Groop Internet Platform Inc. v. Psychotherapy Action Network

Citation: Not availableDocket: Civil Action No. 2019-1854

Court: District Court, District of Columbia; January 20, 2020; Federal District Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The case involves Groop Internet Platform Inc. (Talkspace), a company offering online psychotherapy services, and several defendants including mental health practitioners and the non-profit Psychotherapy Action Network (PsiAN). Talkspace's model aims to provide affordable, accessible therapy via a proprietary online platform, challenging traditional brick-and-mortar practices. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants engaged in a defamatory smear campaign following Talkspace's disruptive entry into the market, particularly through a letter sent to the American Psychological Association (APA) in June 2019, which raised concerns about treatment integrity and ethical obligations related to a potential relationship between Talkspace and a major health insurer. Talkspace claims this letter constitutes “libel per se” and seeks $40 million in damages. The defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court found personal jurisdiction lacking and granted the motions to dismiss. Background information highlights that since its founding, Talkspace has built a significant network of practitioners and served over five million individuals, but has faced opposition from PsiAN, including letters sent to both Michael Phelps and the APA expressing concerns about Talkspace's practices.

Concerns were raised regarding Talkspace's therapy services, with claims that they lack a valid evidence base and that the company intentionally misleads the public by promoting its text-based therapy product through Michael Phelps, who only received in-person treatment. Defendants argued that Talkspace's practices inherently violate patient protections, as non-therapist employees are allowed to review patient conversations for quality control. They requested the American Psychological Association (APA) to prevent Talkspace from making false claims in future advertisements.

The plaintiff accused PsiAN of conducting a "smear campaign," particularly through Todd Essig, a New York psychologist who allegedly disseminated false and defamatory statements about Talkspace to a large APA-maintained listserv. These statements encouraged listserv members to contact Talkspace’s advertisers and the APA to sever ties with the company, which led to the APA canceling its partnership with Talkspace and banning its advertisements at a major conference.

In May 2019, news surfaced about Talkspace's potential partnership with health insurer Optum, which would expand its services to about two million customers. PsiAN responded by reiterating its previous concerns in a letter to the APA, claiming Talkspace's business model was unethical and posed a threat to both therapists and patients. The letter was shared within the listserv, prompting members to also communicate their concerns to the APA.

Subsequently, Talkspace initiated legal action against PsiAN, asserting the defendants' statements in their June 2019 letter were false, as Talkspace claimed to adhere to ethical standards and state laws regarding client confidentiality. The plaintiff accused PsiAN of neglecting to conduct due diligence on Talkspace’s confidentiality practices before publishing the letter.

Plaintiff requests $10 million in compensatory damages and $30 million in punitive damages due to significant harm to Talkspace’s reputation and business. The defendants argue for dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The analysis focuses on Rule 12(b)(2), requiring the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of jurisdictional facts that connect each defendant to the forum, relying on specific factual allegations rather than mere conclusory statements. Unlike Rule 12(b)(6), the court may consider materials outside the pleadings. When addressing personal jurisdiction without an evidentiary hearing, the court must resolve factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff but need not accept unsupported inferences.

Establishing personal jurisdiction involves a two-part inquiry: first, identifying a statutory basis for jurisdiction; second, ensuring that exercising such jurisdiction aligns with constitutional limits. Federal courts look to state statutes for personal jurisdiction under diversity jurisdiction. In this case, the plaintiff relies on the District of Columbia's long-arm statute, specifically D.C. CODE § 13-423, which allows personal jurisdiction over non-residents under certain conditions. The plaintiff claims jurisdiction under subsection 13-423(a)(4), which permits jurisdiction for tortious injury claims arising from actions outside D.C. if the defendant regularly conducts business or derives substantial revenue from services in the District of Columbia.

D.C. CODE § 13-423(a)(4) establishes two criteria for asserting specific jurisdiction regarding a claim for relief. First, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant caused a tortious injury in the District of Columbia through an act or omission occurring outside the District. This provision, often referred to as the "act out/impact in" subsection, emphasizes the need for a direct connection between the defendant's actions and the injury within the District. Second, to prevent overly broad jurisdictional claims, the plaintiff must show “something more,” specifically that the defendant either regularly conducts business in the District, engages in persistent conduct there, or derives substantial revenue from goods or services in the District.

In the case at hand, the plaintiff initially alleged jurisdiction under four subsections of the long-arm statute but later narrowed their argument to solely subsection (a)(4). The court may treat unaddressed arguments from the defendants as conceded by the plaintiff. The first requirement is satisfied as the allegedly defamatory letter, authored by the defendants from Illinois, constitutes an out-of-District act. The letter was claimed to have been mailed to the APA’s headquarters in Washington, D.C., fulfilling the in-District injury requirement. The tort of libel is considered to occur where the defamatory material is circulated, which supports the claim of injury in the District. The defendants' argument that the harm was primarily felt in New York or Delaware does not negate the established jurisdictional basis, consistent with precedent that recognizes such jurisdiction in similar cases.

