableDocket: 0701018040

Court: Superior Court of Delaware; February 18, 2020; Delaware; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Mark Purnell filed a second Motion for Postconviction Relief in May 2018, claiming new evidence indicates he is factually innocent of the acts leading to his conviction. He also raised procedurally barred claims, asserting that the previous version of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 should apply. The Court rejected this assertion, determining no legal basis exists for applying the pre-amendment rule. Consequently, only Purnell's claim of actual innocence was considered. The Court found that his claim did not sufficiently demonstrate a strong inference of his innocence, resulting in the denial of his Motion.

The factual background details a crime that occurred on January 30, 2006, when Ernest and Tameka Giles were approached while walking in Wilmington. After Mrs. Giles refused to surrender her belongings, she was shot and subsequently died from her injuries. Investigators discovered inconsistencies in Mr. Giles’s statements, a history of domestic violence, and suspicions regarding his involvement, particularly concerning an unaccounted tax refund check. Mr. Giles’s shifting accounts during police interviews raised further questions about his credibility. Ultimately, the investigation concluded that Purnell and Ronald Harris were responsible for Tameka Giles's murder.

Purnell Mark Purnell and co-defendant Ronald Harris faced multiple charges: Felony Murder in the First Degree, Attempted Robbery in the First Degree, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, and Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited. One week before trial, Harris pled guilty to attempted robbery and conspiracy. 

During the State's case, fifteen witnesses were called. Eyewitness Angela Rayne testified she observed two teenagers, later identified as Purnell and Harris, shortly before a gunshot occurred, resulting in the shooting of Tameka Giles. Although she recognized one of the teenagers, her visibility was limited due to darkness and their hoods. Rayne admitted to being under the influence of crack cocaine during her police interview. 

Detective Tabor, the lead investigator, confirmed that Rayne identified Harris from a photo lineup and stated she was "100 percent" certain. He also noted Purnell's presence with Harris during a prior police operation. Kellee Mitchell, a long-time acquaintance of Purnell, testified about conversations in which Purnell allegedly confessed to robbing and killing Mrs. Giles, though he could not recall some details. The State presented recordings of Mitchell's statements and a call between Purnell and Mitchell's brother, where Purnell admitted involvement in the murder. Purnell's defense counsel challenged Mitchell's credibility by highlighting his motivations for testifying, including his initial suspect status and a deal made with police to drop charges in exchange for his testimony.

Purnell's counsel questioned him about the acquisition of a .38 revolver shared with Dawan Harris. The State presented written phrases found on a plywood board in Purnell's cell, which forensic expert Georgia Carter confirmed were authored by him. The phrases included threats directed at Kellee Mitch for allegedly snitching. 

Corey Hammond, a State witness, testified about seeing Purnell and Harris on the day of the murder at Harris' aunt's house, where Purnell expressed financial distress and had a gun. After hearing a gunshot an hour later, Hammond saw Mrs. Giles on the ground but did not see Purnell or Harris. He later recounted Purnell's admission of guilt regarding the murder. 

Etienne Williams, Mitchell’s girlfriend, testified about overhearing a phone call where Purnell confessed to killing the lady and warned her mother to tell Mitchell to run. Aqueshia Williams, Harris' ex-girlfriend, corroborated this by stating Purnell claimed their boyfriends were in jail for something he did and warned them to remain silent about his involvement.

Corporal Dempsey from the Wilmington Police Department testified about collecting the bullet casing from the murder scene and noted that Mrs. Giles had cashed a tax check on the day of her death. Dempsey also confirmed that Mitchell was a suspect and mentioned the shared .38 revolver found with Harris and Mitchell during their arrest. 

Ronald Harris, previously co-indicted and having accepted a plea deal, testified that he pled guilty to Attempted Robbery and Conspiracy, agreeing to testify against Purnell. He stated he had only met Purnell once prior to the murder.

