Bryant Dowdy v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Citation: Not availableDocket: 19A-PC-1561

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; February 6, 2020; Indiana; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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A Memorandum Decision issued by the Indiana Court of Appeals on February 7, 2020, pertains to the case of Bryant Dowdy, who faced multiple charges for murder and robbery. Dowdy was initially charged in two separate cases: the Patel case and the Clanton case, which occurred roughly one day apart. He was convicted in the Clanton case first, receiving a seventy-five-year sentence, followed by a conviction in the Patel case, where he received a sixty-year sentence to be served consecutively.

In 2017, Dowdy sought post-conviction relief for the Patel case, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to dismiss the Patel charges after his Clanton conviction and that the charges from both cases should have been combined. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing and ultimately denied his petition. On appeal, the Court concluded that the post-conviction court did not err in its decision, affirming the denial of Dowdy’s petition. 

The factual background reveals that on December 16, 2012, Dowdy, in collaboration with Dominique Clanton, planned a robbery of Nishant Patel, who had listed an iPhone for sale online. The robbery culminated in Dowdy fatally shooting Patel during their meeting.

On December 18, 2012, Dowdy met with Dominique and Eric regarding the sale of a stolen phone. During the meeting, Dowdy shot both victims in the head after handing the phone to Eric. Dominique fell out of the vehicle and called for help, while a nearby driver alerted authorities. Police found Dominique injured but alive, and Eric dead from multiple gunshot wounds. The gun used was identified as belonging to Patel. 

On January 14, 2013, Dowdy was charged in two separate cases: the murder and robbery of Eric and the attempted murder of Dominique. The Clanton case went to trial first on April 27, 2015, where the prosecution introduced evidence from the Patel case to establish Dowdy's motive. Despite Dowdy's objections, the court permitted this evidence. The jury convicted Dowdy of murder and attempted murder, sentencing him to fifty years and twenty-five years, respectively.

The Patel case trial commenced on April 18, 2016, where similar evidence was presented to establish Dowdy's motive and intent. The court instructed the jury to consider the evidence solely for its relevance to corroboration and identity. Dowdy was convicted on all counts, receiving a sixty-year sentence for murder and a concurrent four-year sentence for robbery, to be served consecutively with the Clanton case sentence.

Dowdy appealed his convictions in two separate cases, raising issues regarding the admissibility of evidence from December 17 and 18, 2012. In the Clanton appeal, the court found the evidence admissible under Rule 404(b), as it was essential for the jury to understand the relationships and context surrounding the subsequent events, specifically Dowdy's interactions with Dominique and Eric leading to the crimes on December 18. This evidence was also pertinent to establishing Dowdy’s motive and identity as the perpetrator. His convictions for murder and attempted murder were upheld.

In the Patel appeal, Dowdy questioned the admission of evidence related to December 18, but the court ruled that these events were intrinsically linked to those of December 17, forming part of the complete narrative of the case, thereby affirming his convictions for murder and robbery.

Subsequently, on July 17, 2017, Dowdy filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief regarding his Patel convictions, later amended by counsel to claim ineffective assistance due to his trial counsel's failure to move for dismissal under Indiana’s successive prosecution statute. An evidentiary hearing took place on November 12, 2018, where trial counsel Carl Epstein testified, admitting his lack of familiarity with the statute and failure to file the necessary motion, which he acknowledged did not occur to him at the time. The post-conviction court considered the records from the original criminal cases during this hearing.

On June 12, 2019, the post-conviction court denied Dowdy's petition for post-conviction relief, concluding that the Patel and Clanton murder cases, while sharing some similarities, stemmed from distinct motives and circumstances. The court noted that the murders were not committed in close temporal or geographical proximity and lacked a common modus operandi, indicating that they should not have been charged together. Consequently, it was unlikely that a motion to dismiss by Dowdy's trial counsel would have succeeded, thus rendering the counsel's performance effective. 

