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Kelsey Rose Juliana v. United States
Citation: Not availableDocket: 18-36082
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; January 16, 2020; Federal Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
The document is a legal case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, involving a group of plaintiffs, primarily minors and environmental organizations, against multiple defendants including the United States government and various federal officials in their official capacities. The case is identified as Kelsey Cascadia Rose Juliana et al. v. United States of America et al., case number 18-36082, stemming from the District Court for the District of Oregon, presided over by District Judge Ann L. Aiken. The appeal was argued on June 4, 2019, in Portland, Oregon, and the decision was filed on January 17, 2020. The opinion was authored by Circuit Judge Andrew D. Hurwitz, with a dissenting opinion from District Judge Josephine L. Staton, who was sitting by designation. The case addresses significant environmental and constitutional issues, as indicated by the involvement of prominent agencies and officials, including the President and various secretaries of federal departments. The panel reversed the district court's interlocutory orders in a case initiated by an environmental organization and individual plaintiffs against the federal government, which alleged climate change-related injuries resulting from government actions that permit, authorize, and subsidize fossil fuel use. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss for lack of Article III standing. Plaintiffs cited various harms, including psychological effects, impaired recreational interests, worsened medical conditions, and property damage, while asserting violations of constitutional rights and seeking both declaratory relief and an injunction for a fossil fuel phase-out plan. The panel concluded that climate change is rapidly occurring and that expert evidence linked rising atmospheric carbon dioxide levels to fossil fuel combustion, which poses significant risks. It noted the federal government's longstanding awareness of these risks and its active role in contributing to climate change, rather than being merely passive. The government’s argument for the plaintiffs to proceed under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was rejected, as the APA only permits challenges to specific agency decisions, which would not encompass the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. The panel assessed the three requirements for Article III standing: 1. The plaintiffs presented concrete and particularized injuries, which the district court correctly identified. 2. The causation requirement was satisfied, with genuine factual disputes regarding federal policies as a 'substantial factor' in the injuries claimed. 3. The plaintiffs' injuries were deemed non-redressable by an Article III court, as effective remedies would demand complex policy decisions reserved for the executive and legislative branches. The panel concluded that the plaintiffs' grievances should be addressed politically rather than judicially. In dissent, Judge Staton argued that the plaintiffs should have standing to challenge the government's conduct, asserting that their constitutional claims warranted trial consideration. Counsel for the defendants-appellants includes Jeffrey Bossert Clark (Assistant Attorney General) along with Andrew C. Mergen, Sommer H. Engels, Robert J. Lundman, and Eric Grant from the Environment and Natural Resources Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. Representing the plaintiffs-appellees are Julia A. Olson and attorneys from various law firms, including Philip L. Gregory and Andrew K. Rodgers. Numerous amici curiae participate in support of both sides, including: - **For defendants-appellants**: Texas Public Policy Foundation representing Nuckels Oil Co., Liberty Packing Company, Western States Trucking Association, and the National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center. - **For plaintiffs-appellees**: A coalition of religious and environmental organizations represented by Richard K. Eichstaedt and others, including Eco-Justice Ministries and various Sisters of Mercy groups. - **International Law**: Dr. Curtis FJ Doebbler and D. Inder Comar represent the International Lawyers for International Law. - **Public Health**: Wendy B. Jacobs and Shaun A. Goho from Harvard Law School's Emmett Environmental Law and Policy Clinic support public health experts and organizations. - **Advocacy Groups**: David Bookbinder represents the Niskanen Center, while Courtney B. Johnson represents the League of Women Voters. - **Youth and Environmental Advocacy**: The Sunrise Movement Education Fund is represented by law students and professors from the University of Michigan Law School. - **Environmental Organizations**: Zachary B. Corrigan represents Food and Water Watch, Inc., and Patti Goldman and Sarah H. Burt from Earthjustice represent various environmental organizations including EarthRights International and the Center for Biological Diversity. This diverse array of legal representation reflects a broad coalition of interests surrounding the case. David Hunter and William John Snape III represent various amici curiae, including organizations focused on international environmental law, members of Congress, environmental history