Harris testified that he and Purnell had planned a robbery on the day of the murder. Earlier, Harris had been detained and searched by police at Fifth and Jefferson Streets. After meeting Purnell at Compton Towers, they approached a couple who had just disembarked from a bus. Purnell brandished a gun and demanded their belongings, prompting Harris to flee just before a shot was fired. Harris later admitted to lying in his initial police interview, claiming he was not involved and did not know Purnell, but confessed to Detective Tabor in a follow-up interview. He stated that he ran away because the robbery was not meant to cause harm. During cross-examination, Harris claimed he had just met Purnell that day and acknowledged a plea deal he could not refuse. Testimony indicated Harris had a learning deficiency, as he struggled to read a document presented by the prosecutor. 

Purnell's defense included a motion to admit a statement from Mr. Giles, who did not identify Purnell in a photo array, suggesting the crime was random and unplanned. The trial court denied this motion, with the State arguing the statement lacked reliability and further implicated Harris, who confessed his involvement. 

In Purnell's defense case, witnesses were called, including Dawnell Williams, who heard gunshots and saw two men fleeing. Latoya Moody testified that both men were her cousins and noted Purnell's previous injury, which required him to use crutches. Cross-examination revealed Purnell's inability to stand on his injured leg during the relevant time. Marline Smith corroborated Purnell's limited mobility by stating she saw him resting in a chair with his leg elevated on the night of January 30, 2006.

Doris Honie, Purnell’s grandmother, testified as a defense witness, stating that Purnell was unable to walk the night of January 30, 2006, and remained chair-bound for five to six days post-surgery. She claimed he did not leave her apartment from January 23 to February 6, 2006, and that he received crutches only about a week after surgery. Honie sent Purnell at least 22 envelopes during 2007-2008 but, when questioned, denied writing letters, claiming she only sent money orders. Despite the State quoting a letter where she affirmed Purnell's presence in her apartment on January 30, 2006, Honie stated she forgot about sending any letters. 

George White, a youth rehabilitation counselor, testified that he saw Purnell using crutches from February 1 to February 3, 2006, and the State used a family court document to show Purnell was not in Honie’s apartment during that timeframe. 

In rebuttal, Dr. Rubano, the surgeon, testified that he could not confirm whether Purnell could walk on January 30, 2006, noting Purnell's noncompliance with follow-up appointments. He described the surgery as serious and explained it using Purnell’s knee as a prop. A physical therapist’s report indicated Purnell refused crutches, opting instead for a wheelchair. Dr. Rubano noted Purnell had approximately 13 staples post-surgery and referenced a nurse's report indicating no pain complaints at 9 PM on January 22, 2006.

On April 25, 2008, the jury found Purnell guilty of Second Degree Murder and other counts. He was sentenced to 77 years, suspended after 45 for probation. Purnell appealed, challenging the exclusion of certain statements and juror misconduct. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's rulings on August 25, 2009. Subsequently, Purnell filed a postconviction relief motion on March 25, 2010, later amended in 2011, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The initial review found that defense counsel provided competent representation throughout the trial.

Counsel's performance in the proceedings was deemed active, diligent, and capable. The Court ruled Mr. Giles' statements lacked sufficient reliability for evidence admission. The denial of a mistrial was upheld, with the trial judge's instructions deemed adequate alternatives. The Commissioner recommended denying Purnell’s motion, which the Superior Court affirmed after a de novo review, stating Purnell's claims lacked merit. Following Purnell’s appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court also affirmed the denial after another de novo review. 

On May 14, 2018, Purnell, with counsel, filed a second Motion for Postconviction Relief, comprising a 78-page brief and four exhibit volumes, raising ten claims related to actual innocence, ineffective assistance of counsel, failure to investigate key witnesses, prosecutorial misconduct, and cumulative error undermining trial fairness. 

