Russell J. Sanders, Joe Sanders, and Laquetta Sanders v. Jimmie Kennedy, Chief of Police Don Roth E. Llewellyn Overholt, Jr., Ben Bay Mariam Kaywood Irv Pickler

Citations: 794 F.2d 478; 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 26981Docket: 84-6370

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; July 14, 1986; Federal Appellate Court

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Russell J. Sanders, Joe Sanders, and Laquetta Sanders appealed the dismissal of their civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that members of the Anaheim police department unlawfully damaged their property, conducted an unlawful search, and deprived Russell Sanders of liberty without probable cause, claiming violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed the claims, citing the availability of a post-deprivation state tort remedy, and ruled that the Chief of Police and City Council members were not personally involved in the alleged deprivations.

The Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, determining that the district court incorrectly applied the Parratt v. Taylor analysis to the Fourth Amendment claim, which does not allow for such a defense. Moreover, the court found that the Fourteenth Amendment due process claims should not have been dismissed, as the injuries resulted from official policies and not random acts. The appeal also addressed the liability of Chief of Police Kennedy and the City Council, clarifying that the plaintiffs sought to hold these defendants accountable based on official policies rather than under a theory of respondeat superior.

The case arose from a July 24-25, 1983, incident in which Anaheim police conducted a prolonged siege on the Sanders' residence, involving low-flying helicopters, damaging projectiles, and warrantless entry and search of the premises. The district court's dismissal of the complaint was made with prejudice in federal court but allowed for the possibility of state tort claims. The Sanders timely appealed the dismissal.

A dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is subject to de novo review, requiring that all allegations in the complaint be taken as true and viewed favorably toward the non-moving party. The Sanders claim violations of their Fourth Amendment rights, asserting that Russell Sanders's arrest lacked probable cause and that the Anaheim police entered their home without consent, a warrant, or exigent circumstances. The district court deemed Russell Sanders's claims insufficient under section 1983, citing available state tort remedies, but this was reversed. The appellate court determined that allegations of unlawful arrest without probable cause, especially following a prolonged siege, do present a viable Fourth Amendment claim. Additionally, the court clarified that the Parratt analysis, which addresses state tort remedies, does not apply to Fourth Amendment claims, allowing the Sanders to pursue their claims despite the existence of state remedies.

Regarding the Fourteenth Amendment, the Sanders alleged deprivations of property and liberty without due process, which the district court dismissed based on the Parratt analysis. This dismissal was also reversed, as the court held that due process claims under section 1983 can proceed when challenging established state procedures, further confirming that the Parratt analysis is relevant only to random and unauthorized actions.

The principles established in a trilogy of en banc cases clarify the applicability of Logan versus Parratt in wrongful deprivation of liberty claims. Specifically, Logan applies when state officials engage in deliberate policies or customs that lead to such deprivations, while Parratt pertains to minor, unauthorized infractions. The Sanders' allegations, which assert that city officials authorized intentional acts causing significant damage and unlawfully deprived Russell Sanders of liberty, fall under the Logan framework, indicating the district court erred in dismissing their due process claims.

Regarding the dismissal of Chief Kennedy and Anaheim City Council members, the district court ruled that there was no personal participation by these defendants in the alleged rights violations. However, the court's decision was reversed because the Sanders' claims were based on unconstitutional policies rather than the respondeat superior doctrine. The appropriate defendants are those who were in office during the time of the alleged unconstitutional acts. The Sanders alleged that their rights were violated due to an official policy of the city and the police department, as well as improper hiring practices that allowed the employment of officers prone to rights violations. These claims are sufficient to proceed under section 1983 against Chief Kennedy and the Council members, thus indicating that the dismissal was erroneous.

The appellees argue that the district court's dismissal of Chief Kennedy and the City Council members is justified by the precedent set in Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, which asserts that a supervisor cannot be held personally liable for constitutional violations caused by subordinates unless they directly participated in or directed the deprivation. However, this interpretation is challenged by Johnson v. Duffy, which clarifies that personal participation is not the sole basis for liability under section 1983; liability can also arise from actions that set in motion a series of events leading to constitutional violations. 

The Sanders' complaint claims a direct causal link between their injuries and the defendants' actions, alleging that Chief Kennedy and the City Council were complicit by selecting, training, employing, and retaining police officers likely to violate constitutional rights. They argue that these hiring practices reflect deliberate indifference and gross neglect regarding the Sanders' rights, thereby establishing sufficient grounds for a section 1983 claim against the defendants. 

The court concludes that the Sanders are pursuing their claim based on official customs and policies, rather than a respondeat superior theory, allowing them to hold individual defendants accountable. Consequently, the district court's dismissal is deemed erroneous, leading to a reversal of the judgment and remand for further proceedings. The document also references relevant Supreme Court precedents regarding due process claims under section 1983, affirming that California municipalities can be liable for tortious conduct leading to personal injuries. Other circuit rulings are noted, indicating that section 1983 claims based on the Fourth Amendment are not precluded by the principles established in Parratt.

A local government entity can be held liable under Section 1983 if a constitutional violation occurs as a result of an official policy enacted by its policymakers, as established in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services. Liability may arise even from a single decision made by those policymakers, as indicated in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati. The Supreme Court has examined whether inadequate training can serve as a basis for municipal liability under Section 1983 in City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, where it was determined that a single instance of police misconduct does not demonstrate a city policymaker's knowledge or approval of such actions. The Court did not reach a definitive conclusion on whether policies like inadequate training, which are not inherently unconstitutional, could lead to liability under Monell. Additionally, case law such as Grandstaff v. City of Borger suggests that policymakers' reckless disregard for safety may also implicate Section 1983 liability.