Alabama State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. State of Alabama

Citation: Not availableDocket: 17-14443

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; February 2, 2020; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The appeal, case number 17-14443, arises from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit regarding a lawsuit filed by the Alabama State Conference of the NAACP and individual plaintiffs against the State of Alabama and its Secretary of State. The central legal issue is whether states enjoy sovereign immunity against lawsuits brought under the Voting Rights Act (VRA). The district court ruled against Alabama's claim of immunity, aligning with other circuit courts that found Congress abrogated state sovereign immunity through the VRA.

The VRA, enacted to combat racial discrimination in voting, has been largely enforced by private litigants rather than the Department of Justice, which has filed only a few enforcement actions since 2013. The court emphasized its jurisdiction to address Alabama’s immunity claim due to the immediate appealability of a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds.

It noted that while the Eleventh Amendment typically protects states from being sued by their citizens in federal court, this immunity is not absolute. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer allows Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity under its enforcement powers related to the Fourteenth Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit found that despite Alabama’s claim that the issue of immunity was moot due to the conclusion of the trial, the state still needed to defend itself in ongoing post-trial proceedings, warranting judicial intervention. The court will determine if Congress clearly intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity and acted under constitutional authority.

Congress must clearly express its intent to abrogate sovereign immunity through unmistakable language within a statute, as established in Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon. Legislative history cannot be used as evidence of such intent, although an express abrogation clause is not strictly necessary. Courts may examine the statute as a whole, including amendments, to ascertain Congress's intent. The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that Congress's clear statement does not need to be confined to a single section or contemporaneously enacted provisions.

In Atascadero, the Court found that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 lacked unequivocal statutory language to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment, as it only provided a general authorization for federal court suits without explicitly referring to States. Similarly, in Welch v. Texas, the Jones Act was deemed insufficient in expressing intent to abrogate sovereign immunity. The Court in Dellmuth recognized that while States could be considered 'logical defendants' under the Education of the Handicapped Act, this did not imply a clear abrogation of immunity.

Conversely, in Kimel, the Court determined that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) clearly indicated Congress's intention to abrogate state sovereign immunity, using explicit language that included public agencies as employers. This finding was mirrored in the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), where similar language was present. In Seminole Tribe, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) was also found to clearly express Congress's intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity, as it provided a detailed jurisdictional framework and remedial measures for disputes between States and tribes, confirming Congress's unequivocal intent through numerous references to the States within the text.

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) prohibits states and political subdivisions from implementing any voting qualifications or practices that result in the denial or abridgment of voting rights based on race (52 U.S.C. § 10301(a)). Section 3 outlines enforcement mechanisms, initially granting enforcement authority solely to the Attorney General. However, following the Supreme Court's recognition of an implied private right of action in Allen v. State Board of Elections (1969), Congress amended Section 3 in 1975 to explicitly allow private parties to sue for VRA violations.

Both the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have upheld that Congress validly abrogated state sovereignty under the VRA, establishing that states cannot discriminate against voters based on race (Mixon v. Ohio, 1999; OCA-Greater Houston v. Texas, 2017). Additionally, district courts have reached similar conclusions, affirming that Section 2 expresses a clear intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity (Ga. State Conference of NAACP v. State, 2017; Reaves v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2005).

The document asserts that the VRA allows private parties to sue states for discriminatory practices in voting, emphasizing that the language of Sections 2 and 3 imposes direct liability on states and explicitly provides remedies for violations. Unlike other statutes that broadly authorize enforcement, the VRA specifically prohibits states from imposing discriminatory voting practices and facilitates actions by "aggrieved persons" against both states and political subdivisions. The VRA is characterized as a carefully designed remedial statute aimed at holding states accountable for voting rights violations.

Congress intended for the Voting Rights Act (VRA) to allow private parties to sue States, as evidenced by the Supreme Court's recognition of private rights of action following the VRA's amendment in 1975. Historical cases, such as Chisom v. Roemer and Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, demonstrate that private parties have consistently brought lawsuits against States under § 2 of the VRA. The dissent's argument that the VRA's phrasing creates ambiguity regarding state sovereign immunity is unfounded; the statute clearly allows both the Attorney General and aggrieved individuals to initiate proceedings against States or their subdivisions. 