No factor justifies personal jurisdiction over the defendants under D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(4). The court must assess each defendant individually to determine if they engage in business, conduct, or derive revenue in the District of Columbia. The plaintiff contends that each defendant has engaged in persistent conduct within the District. 

1. For PsiAN, the plaintiff presents several arguments for establishing personal jurisdiction: 
   - **Website Activity**: PsiAN operates an interactive website accessible to D.C. residents, encouraging email sign-ups, petition signing, and donations.
   - **Communications**: PsiAN frequently communicates with D.C. residents and government officials to influence policy on various issues.
   - **Trade Association Membership**: PsiAN is a member of the D.C.-based Mental Health Liaison Group (MHLG).

However, the court emphasizes that mere membership in a trade association does not establish personal jurisdiction, as such membership could lead to jurisdiction based on the organization’s advocacy efforts, which D.C. courts have historically avoided. The precedent suggests that non-resident contact with trade associations in D.C. does not suffice for jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. Thus, PsiAN’s membership in MHLG and the other cited activities do not support claims of personal jurisdiction, as established in prior case law.

Personal jurisdiction cannot be established solely based on District residents' access to a defendant's website, as this fails to demonstrate a persistent course of conduct in the District. Courts require a certain level of interactivity on the website that connects it to the District. Mere accessibility or basic interactive features, such as subscription options and donation requests, do not suffice. For instance, PsiAN’s website, while described as “interactive,” lacks any evidence of targeting D.C. residents or facilitating meaningful interaction. Additionally, previous cases emphasize that substantial non-internet contacts alongside website interactivity are necessary to establish jurisdiction. Notably, cases like Blumenthal and Lewy involved websites with significant interactivity and targeted content relevant to the District, which PsiAN's website does not demonstrate. Evidence indicates PsiAN has received minimal donations from D.C. residents, further undermining claims of a persistent course of conduct in the District. Therefore, without more substantial connections, PsiAN's website cannot establish personal jurisdiction.

Non-Internet related contacts are essential for establishing personal jurisdiction over a defendant in the District of Columbia. In the case of Blumenthal, such contacts included a promotional interview on C-SPAN and interactions with local residents, while Lewy involved the mailing of magazines, employee training in the District, and the collection of local information. In contrast, PsiAN's alleged contacts consist mainly of letters and emails sent to District residents, which do not meet the threshold of "persistent" conduct as required under D.C. CODE § 13-423(a)(4). Notably, communications directed at government officials are excluded from jurisdictional considerations. The letters sent from Illinois cannot be characterized as conduct “in the District,” paralleling the reasoning in prior cases such as Crane and Tavoulareas, which dismissed similar claims based on external communications. Consequently, PsiAN's activities fail to demonstrate a persistent course of conduct in D.C., negating personal jurisdiction. Similarly, for individual defendants, the plaintiff's claims rely heavily on communications sent from Illinois, which also do not establish jurisdiction. Remaining evidence includes occasional attendance at conferences and travel to D.C., but these do not indicate regular business or persistent conduct within the District, leading to the conclusion that personal jurisdiction over PsiAN and the individual defendants is absent.

Burke and Muhr's connections to the District of Columbia are insufficient to establish jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. Burke's limited visits—four trips over twenty years and attendance at events—do not demonstrate a "persistent course of conduct." Similarly, Muhr's past travel for her daughter's education and her role as a guarantor on a lease do not create a property interest sufficient for jurisdiction. The court refers to precedent indicating that being a lease guarantor does not equate to property interest. 

The request for jurisdictional discovery by the plaintiff is also denied, as the current record is deemed inadequate to support personal jurisdiction. Jurisdictional discovery is typically granted when a party shows potential to supplement jurisdictional allegations, but it is at the court's discretion and should not be a mere "fishing expedition." The plaintiff proposes various avenues for discovery, including inquiries about website control, the defendants' contacts in D.C., solicitation efforts, and revenue generation in the District. However, many of these proposed discovery paths are likely to yield no significant information. The defendants operate their website from Illinois, and the plaintiff has not substantiated claims of recruitment efforts occurring in D.C.

PsiAN's website solicits members broadly without targeting D.C., and there is no evidence of attempts to recruit members specifically from D.C. The website is minimally interactive, and control over it does not imply persistent conduct in the District. The individual defendants operate the website from Illinois and have indicated that PsiAN has received only two donations from D.C. residents, totaling $350. Furthermore, a $6,000 grant from a D.C.-based organization, awarded after the lawsuit was filed, does not establish persistent conduct in D.C. The defendants' memberships in D.C. associations and communications with D.C. residents from outside the area are irrelevant to jurisdiction. The plaintiff's proposed jurisdictional discovery is deemed overly broad and speculative, lacking a substantial basis for further investigation. The request for jurisdictional discovery is denied, as the plaintiff has not demonstrated a sufficient connection to D.C. to invoke the long-arm statute. Consequently, the complaint is dismissed.