A hearing on September 4, 2019, addressed whether to apply the 2005 or 2014 versions of Rule 61 to Purnell's Motion. The Court allowed post-hearing briefs to determine the applicable version and the need for an evidentiary hearing. Purnell argued for the 2005 version due to fair notice concerns, referencing Bronshtein v. Horn and State v. Burroughs, which would permit consideration of a successive motion in the interest of justice under certain conditions. The State countered with references to Delaware case law supporting the amended Rule's constitutionality. Purnell replied, asserting that the fair notice issue was unprecedented in Delaware. The Court reviewed all submitted materials, including trial transcripts and prior opinions.

The analysis will first establish the applicable version of Rule 61 for Purnell’s Motion, then evaluate the new evidence he claims supports his alleged actual innocence. Under Rule 61(i)(2) (2005), any ground for relief not raised in a prior postconviction proceeding is barred unless justice warrants its consideration. The State contends that Purnell’s Motion is procedurally barred under Rule 61(d)(2) (current version), which mandates that a second or subsequent postconviction motion be summarily dismissed unless it meets specific criteria: it must either plead new evidence that strongly infers actual innocence or assert a new, retroactively applicable constitutional law rendering the conviction invalid. Summary dismissal indicates that the court rejects the motion without addressing the merits. The version of Rule 61 determines which claims may be considered; if the 2014 version applies, claims lacking new evidence or applicable law will be dismissed. Conversely, if the 2005 version applies, the court may review otherwise barred claims if they meet one of the exceptions.

The current version of Rule 61 took effect on June 4, 2014, removing two exceptions to its procedural bars. Purnell argues that his case resembles *State v. Burroughs*, where unique circumstances warranted the application of the pre-amendment version of Rule 61. In *Burroughs*, the defendant faced ineffective assistance of counsel claims after exhausting appeals and was misled by his attorney, leading to an untimely appeal that the Supreme Court deemed outside its jurisdiction. However, the Court remanded the case for the appointment of counsel to help Burroughs file a second postconviction relief motion under Rule 61, acknowledging the impact of his attorney's ineffective assistance.

On June 4, 2014, Rule 61 was amended to introduce the 61(i) bars after Burroughs filed his initial post-conviction motion, but prior to the Superior Court receiving the case on remand on April 4, 2016. The parties agreed that Burroughs' motion would be evaluated under the law in effect at the time of remand, which permitted his counsel to review the record and assert claims of ineffective assistance by May 2, 2015. The Superior Court ruled it would consider the merits of claims typically barred by the new Rule 61(1) due to the unique procedural circumstances surrounding Burroughs, specifically that his prior counsel's motion was governed by the version of Rule 61 effective on July 1, 2005.

In contrast, Purnell's situation differs significantly as he was able to appeal his first Rule 61 motion to the Supreme Court, providing him an opportunity that Burroughs did not have. Purnell's second motion, initiated in May 2018, was a distinct submission following the Supreme Court's affirmation of the denial of his first motion, and occurred after the amendment to Rule 61. Therefore, Purnell's procedural circumstances do not warrant the same exceptions applied in Burroughs' case.

Purnell's reference to the Bronshtein case is also unpersuasive. Bronshtein, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in Pennsylvania, faced a procedural bar similar to Rule 61 when he filed a petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) over a year after his judgment became final. The Pennsylvania courts had previously relaxed this bar for death sentence challenges, but a 1998 ruling reversed that leniency, leading to the dismissal of Bronshtein's untimely petition. His subsequent federal habeas corpus petition was also barred due to procedural default, which prevents federal review of state law decisions that are independent and adequate to support the state court's judgment.

For a state procedural rule to be deemed adequate, it must have been "firmly established and regularly followed" by the time the petitioner defaulted, which is defined as when the defendant could no longer file a timely petition. The Court of Appeals found that as of October 20, 1998, the strict enforcement of the time bar was not adequately established, thus allowing for federal habeas review. The court suggested that a transitional rule could have provided adequate notice to potential filers about the enforcement of the time bar.

