Ethan Watson Borne v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 09-19-00094-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; January 7, 2020; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Ethan Watson Borne appeals his conviction for the manufacture or possession of LSD with intent to deliver, involving 277 units of the substance, a first-degree felony. The trial court sentenced him to ten years of imprisonment, probated for ten years. Borne raises three issues on appeal: lack of proven jurisdiction, denial of due process, and violations of constitutional rights. The appeal follows a grand jury indictment, with the evidence against Borne stemming from a traffic stop by Trooper Christopher Olvera, who observed Borne's erratic behavior and subsequent search of his vehicle, revealing the LSD and cash. Borne did not contest the facts at trial, and the jury found him guilty. 

The court emphasizes that Borne, representing himself pro se, must adhere to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys and must preserve errors for review by timely and specifically objecting to alleged errors during the trial. The ruling affirms the trial court's judgment.

Timely and specific objections are critical in legal proceedings to inform the judge and opposing counsel, allowing for appropriate rulings and responses. An appellate brief must clearly state all issues for review with relevant citations. If an appellant raises multiple issues in a single point of error, the appellate court may choose not to address them if deemed multifarious, but can still address them in the interest of justice if the issues can be clearly identified.

Borne contends that the State failed to prove the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction over him, presenting a multifarious argument. Nonetheless, the court addresses identifiable arguments for justice. Borne argues he did not consent to the trial court's jurisdiction and questions the jurisdiction's proof on record, but he provides no legal basis for claiming his consent was necessary. According to the Texas Constitution, state district courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over all matters, and the presentment of an indictment automatically grants the court jurisdiction. A grand jury indicted Borne under the Health and Safety Code, affirming the district court's jurisdiction.

Borne further argues that the trial court lacks jurisdiction over him as a "living breathing, sovereign" individual, asserting he is not a "Legal Fiction Person." He filed documents with the court claiming he is a Texas Citizen/National and not a corporate U.S. citizen. Borne's position is that the Texas Controlled Substances Act applies only to legal entities, which he asserts does not include him as an individual.

Borne requested the inclusion of a definition of 'person' in the jury charge during the trial, which the court incorporated from section 481.002 of the Controlled Substances Act, confirming that 'person' includes individuals. This interpretation aligns with the common usage of the term, as there are no statutory exclusions for individuals. Consequently, individuals can be charged with felonies related to controlled substances, undermining Borne’s argument. 

Borne also claimed that his use of 'w/o prej. UCC 1-308' in signing documents indicated a lack of jurisdiction over him by the trial court, asserting that he was compelled to obtain a driver’s license against his will. However, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) applies to commercial transactions and does not pertain to criminal cases, rendering Borne’s UCC argument ineffective.

Moreover, Borne contended that section 481.1121 of the Texas Health and Safety Code lacked an 'enacting clause,' which he argued was necessary for jurisdiction. He failed to provide legal authority supporting the notion that an enacting clause is a jurisdictional requirement. The Texas Constitution mandates that laws include an enacting clause, and the version of section 481.1121 under which Borne was charged was enacted with the requisite language in Senate Bill 1969. Therefore, his argument regarding the enacting clause was dismissed.

Finally, Borne argued that he initiated a complaint against the trial court judge and prosecutor in a common law court, claiming they were provided due process and failed to respond.

A common law jury determined that Borne's constitutional rights were violated and issued an Injunctive Relief in the Nature of a Writ of Mandamus, which was served on the trial court judge and prosecutor. Borne claimed that this jury found him innocent of all charges, a verdict purportedly ignored by the trial court. He filed a document asserting that the Texas Jural Assembly and common law court deemed the trial court officials lacked the authority to prosecute him and declared him innocent. Borne further alleged that his case was dismissed due to a lack of jurisdiction and due process, citing the absence of an injured party. However, the record does not provide legal authority supporting the jurisdiction of this so-called common law court or the Texas Jural Assembly. Borne's arguments also included claims regarding his rights as a "sovereign citizen," asserting that he is not a 14th Amendment citizen created by Congress. The court noted that if an appellant's trial objection does not match their appeal argument, the issue is not preserved for review. Even if preserved, Borne’s assertion of sovereign-citizen status does not exempt him from state laws or the jurisdiction of Texas courts. Multiple cited cases emphasize that claims of sovereign citizenship do not affect court jurisdiction in criminal matters and are generally without merit in American law.

Sister state courts have consistently rejected 'sovereign citizen' arguments, as evidenced in several cases, including Meyer v. State and others. The court agrees with this consensus and dismisses Borne's 'sovereign citizen' claims, overruling his jurisdictional challenge. Regarding Borne’s right to self-representation, he argues that the appointment of standby counsel violated his due process rights. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel and self-representation, with the Texas Constitution affirming the right to represent oneself or to have counsel. However, the U.S. Supreme Court permits the appointment of standby counsel even against a defendant's wishes. A Faretta hearing was conducted before trial, confirming that Borne voluntarily chose to represent himself and was informed about the risks involved. During the trial, standby counsel was appointed to assist Borne, who explicitly stated he did not want counsel to speak on his behalf. The court clarified that standby counsel would remain silent unless Borne requested assistance. Borne acknowledged that his decision to proceed pro se was voluntary, and throughout the trial, he directed procedural questions to the court, which advised him to consult standby counsel. Borne noted in his appeal that standby counsel's involvement was limited to accepting discovery and requesting jury removal when necessary.

The appointment of standby counsel despite a defendant's objection does not violate the Sixth Amendment, as established by precedent. Borne's brief lacks citations of opposing authority or explanations of how standby counsel affected his rights. A defendant waiving counsel and proceeding pro se is held to the same standards as an attorney. Thus, Borne's claim that he was held to attorney standards is unfounded. Additionally, Borne's assertion that standby counsel was appointed after an ex parte discussion was not preserved for appeal due to lack of objection during the trial. 

Borne further contends that the judgment against him is void because the State did not identify an "injured party." However, the statute under which he was charged does not require proof of an injured party, as it pertains to a "nature of conduct" offense where the offense is defined by the conduct itself rather than its result. Borne provides no legal authority supporting his claim that an "injured party" is necessary for his conviction.

Lastly, Borne argues that he was denied the opportunity to present evidence when the trial court excluded certain certified documents, which he claims impeded his defense and violated his First Amendment rights. The trial court sustained objections to these documents, which were marked for appellate purposes only.

Borne filed various pro se documents, including notices and affidavits related to his legal proceedings. The State objected to these documents on grounds of relevance and hearsay, and the court upheld these objections. Borne did not demonstrate how the documents were relevant or if they met hearsay exceptions, nor did he cite legal authority for his claims regarding First Amendment violations. Consequently, his arguments regarding the exclusion of evidence were deemed lacking in merit. 

Borne also argued that evidence seized from his vehicle was inadmissible as "fruit of the poisonous tree" due to lack of a search warrant; however, he did not raise this objection during the trial or seek to suppress the evidence, thus failing to preserve the issue for appeal. Even if preserved, there are exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as the automobile exception, which applies if an officer has probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband. The court concluded that the State could invoke this exception, rendering Borne's argument meritless. Ultimately, Borne's complaints regarding constitutional rights violations were overruled, and the trial court's judgment was affirmed. Additionally, other complaints raised by Borne were inadequately briefed.