professors, and child advocates, among others in a case concerning climate change. The plaintiffs, consisting of twenty-one young citizens, an environmental organization, and a representative for future generations, assert that the federal government, through its promotion of fossil fuel use, has violated their constitutional rights, particularly under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, by failing to provide a climate system capable of sustaining human life. They contend that the government’s actions have led to various injuries attributable to climate change, including psychological harm, recreational impairment, medical exacerbation, and property damage. The plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the government to create a plan to phase out fossil fuel emissions and address excess atmospheric CO2. However, the court concludes that it lacks the constitutional authority to grant such relief, indicating that the matter should be addressed by the political branches of government instead. The district court denied the government's motion to dismiss, affirming that the plaintiffs had standing and raised justiciable claims, particularly regarding a Fifth Amendment due process right to a climate system that sustains human life. The court characterized this right as freedom from catastrophic climate change, which could lead to human deaths, reduced lifespans, property damage, threats to food sources, and significant ecological changes. It also recognized a viable "danger-creation due process claim" based on the government's failure to regulate emissions from third parties and a public trust claim linked to the Fifth and Ninth Amendments. The government sought a writ of mandamus, which was denied, and its motion for a stay was also rejected by the Supreme Court, which expressed concerns about the justiciability of the claims. Subsequently, the government filed for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted summary judgment on the Ninth Amendment claim, dismissed the President as a defendant, and partially dismissed the equal protection claim but denied the remaining motions, affirming the plaintiffs' standing and their sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment. The court dismissed the government's argument that the plaintiffs' only remedy was under the Administrative Procedure Act. Initially, the district court declined to certify its orders for interlocutory appeal, but later agreed to reconsider after a second mandamus petition, ultimately certifying the orders under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) while staying the proceedings, emphasizing the need for further factual development at trial. The plaintiffs presented a substantial record indicating rapid climate change, highlighting that atmospheric carbon dioxide levels have risen dramatically since the Industrial Age, now exceeding 410 parts per million, a rate significantly faster than historical fluctuations. Expert evidence indicates a significant rise in global temperatures, primarily due to fossil fuel combustion, which poses severe risks to the Earth's climate. Current temperatures are 0.9 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and could exceed 6 degrees Celsius by century's end. The last decade has recorded the hottest years, with each subsequent year since 1997 being hotter than the previous average. This extreme heat is contributing to the melting of polar ice caps, potentially leading to a sea-level rise of 15 to 30 feet by 2100. The situation is nearing a critical threshold, where unchecked climate destabilization could submerge cities, trigger devastating natural disasters, and threaten essential food and water supplies. The federal government has long been aware of the dangers associated with fossil fuel usage and rising carbon dioxide emissions, with warnings dating back to the Johnson Administration in 1965 about the significant climate impacts. An EPA report in 1983 forecasted a 2 degrees Celsius temperature increase by 2040, cautioning against a passive approach to carbon emissions. Despite these warnings, U.S. fossil fuel emissions rose to 5.4 billion metric tons by 2014, showing a marked increase since 1965, with oil and gas production increasing nearly 60% from 2008 to 2017 and extraction rates accelerating faster than any other country. The government actively supports fossil fuel production through tax benefits, permits, subsidies, and leasing federal lands for extraction. While the government largely does not dispute the factual basis of the plaintiffs' claims, it contends that these claims should be pursued under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs argue that their claims stem from a combination of government actions violating constitutional rights, rather than from isolated agency decisions, which the APA addresses. Thus, they cannot effectively pursue these constitutional claims under the APA framework. Defendants contend that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides a comprehensive remedial scheme that implicitly prevents plaintiffs from asserting independent constitutional claims. However, if all constitutional claims were required to conform to APA procedures, plaintiffs would be unable to challenge constitutional violations that occur without a specific agency action. The courts have recognized the right to challenge unconstitutional official conduct through equitable actions or under APA provisions (Sierra Club v. Trump; Navajo Nation v. Dep’t of the Interior). The APA's waiver of sovereign immunity applies broadly, whereas the “final agency action” limitation is specific to APA claims. It raises a serious constitutional issue if Congress intends to deny judicial review for valid constitutional claims, and such intent must be clearly expressed. There is no indication in the APA that it restricts plaintiffs' ability to pursue constitutional claims independently. The government also argues that plaintiffs lack Article III standing, which requires a concrete injury caused by the challenged conduct that is redressable by the court. The district court found that some plaintiffs demonstrated concrete injuries: Jaime B. experienced displacement due to water scarcity, and Levi D. faced repeated evacuations due to flooding. These injuries are not speculative; they are directly linked to climate change effects currently impacting the plaintiffs. This contrasts with cases where standing was denied due to mere conjecture about future harm. The government contends that the plaintiffs' injuries lack particularity since climate change impacts everyone; however, the critical aspect is whether the injuries are "concrete and personal." Established case law indicates that the presence of widespread harm does not equate to a generalized grievance, and only one plaintiff must demonstrate concrete harm for standing under Article III. The district court affirmed that the causation requirement was met for summary judgment, stating that causation can be established even with multiple links, provided they are not hypothetical. The plaintiffs’ injuries stem from carbon emissions linked to fossil fuel activities, with the U.S. contributing significantly to global emissions. Evidence suggests that federal policies, including subsidies and permits for fossil fuel extraction, have exacerbated these emissions. The government’s reliance on a precedent (Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon) is countered by the plaintiffs’ assertion that their injuries result from a broad range of federal actions spanning over five decades, creating a genuine dispute regarding causation. The more complex issue is whether the plaintiffs’ injuries are redressable in court, as they do not allege violations of specific statutes or seek damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act, but rather claim a deprivation of their constitutional right to a viable climate system, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Reasonable jurists hold differing views on the existence of the asserted constitutional right, as evidenced by contrasting decisions in Clean Air Council v. United States, which found no such right, and Juliana, which supported it. In assessing redressability, the court assumes the constitutional right exists but emphasizes that not all legal claims are redressable in federal court. To meet Article III's redressability standard, plaintiffs must demonstrate that their requested relief is likely to alleviate their injuries and that the district court has the authority to grant it. While plaintiffs seek a declaration of constitutional violations, this alone is insufficient to remedy their claimed injuries without further judicial action. Their suit illustrates their belief that a favorable ruling would provide psychological comfort; however, such satisfaction does not constitute a legitimate Article III remedy. The primary relief sought is an injunction to prevent the government from supporting fossil fuel use and to mandate a judicially approved plan to reduce harmful emissions. This request challenges the government's discretionary powers granted by Congress and seeks to limit Congress's constitutional authority over public lands. Despite plaintiffs arguing they only target affirmative government actions, their experts indicate that merely enjoining these actions would not suffice to address catastrophic climate change or mitigate their injuries. Although plaintiffs assert that federal leases and subsidies contribute to carbon emissions, they fail to demonstrate that eliminating these programs would halt atmospheric carbon growth or prevent further harm, as many emissions stem from historical actions or non-governmental sources. Plaintiffs’ experts argue that addressing climate change requires a comprehensive overhaul of the energy system, transcending merely halting fossil fuel promotion. They emphasize that significant atmospheric carbon reductions must largely come from reforestation and necessitate immediate, substantial decreases in emissions from various sources. One expert asserts that achieving these reductions demands an ambitious plan for nearly complete decarbonization, which involves a rapid expansion of renewable energy and sustained infrastructure transformation over decades, including advancements in energy efficiency and transportation. While plaintiffs acknowledge their requested relief won't fully resolve global climate change, they claim it would partially alleviate their injuries. The district court referenced Massachusetts v. EPA to support the notion of redressability, as the relief sought might slow emissions, but the case involved a procedural right, whereas plaintiffs here are asserting a substantive due process claim, raising doubts about meeting the redressability requirement. Even if redressability were met, the court finds that it lacks the authority under Article III