Purell's argument for applying the 2005 version of Rule 61 based on Bronshtein's analysis was rejected, as Bronshtein is not controlling precedent and its standard does not mandate applying the 2005 rule since it was established when Purnell defaulted. Furthermore, the Bronshtein decision pertains only to federal court jurisdiction regarding habeas corpus petitions after state procedural dismissals. In contrast, Purnell's situation does not invoke the procedural default claim as described in Bronshtein. 

Instead, the Court emphasized adherence to Delaware state law and precedent, affirming that unless a constitutional violation is found, it will continue to apply the current version of Rule 61, consistent with Delaware Supreme Court rulings. The constitutionality of applying amended Rule 61, even for convictions finalized before the amendments, was previously upheld in Turnage v. State, where claims of due process violations were deemed meritless.

The United States Supreme Court has established that states are not obligated to provide postconviction relief. Turnage contends that the state has granted a right to postconviction relief that it is not constitutionally required to offer. The amended Rule 61 enhances due process and court access beyond constitutional mandates, allowing a first petition to be filed within one year after a judgment or conviction becomes final, and permitting successive petitions under specific circumstances. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that the post-June 2014 revision of Rule 61 is constitutional and does not infringe on rights. Specifically, it noted that Purnell's claims are subject to procedural bars under the amended Rule 61, including a one-year time limit and successive motions bar. Purnell's conviction became final in 2009, and he defaulted on these claims by not filing within the one-year time frame. His second motion, filed in May 2018, also triggered the successive motions bar. Thus, any hypothetical analysis of adequacy regarding the Bronshtein case would still apply the 2014 version of Rule 61, which was already established by then. The court concludes that Purnell's only viable claim is one of actual innocence, requiring new reliable evidence not presented at trial. For evidence to be considered "new" under Rule 61, it must have been discovered after the trial.

Purnell must demonstrate that the new evidence could not have been discovered before trial despite due diligence and is not merely cumulative or impeaching. To satisfy this, he must show that reasonable efforts were made to obtain the evidence, and that obstacles were encountered which could not be overcome with due diligence. The concept of a "strong inference" suggests that the evidence must indicate that a reasonable juror would likely not have convicted Purnell. A court will evaluate all evidence, old and new, without strict adherence to trial admissibility rules, considering the timing of the evidence submission and the credibility of the witnesses.

Purnell's new evidence is categorized into six types: recantations from Kellee Mitchell, Ronald Harris, and Corey Hammond; new medical evidence demonstrating Purnell's incapacity to commit the crime; new ballistic evidence indicating the shell casing's irrelevance; and evidence suggesting the guilt of Dawan Harris and Kellee Mitchell. Purnell argues that this evidence would have influenced the jury's verdict at trial.

Specifically, Kellee Mitchell's recantation includes an affidavit stating he never heard Purnell discuss the murder, contradicting his prior trial testimony where he suggested Purnell bragged about it. Purnell supports this claim with affidavits from Dawon Brown, who denies witnessing any such conversation, and Andrew Moore, a fellow inmate of Mitchell's, who states that Mitchell confessed to lying out of fear. Purnell contends that Moore's declaration provides context that goes beyond mere impeachment of Mitchell's testimony. The State counters that Mitchell's affidavit is not new evidence, as it mirrors his trial statements, wherein he claimed to have told the truth.

Purnell's trial counsel presented evidence questioning the credibility of witness Mitchell, who had previously been a primary suspect, arguing that this did not constitute new evidence that would affect the trial's outcome. The State contends that neither Mitchell's affidavit nor Brown's affidavit introduces new evidence as they relate to statements made prior to trial. The Court acknowledges the distinction between Mitchell's trial testimony and his affidavit but concludes that this does not significantly alter its impact. Purnell admits that Brown's affidavit is not new and notes that neither defense counsel nor detectives verified Mitchell's claims regarding Dawon Brown, suggesting that the alleged conversation about the shooting never occurred. Purnell’s assertion that Moore’s declaration indicates why Mitchell lied is also dismissed as it is merely cumulative, as the jury was already aware of Mitchell's status as a suspect during trial.

