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Bussey v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 324, 2019

Court: Supreme Court of Delaware; February 10, 2020; Delaware; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Tyrone Bussey was convicted by a Superior Court jury of thirteen criminal offenses, including aggravated menacing and possession of a firearm during a felony, arising from a domestic dispute with his girlfriend, Kolanda Shelton. He was sentenced to eleven years and 150 days of Level V incarceration, followed by decreasing supervision. After affirming his convictions on direct appeal, Bussey sought postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the admission of statements made to police and inadequate cross-examination of officers regarding report timings. The Superior Court denied his motion, and the appellate court affirmed, concluding that Bussey did not demonstrate prejudice from his trial counsel's performance.

The incident began when Shelton reported that Bussey assaulted her and threatened her with a gun. Shelton's son, also threatened, called the police. Following Bussey's arrest, a no-contact order was issued, which he violated by contacting Shelton multiple times while detained, discussing altering her police statement to help his defense. At trial, Shelton and her son provided inconsistent testimony, which the trial court allowed as prior statements under 11 Del. C. 3507.

Bussey argues that the Superior Court improperly denied his motion for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He asserts that his counsel lacked a strategic basis for not challenging the admissibility and reliability of Shelton’s 3507 statements, which he views as inadmissible narratives. Additionally, he criticizes his counsel for failing to cross-examine two officers about the timing of their police reports, which were written months after the incident, impacting their recollections of Shelton’s statements. Bussey contends these statements were prejudicial, particularly since Shelton’s trial testimony contradicted her earlier claims about him threatening her with a gun, a crucial element for the charges against him.

The State counters that Bussey's claims are procedurally barred under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(4), asserting that his focus on the 3507 statements essentially revisits a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim previously rejected on direct appeal. Although the State did not raise this argument at the trial level, it was noted that both parties agreed there were no procedural bars to the review of Bussey's claims.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that their attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this deficiency prejudiced the case outcome, requiring a reasonable probability that a different result would have occurred without the attorney's shortcomings. Despite recognizing some legitimate concerns regarding the State's proof of Shelton's statements, the court concluded that even if Bussey's counsel should have objected, the failure to do so did not result in prejudice to Bussey's case.

Bussey’s trial strategy aimed to prove he did not possess a gun during the altercation with Shelton, yet he did not contest Shelton's statement to police claiming he threatened her with a gun. Shelton confirmed this assertion during her testimony, acknowledging she informed the police that Bussey was armed. Bussey's trial counsel noted that while Shelton claimed her statements included false allegations about Bussey's actions, the occurrence of a false statement to police was undisputed. Additionally, even if Bussey's counsel had successfully challenged Shelton’s statements, sufficient evidence existed for the jury to determine he had a gun. Testimony from Shelton's neighbor indicated she saw Bussey with what appeared to be a firearm, and an unchallenged statement from Shelton's son corroborated that Bussey threatened them with a gun. Furthermore, recorded prison conversations between Bussey and Shelton suggested he had a gun, as Shelton remarked about not knowing its location after Bussey accused her of revealing where he hid it. Ultimately, it was concluded that the admission of Shelton's statements did not likely alter the trial's outcome. Consequently, Bussey did not meet the prejudice requirement outlined in Strickland, leading to the Superior Court's denial of his post-conviction relief motion under Rule 61 being upheld. The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.