to implement the extensive remedial plan proposed by the plaintiffs. Such a plan would entail complex policy decisions reserved for the executive and legislative branches, emphasizing that these choices involve competing social, political, and economic factors that should be managed by elected representatives rather than federal judges. Separation of powers relies on a shared understanding of the appropriate roles of legislatures, executives, and courts. In the case of *Juliana v. United States*, plaintiffs argue that the district court does not need to make specific policy decisions, as granting their request for a remedial plan would allow political branches to determine the best approach to reduce fossil fuel emissions and lower atmospheric CO2. Courts can issue broad injunctive relief, but this would still require judicial evaluation of the government's compliance, which involves considerable policymaking. The political branches might, based on their own assessments, decide to continue certain programs or adopt less aggressive measures than the plaintiffs deem necessary. Courts cannot replace the Executive or Legislature's judgments on complex, predictive matters, especially regarding climate change, which requires long-term oversight. The Supreme Court in *Rucho v. Common Cause* stated that political questions like partisan gerrymandering are beyond the reach of Article III courts, underscoring the necessity of clear constitutional directives or legal standards for equitable relief. Currently, political branches are discussing various legislative actions related to climate change, including proposals for clean energy innovation and comprehensive measures to transition away from fossil fuels. These initiatives include numerous bills introduced in Congress, such as the "Green New Deal" and other targeted acts aimed at addressing climate-related challenges. The excerpt outlines several legislative acts from the 116th Congress aimed at addressing climate change, specifically mentioning the Leading Infrastructure for Tomorrow’s America Act, Buy Clean Transparency Act, Carbon Capture Modernization Act, and others. It emphasizes that the proposed solutions involve discretion, trade-offs, and international cooperation, which are not suitable for judicial resolution under Article III. The court's decision in *Juliana v. United States* is referenced, noting that the plaintiffs' proposed standards for addressing climate issues are not easily administrable, similar to the difficulties identified in *Rucho v. Common Cause* regarding redistricting. The court expresses concerns about the separation of powers, asserting that federal courts lack the authority to allocate political power without clear guiding standards, which could lead to an overreach of judicial power. The excerpt underscores that constitutional democracy is intended for political processes, not judicial intervention, in matters that may be existential. Although the plaintiffs' experts claim a need for atmospheric carbon levels of 350 parts per million to stabilize the climate, the court questions the feasibility of an enforceable judicial order to achieve this, highlighting the impracticality of overseeing such a plan through the courts. The dissenting opinion acknowledges the seriousness of the plaintiffs' claims but disagrees on the court's ability to grant the requested relief. Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to enforce broad constitutional rights related to climate change, as their alleged injuries do not stem from violations of these rights. Any harm resulting from the dissolution of the Republic would be a collective injury felt equally by all citizens, failing to meet the requirement for discrete and particularized injury necessary for standing. The court reiterates that claims under the Guarantee Clause are nonjusticiable, citing precedents that reject the idea of a justiciable claim based on this clause. The dissent's lack of clear metrics for assessing climate change's impact on the Republic further undermines the claim. A judicial order that merely delays the effects of climate change does not satisfy the redressability requirement. The court emphasizes that not all threats to the political system can be addressed by the judiciary, and it distinguishes between judicial authority and the responsibilities of the political branches. Inaction by these branches does not transform nonjusticiable claims into justiciable ones, underscoring that judicial power is defined by the necessity to resolve specific legal rights, not by political failures. The excerpt addresses a legal dispute regarding climate change and the judicial role in addressing it. It cites **Clinton v. City of New York** and emphasizes that the absence of law does not equate to a substantive result eligible for judicial review. The plaintiffs argue for necessary action to combat climate change, which they assert is a moral responsibility of elected officials. The majority opinion concludes that while the political branches may be neglecting their duties, Article III courts lack the authority to intervene in enforcing treaty provisions related to climate change, ultimately leading to a dismissal of the case for lack of standing. In dissent, Judge Staton contends that the government acknowledges the urgent need for action against climate change but continues to disregard it. He argues that the judiciary can provide meaningful relief without managing all