Additionally, Purnell argues Ronald Harris' recantation, through his parents' affidavits, qualifies as new evidence. These affidavits claim Harris testified to return home, that his trial testimony was confused, and highlight his intellectual disabilities. Purnell maintains that this evidence, alongside harsh interrogation tactics, supports Harris' credibility. However, the State argues that Harris' recantation is not new evidence, as Purnell's trial counsel had already presented information regarding Harris' social connections with Purnell, cross-examined him about inconsistencies, and had access to interrogation videos at trial.

The State argues that affidavits from Harris' parents do not constitute a credible recantation of Harris' trial testimony, as they are not direct statements from Harris and do not contradict his original testimony. The Court concludes that this evidence does not qualify as new; prior rulings from the Superior and Supreme Courts indicated there was sufficient supporting evidence for Harris' testimony. Affidavits from Harris' parents primarily serve to impeach his credibility and are unlikely to alter the trial's outcome. 

Purnell also submitted three affidavits claiming Corey Hammond recanted his trial testimony. These include statements from Alfred Lewis, who asserts that Hammond’s testimony was false, Naco Hammond, who describes her husband's relationship with police and influence over Corey, and Troy Hammond, who states Corey was not present at the murder scene. Despite Purnell's claims, the State argues these affidavits do not constitute new evidence and are merely impeachment evidence that would not affect the trial's result. The Court agrees, noting that Hammond's statements were accessible during the trial and already addressed through cross-examination. Therefore, the evidence presented does not demonstrate Purnell's actual innocence.

Hammond's credibility was undermined during cross-examination, rendering subsequent evidence cumulative. Purnell introduced a new medical opinion asserting he was likely unable to run on the murder date, contradicting earlier trial testimony. Although Purnell acknowledged that the medical evidence was new in type rather than kind, he provided declarations from Dr. McGuigan, William Davis, and Khiry Brown to support his claim of physical incapacity. Purnell argued this evidence could potentially alter the trial outcome. However, the State contended that the medical evidence was not new, as Purnell's medical records and witnesses had already established his reliance on crutches during the trial. The court concurred that the evidence was cumulative and not new, noting Purnell had not demonstrated he could not have obtained the evidence despite diligent efforts. Furthermore, it concluded that the medical evidence did not definitively prove Purnell's inability to run on the crime date.

Regarding new ballistic evidence, Purnell claimed it demonstrated that a 9mm shell casing could not have traveled 50 feet post-ejection, yet his postconviction counsel acknowledged this evidence was available pre-trial. The State argued that the ballistics evidence was not new since Purnell's trial counsel had already contested its relevance, and the jury had been informed of alternative theories regarding the murder weapon. The court agreed that the ballistic evidence was not new and would likely not influence the trial's outcome due to its peripheral nature in relation to the core issue of the shooter's identity.

Purnell argues that new evidence regarding the acquisition of a .38-caliber revolver by Dawan Harris and Kellee Mitchell could alter the outcome of his trial. He submitted a video and transcript of police interrogations, highlighting Cameron Johnson's statement that the revolver was stolen weeks prior to the murder, contradicting Harris' timeline. The State counters that this evidence is neither new nor impactful, as the jury was already aware of Mitchell and Harris as suspects and that Mitchell lacked an alibi. The court determined that the interrogations do not constitute new evidence since the information was available during the trial and noted Purnell did not demonstrate diligent efforts to obtain it. The court found that Purnell’s additional evidence fails to establish a strong inference of his actual innocence, and his claim of actual innocence was denied. Consequently, all other claims in Purnell’s second Motion for Postconviction Relief were summarily dismissed. The ruling was made on February 19, 2020.