Alabama's contention that § 3 only allows private suits under other statutes, excluding the VRA, misreads the legislation and contradicts established Supreme Court precedent. Furthermore, while Alabama argues that a lack of sovereign immunity abrogation would not render the VRA ineffective because private parties could still sue local governments, this reasoning overlooks the intent recognized in similar cases involving other federal statutes like the FMLA and ADEA. Alabama's interpretation that Congress would have specified "this statute" rather than "any statute" if it meant to allow private action under the VRA is incorrect; the VRA itself is designed to enforce voting guarantees from the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The VRA's provisions are thus an exercise of Congress's enforcement power under these amendments, affirming that private individuals do have the right to sue under the Act.

A statute does not need to be entirely ineffective without a finding of abrogation for a court to determine Congress's intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. The text of the statute clearly demonstrates that Congress intended to impose liability on states by private parties. To abrogate state sovereign immunity, Congress must act under a valid power; it cannot do so under Article I powers but can under the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether Congress can abrogate state immunity using its Fifteenth Amendment enforcement powers. The Voting Rights Act (VRA) was intended to implement both the Fifteenth and, in some respects, the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress relied on its authority to enforce the Civil War Amendments when enacting Section 2 of the VRA, which intrudes on state sovereignty to address state-sponsored racial discrimination in voting. Both § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment allow Congress to enforce their provisions through appropriate legislation. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits concur that if § 5 permits such abrogation, so does § 2. This understanding reflects the Civil War Amendments' design as an intentional limitation on state sovereignty. Consequently, Alabama is not immune from lawsuits under § 2 of the VRA, as enforcing non-discriminatory practices in elections is a minor obligation for states. The ruling is affirmed.

Circuit Judge Branch dissents from the majority opinion, asserting that Congress did not clearly abrogate state sovereign immunity under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). Citing the Eleventh Amendment, which prohibits suits against states by citizens from other states as well as their own citizens, Branch notes that nonconsenting states cannot be sued in federal court. He references established Supreme Court precedents indicating that Congress can abrogate state immunity only if it explicitly expresses this intent and acts within its constitutional authority. The standards for determining such intent require Congress to make its abrogation intentions "unmistakably clear" in the statute's language, as reinforced by the Eleventh Circuit's adherence to the "clear statement rule." Examining the text of Section 2 of the VRA, Branch highlights that it prohibits discriminatory voting practices based on race or color and outlines conditions for establishing violations related to equal participation in political processes, but does not provide a clear abrogation of state sovereign immunity.

Section 2 prohibits states or political subdivisions from imposing voting qualifications or procedures that deny or abridge the voting rights of U.S. citizens based on race or color. However, it lacks explicit language indicating congressional intent to waive state sovereign immunity, as it does not reference the Eleventh Amendment or allow private lawsuits against states in federal court. The requirement for unequivocal and textual evidence of congressional intent for abrogation is not met, making this absence critical. The text of Section 2 is distinguished from other federal statutes, such as the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), which clearly allowed tribes to sue states in federal court, indicating an unequivocal intent to abrogate state immunity. Similarly, the Supreme Court recognized abrogation in cases like Kimel and Hibbs, where the relevant statutes explicitly permitted lawsuits against states. In contrast, Section 2 does not provide such explicit provisions, underscoring the lack of congressional intent to subject states to legal action under this provision.

In Hibbs, the Supreme Court analyzed the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), which allows employees to sue any employer, including states, in federal or state courts. The Court determined that Congress clearly intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the FMLA, satisfying the clear statement rule established in Dellmuth. However, Section 2 of the relevant statute lacks explicit language identifying the State as a proper defendant in lawsuits by private individuals, unlike the statutes in Kimel and Hibbs. Consequently, Section 2 does not meet the clear statement requirement. 