aspects of climate policy and that the plaintiffs' claim aligns with constitutional principles against willful destruction of the nation. Staton believes that even partial relief would be significant and is within the judiciary's authority, drawing parallels to historical judicial interventions in civil rights. The excerpt concludes with the recognition that greenhouse gas emissions pose a dire threat to the planet, validating the urgency of the plaintiffs' claims. The majority's decision to remand the case for dismissal and the dissent's call for judicial intervention highlight the tension between judicial authority and political accountability in addressing climate change. Rising sea levels and climate change are projected to cause significant destruction, including the loss of coastal city functionality, mass migrations, resource wars, food shortages, and public health crises. Government scientists estimate sea levels could rise by two feet by 2050, nearly four feet by 2070, and over eight feet by 2100, potentially rendering millions of American homes uninhabitable and leading to the loss of cities like Miami and New Orleans with a rise of approximately 20 feet. The harms faced by the plaintiffs are described as the beginning of a catastrophic series of events that will irreversibly damage the United States, with experts noting that global warming effects will persist for centuries, even after greenhouse gas emissions cease. The plaintiffs argue that the government has not only failed to act on warnings about the dangers of greenhouse gas emissions but has actively promoted fossil fuel use, contributing to an existential crisis. The majority opinion acknowledges that the plaintiffs have established injury and traceability but ultimately dismisses the case for lack of standing, claiming that the relief sought is beyond judicial reach and skeptical that it could effectively address the harms caused by climate change. Disagreement is rooted in the significance of the interest at stake, emphasizing that standing is a threshold issue separate from the claim's merits, as established in Warth v. Seldin. The argument posits that the government has a more substantial duty than merely a vague “moral responsibility” to safeguard the Nation. The Constitution guarantees rights such as “life, liberty, and property,” free speech, and assembly, as recognized in W. Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette. The Supreme Court has identified certain fundamental interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, including the rights to marry, family life, and occupational choice. These fundamental rights are not subject to majority vote and are essential for preserving other constitutional protections, as highlighted in cases like Timbs v. Indiana. Voting is deemed a fundamental political right critical to democracy, recognized despite its imperfect constitutional protection. The preservation of the Republic is similarly vital, functioning as a protector of all other rights, with civil liberties contingent upon an organized society. George Washington's warnings about the dangers of dissolving the Union underscore the importance of maintaining the Republic to prevent the descent into tyranny and to protect liberties. The framers of the Constitution convened to address the inadequacies of the Articles of Confederation, with the aim of preserving the Union, which they deemed essential for America’s prosperity. Alexander Hamilton, in advocating for New York’s ratification of the Constitution, emphasized the gravity of this endeavor, linking it to the safety and welfare of the nation and its future. The Constitution's Preamble reflects this commitment to securing "the Blessings of Liberty" for future generations. Its structure embodies a principle of perpetuity, evidenced by the President's oath to "preserve, protect and defend" the Constitution and the obligation to faithfully execute laws. Article IV, Section 4 guarantees each state a Republican form of government and protection against invasion and domestic violence. The principle of perpetuity faced its most significant challenge during the South's secession, which President Lincoln asserted was constitutionally impermissible. He argued that the Union is perpetual, a notion rooted in the fundamental nature of national governments. Lincoln noted that the Union predates the Constitution and referenced the Constitution's aim to create a "more perfect Union." While the threat of secession highlighted the risk of political dissolution, this principle also applies to the physical integrity of the Union. However, this principle does not equate to a constitutional right to a pollution-free environment, despite the severe impacts of environmental degradation on health and quality of life. Mine-run environmental concerns are deemed policy choices for elected representatives, not federal judges, as established in Collins v. City of Harker Heights. The perpetuity principle is clarified as not an environmental right, but a restriction against the willful dissolution of the Republic. Evidence is cited, such as a study estimating fine particulate matter caused 107,000 premature deaths in 2011. The government contends that the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for all social and economic issues, referencing Lindsey v. Normet. However, structural principles within the Constitution, though not explicitly stated, are enforceable and have been