Dowdy's appeal argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to dismiss the charges he claims were barred. Post-conviction proceedings are recognized as a narrow remedy for issues unknown during the original trial or unavailable on direct appeal. The burden is on the petitioner to prove claims by a preponderance of the evidence, and those denied relief face a strict standard of review. To overturn the post-conviction court’s decision, Dowdy must demonstrate that the evidence overwhelmingly supports a conclusion contrary to that reached by the court. The post-conviction court has the authority to weigh evidence and assess witness credibility. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to effective counsel, as established in Strickland v. Washington.

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency resulted in prejudice to the petitioner. Deficient performance is defined as falling below an objective standard of reasonableness, while prejudice occurs if there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different absent the errors. The standard for "reasonable probability" means it must be sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. A strong presumption exists that counsel acted effectively, and the defendant bears the burden to provide compelling evidence to overcome this presumption.

In the context of Dowdy's case, he argues that his counsel was ineffective for not moving to dismiss charges in the Patel case based on Indiana’s successive prosecution statute, following his conviction in the Clanton case. For such a claim to succeed, Dowdy must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that a motion to dismiss would have been granted. The statute prohibits prosecution if a prior case involved the same acts or offenses. Dowdy was convicted in the Clanton case, fulfilling the first two criteria for dismissal under Indiana Code. The key issue hinges on whether the offenses in the Patel case should have been included in the Clanton prosecution, which relies on the joinder statute that allows for joining charges based on related conduct or connected acts. Thus, if the offenses were related and should have been charged together, the motion to dismiss would likely have been granted.

To assess whether contemporaneous crimes should be charged together under Indiana Code section 35-34-1-9(a)(2), the court evaluates if the crimes are connected by distinctive characteristics, a common modus operandi, and shared motivations. This evaluation requires a pattern of activity that goes beyond merely satisfying statutory elements. The Indiana Supreme Court has indicated that charges based on the same conduct or a series of acts that form part of a single scheme should be joined for trial, as this prevents the State from pursuing multiple prosecutions for interconnected acts, which it does at its own risk.

In the context of Dowdy's case, he asserts that the two murder cases against him should have been mandatorily joined as they represent a series of connected acts. He differentiates his argument from the State's position and the post-conviction court's conclusion that the crimes were not part of a single scheme or plan. Despite Dowdy's insistence on this distinction, the court suggests that such parsing of the statute is unwarranted, as established case law does not treat these concepts as fundamentally different. In the cited case of Williams, the court found two cases involving a drug transaction and subsequent possession of drugs in a vacant apartment to be interconnected, thus warranting their combined prosecution. Dowdy's failure to articulate how his analysis diverges from the court's established standards further undermines his position.

Successive prosecution is barred when crimes are committed at nearly the same time and location, as seen in cases like D.T.A. v. State and Haywood v. State, where the offenses were closely related. In contrast, State v. Dixon demonstrates that if offenses, such as operating while intoxicated and criminal recklessness, stem from different incidents or lack a direct connection in time and place, they may be prosecuted separately without violating Indiana law. Similarly, Richardson v. State illustrates that separated crimes, even if related by the stolen property, do not constitute a single scheme requiring joint prosecution. The current case aligns more closely with Dixon and Richardson, as the evidence presented was specifically tailored to show motive and identity for each separate case without overlap. The possibility of joining the cases could have led to complications in ensuring a fair trial for each charge, as the events of one case did not significantly impact the other.

Joinder restrictions prevent successive prosecutions for a single criminal transaction characterized by distinctive nature, common modus operandi, and common motive. In Dowdy's case, while his December 18 offenses may be linked to those from December 17, they do not exhibit a recognizable pattern of behavior or motive. The crimes occurred approximately twenty-four hours apart, in different locations, and involved different victims, which does not indicate a unified scheme. Although both crimes involved firearms, the use of different weapons and the commonality of gun violence further dilute the argument for a single modus operandi.

Dowdy's motive for the Patel robbery shifted to murder in an attempt to silence witnesses after the fact, illustrating distinct motivations between the two incidents. Consequently, the trial court would not have been obligated to dismiss the Patel case as a successive prosecution, had Dowdy’s counsel moved for dismissal. The evidence does not support a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion that was unlikely to succeed. The successive prosecution of the Patel case was permissible under Indiana law, and thus the post-conviction court correctly denied Dowdy's petition for relief. The court affirmed the decision.