The majority's focus on the frequent references to "State" in the statute is insufficient, as the Supreme Court in Dellmuth ruled that mere references do not constitute an unequivocal declaration of Congress's intent to subject states to liability. The majority's argument rests on the assumption that Congress would not enact "half-way measures," which is flawed. Policy considerations cannot override constitutional limitations on federal judicial authority regarding state immunity. Additionally, Section 2 restricts conduct by entities other than states, suggesting that Congress may have intended for the statute to be enforceable by private parties without granting the right to sue states. The majority's interpretation of Sections 2 and 3 as collectively permitting lawsuits against states is contested, as legislative intent must be clear, and the Court should not add presumed intentions to a statute.

The Supreme Court, in Return Mail, referenced a statute explicitly stating that states are not immune from being sued in federal court by any person or entity, highlighting Congress's ability to clearly abrogate state sovereign immunity when intended. However, Sections 2 and 3 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) do not unmistakably demonstrate Congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Section 3 allows courts to appoint federal observers in cases enforcing voting guarantees of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, contingent upon determinations of necessity by the court. The majority's reliance on previous cases, such as Chisom v. Roemer and Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, is deemed misplaced since neither case addressed the issue of state sovereign immunity directly; Chisom involved state officials without the state as a defendant, while the Alabama case involved the state but did not consider immunity. The Eleventh Amendment permits states to assert sovereign immunity, which they can choose to waive, and courts are not obligated to address this issue unless raised by the state. Additionally, under Section 3, the appointment of federal observers is not required if voting rights violations are minimal, promptly addressed, and unlikely to recur.

Suspension of voting tests and devices occurs when a court, upon finding that such measures violate the voting rights guaranteed by the fourteenth or fifteenth amendments, determines they deny or abridge the right to vote based on race or color. In such cases, the court will suspend these tests and devices for a deemed necessary period in the affected State or political subdivision. Additionally, if violations justifying equitable relief are found, the court retains jurisdiction to prevent new voting qualifications or procedures from being enforced that differ from those in effect at the time of the proceedings, unless these changes are approved by the Attorney General without objection within sixty days. The Attorney General, or an aggrieved individual, has the authority to initiate lawsuits to enforce voting guarantees. However, the ability for aggrieved persons to sue States in federal court is limited, and such actions differ from those taken by the Federal Government or other States, as established in case law.

The preservation of States' sovereign immunity was primarily motivated by the fear of private lawsuits against nonconsenting States, as indicated by the Founders. The case of Dellmuth clarifies that general language referring to "aggrieved parties" in statutory provisions does not imply the abrogation of States' sovereign immunity. Specifically, a broad authorization for federal suits is insufficient to overturn the Eleventh Amendment protections. Section 3's reference to “aggrieved person” fails to demonstrate Congress's intent to abrogate immunity, as it mandates actions by courts only after proceedings are initiated against non-State entities, not against States themselves. Comparisons are drawn with the ADEA and FMLA, where explicit provisions for suits against States indicated Congress's intent to abrogate immunity. The majority's reliance on the Fifth and Sixth Circuits' decisions regarding the Voting Rights Act (VRA) is criticized for lacking thorough analysis. The Sixth Circuit's conclusion that the VRA abrogates State immunity is based on the Act's language and intent, but this broad interpretation is not universally accepted, as reflected in the Fifth Circuit's adoption of the Sixth Circuit's reasoning without significant scrutiny.

The text outlines the legal principle that prohibits states or political subdivisions from discriminating against voters based on race. It emphasizes that federal laws, such as the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), allow private individuals to sue states in federal court, effectively abrogating state sovereign immunity. This abrogation is seen as crucial to the federal system, as the framers of the Constitution valued immunity from private lawsuits as essential for state dignity. The excerpt critiques a majority decision that diverges from the Supreme Court's established abrogation test, arguing that it undermines constitutional principles by suggesting that Congress can simply prohibit state actions to achieve abrogation. The dissenting opinion calls for reversing the district court's order and instructs the dismissal of the State of Alabama from the case.