recognized by the Supreme Court. Examples include judicial review and sovereign immunity, which have become entrenched despite lacking direct textual support. The perpetuity principle aims to safeguard fundamental rights to life, liberty, and property, activating only in the face of an existential threat largely caused by government actions. This principle is essential to uphold the Constitution's intended framework and protect individual rights alongside national interests. The perpetuity principle cannot be dismissed merely due to its lack of enforcement by the Court against government actions. Constitutional principles are continuously tested as new challenges arise. Historical precedents include the anticommandeering doctrine, which was only recognized in the 1970s in response to federal overreach, and the acknowledgment in 2018 that cell-site data is protected under the Fourth Amendment. This recognition reflects an understanding that advancements in technology increase government surveillance capabilities. The current scrutiny of the Constitution's commitment to perpetuity is warranted, given the unprecedented existential threat posed by climate change, exacerbated by government inaction. Alternative means, such as voting, do not negate the independent enforceability of constitutional principles like federalism and equal protection. The Constitution intentionally shields certain subjects from political majority influence, establishing them as judicially enforceable rights. Individuals should not have to wait for legislative action on fundamental rights; in the context of the climate crisis, immediate judicial intervention is crucial. Democracy allows for debate and action, but it cannot override natural laws or the urgency of the situation. Furthermore, while it is primarily the responsibility of political branches to align government institutions with legal standards, federal courts fulfill an essential role as a judicial safeguard in justiciable cases. Standing to sue is a foundational doctrine ensuring federal courts do not overstep their authority, maintaining the integrity of the judicial process in addressing grievances. A case qualifies for judicial determination if the plaintiff demonstrates: 1) an injury in fact, 2) that is fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct, and 3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Evidence presented by the plaintiffs indicates particularized, concrete injuries related to legally protected interests and raises genuine disputes regarding the traceability of these injuries to the government’s actions. The conclusion is that plaintiffs have established standing, meeting all three criteria necessary for invoking federal court jurisdiction. Redressability is defined by a court's ability to vindicate a plaintiff's legal rights, involving inquiries of efficacy and power. The court must consider whether an order is likely to remediate the plaintiffs’ injury and whether it has the constitutional authority to issue such an order. There is skepticism regarding the effectiveness of curbing fossil-fuel extraction to alleviate plaintiffs’ harms, but the plaintiffs assert a constitutional right to be free from irreversible and catastrophic climate change. While they are experiencing some concrete manifestations of this injury, the full extent of harm is anticipated to worsen. Thus, practical redressability is not measured by the ability to halt climate change entirely, but rather by mitigating the progression towards irreversible damage. The critical focus is on preventing climate change from reaching a threshold of no return, emphasizing the importance of each reduction in emissions. The argument posits that even a minor court order could significantly influence the timing of potential remedies, thereby having a meaningful impact on preventing further injuries, thus satisfying the standing requirement as established in previous cases, including Massachusetts v. EPA. A non-negligible reduction in emissions, such as through regulating vehicle emissions, satisfies the redressability requirement of Article III standing. While regulating motor-vehicle emissions alone may not reverse global warming, it does not negate jurisdiction to determine the EPA's duty to mitigate climate change. The potential substantial consequences of manmade climate change render the delayed effectiveness of remedies inconsequential. Additionally, even with increasing emissions from developing countries like China and India, domestic reductions can still slow global emissions growth. The Supreme Court has affirmed that a perceptible reduction in climate change advancement is sufficient to address climate change-induced harms. The majority opinion differentiates between procedural and substantive rights but states that this distinction does not alter the outcome regarding redressability. It emphasizes that the assumption of plaintiffs' success in obtaining relief allows for a traditional analysis of whether the desired outcome will redress their harms. The presence of procedural rights is more significant in determining the first two standing elements, particularly when Congress has created rights that connect individuals to injuries. Ultimately, the Supreme Court's conclusion that reducing emissions from fossil fuels can mitigate climate change-related injuries remains applicable, making the lack of procedural rights irrelevant in this context. The majority acknowledges the traceability of plaintiffs' injuries to government actions, reinforcing the connection between standing and redressability. The Supreme Court has established that the 'fairly traceable' and 'redressability' components of standing are intertwined aspects of a singular causation requirement, with causality focusing on the link between alleged misconduct and injury, and redressability assessing the connection between injury and the sought judicial remedy. In cases where the relief requested is solely to halt ongoing misconduct, these inquiries become nearly identical. It is crucial to distinguish these inquiries when the relief sought extends beyond the alleged legal violation. The document references *Massachusetts v. EPA*, noting that the standing requirements were relaxed in cases brought by a state against the federal government, but asserts that the plaintiffs here have presented clear scientific evidence of their injuries caused by climate change due to fossil fuel emissions, independent of any "special solicitude" typically afforded to states. The text argues that the judiciary's role is to provide relief for legal wrongs, which may require addressing the actions of the political branches, thus maintaining the balance of power among the governmental branches. The emphasis is on the necessity of the judicial branch to engage with constitutional violations while recognizing that claims must be grounded in actual, cognizable injuries. The Court must address and resolve the tension surrounding standing before concluding that it precludes review in this case. Historical precedent indicates a presumption of judicial review countered only by limited separation-of-powers concerns. It is the judiciary's responsibility to limit actions by the political branches that violate constitutional principles. The authority to grant redress, as established in *Marbury v. Madison*, places the burden on those denying legal remedies to demonstrate the uniqueness of their case, which must show something "peculiar" justifying exclusion from legal redress. While plaintiffs bear the burden of proving injury, causation, and redressability, the government must justify why this otherwise justiciable dispute raises broader separation-of-powers issues. The majority suggests this case is "special" due to the complexity of evaluating policy considerations related to fossil fuel regulation and the long-term supervision required for implementation. However, the judiciary is constitutionally empowered to handle such challenges, and there is no exception for cases of significant complexity. Judicial restraint may be warranted in certain instances, where issues are clearly designated for political branches, lack manageable standards for resolution, require initial policy determinations, or where respecting the roles of other branches is necessary. These considerations are based on the "political question doctrine," which includes several factors outlined in *Baker v. Carr* and other related cases. The excerpt outlines the distinction between constitutional limitations of a court's jurisdiction and prudential considerations in adjudicating cases involving the political question doctrine. It references the origin of this doctrine in Marbury and its modern formulation established in Baker v. Carr (1962). It emphasizes that the first two of the six Baker factors are particularly significant, with the understanding that these factors often overlap and that the presence of one compelling factor can render a case unsuitable for judicial review. The excerpt advises caution in applying the political question doctrine, asserting that courts should not dismiss cases for non-justiciability unless a political question is fundamentally intertwined with the case. It clarifies that the doctrine pertains to "political questions," not merely "political cases," and warns against dismissing genuine controversies solely based on their political implications. Courts are encouraged to conduct a thorough examination of the specific facts and context of each case rather than relying on broad categorizations. The majority opinion equates climate change litigation to political gerrymandering, suggesting that such issues are too political for the judiciary to adjudicate, relying on Rucho v. Common Cause as a precedent. The dissenting opinion strongly disagrees, asserting that the government failed to address the district court's analysis of the Baker factors, particularly the first factor regarding constitutional delegation to another branch. The dissent emphasizes the lack of clear constitutional text addressing climate change, arguing that it does not fit into recognized political-question areas, unlike foreign policy or legislative matters. The dissent finds the district judge's conclusions well-reasoned and notes that climate change policy, while it may have implications for foreign policy, is not inherently a foreign policy decision. The dissent criticizes the majority's reliance on the second Baker factor concerning the absence of clear judicial standards for relief, labeling this reasoning as a diversion and asserting that it is erroneous to assume that all cases relating to foreign relations fall outside judicial review. Plaintiffs present substantial evidence suggesting a critical "tipping point" where government actions transition from mere pollution to creating irreversible harm, infringing upon their rights. The plaintiffs reference a threshold of 350 parts per million of atmospheric carbon necessary for climate stabilization. This contrasts with the Rucho decision, which noted the absence of standards to determine when partisan gerrymandering constitutes a rights violation, focusing instead on the difficulty of establishing when political manipulation exceeds acceptable limits. In this case, the plaintiffs argue for a clear standard regarding fossil fuel emissions that could irreparably damage the nation, supported by scientific evidence. While the plaintiffs must ultimately prove this fact at trial, the current issue is whether sufficient evidence exists to create a genuine dispute regarding this standard. The court emphasizes the need for meaningful relief if the plaintiffs succeed, indicating that a judicially enforceable "plan" to reduce emissions could be developed without overstepping judicial boundaries into policy-making. Judicial history supports significant governmental reforms mandated by courts to uphold constitutional rights, as seen in cases like Brown v. Plata, where the judiciary intervened to correct constitutional violations in prison systems. The Court mandated the racial integration of all public schools in the United States, reinforcing the Constitution's equal protection clause as established in *Brown v. Bd. of Educ. Brown I*. Although the district court may later find it unable to provide meaningful redress based on trial facts, the current decision focuses on whether plaintiffs have demonstrated a genuine dispute regarding the judiciary's capacity to offer such redress. The Supreme Court, in historical context, had previously shown indifference to the complexities of dismantling segregation, emphasizing that the judiciary could manage this process while considering public interests. The Court acknowledged that achieving compliance with constitutional principles may require time and that the burden lies with defendants to justify any necessary delays. Challenges related to school administration, transportation, and local regulations must be addressed to facilitate nonracial admissions. The slow realization of *Brown*'s promise over decades should not deter current efforts to remedy institutional violations, and the plaintiffs’ request for a "plan" aligns with established judicial practices recognizing the time needed for effective relief. Decelerating the trajectory toward environmental disaster necessitates overcoming numerous obstacles, which, while significant, can be addressed through discernible standards. Historical cases, such as those following Brown v. Board of Education, illustrate that complex policy decisions were managed by courts, suggesting that disentangling government support for fossil fuels can similarly be navigated judicially. The majority's assertion that courts cannot engage with scientific and prudential considerations to ensure governmental constitutional compliance is challenged. The concern regarding the need for a comprehensive plan to reduce fossil fuel emissions is addressed; the request for a broad strategy does not impede the ability to redress specific drivers of climate change related to the government's actions. Courts often grant partial relief, allowing for government injunctions against constitutional violations without extending to unrelated emissions or foreign entities. The resolution of this case hinges on scientific inquiries rather than political ones, with evidence presented by plaintiffs warranting judicial examination. The majority's conclusion, which misapplies the Rucho decision by categorizing complex issues as nonjusticiable political questions, undermines judicial review in nonpolitical contexts. Rucho is fundamentally about partisan political processes, whereas climate change issues do not inherently fall within that realm. While addressing climate change involves various policy considerations, it does not alter the structure of political representation or governmental powers, and jurisdiction is defined by legal principles, not common political interpretations. The Baker factors serve as a critical framework in differentiating the current case from Rucho, which concluded that the courts lack the competence to address partisan gerrymandering due to the historical and textual delegation of electoral-district drawing to state legislatures. The Rucho Court found it impossible to establish mathematical standards for this political issue, but did not suggest that such difficulties eliminate judicial jurisdiction entirely. An overly broad interpretation of Rucho could allow the “political question” doctrine to undermine judicial authority in significant matters, including global warming and other social issues like education diversity and reproductive rights. The dissent emphasizes that while courts should generally defer to democratic processes unless constitutional violations occur, identifying when judicial intervention is necessary to protect fundamental rights is complex. The dissenting opinion expresses concern that the majority's ruling may hinder the judiciary's ability to address critical issues. The author asserts that the plaintiffs have standing and have made constitutional claims based on scientific evidence regarding climate change, urging that these claims deserve to be heard in court. Ultimately, the dissent calls for the affirmation of the lower court's decision, highlighting the importance of addressing these pressing concerns for future generations.