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E.W. Burman, Inc. v. Bradford Dyeing Association, Inc.

Citation: Not availableDocket: 18-261

Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island; November 25, 2019; Rhode Island; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

Narrative Opinion Summary

In this case, a construction company (the plaintiff) appealed a Superior Court judgment favoring a dyeing association (the defendant), challenging the court's determination that no oral or implied-in-fact contract existed between them. The dispute arose following a fire at the defendant's facility, leading to a roof restoration project insured by Liberty Mutual. The plaintiff alleged breach of contract and sought relief under quasi-contract and promissory estoppel theories after incurring costs without a finalized written contract. The Superior Court, following a bench trial, found no binding contract existed, emphasizing the lack of mutual assent and objective intent to be bound prior to executing a written document. The trial justice also noted credible testimony indicating that the defendant's representatives did not authorize the plaintiff's actions and maintained communication as an intermediary. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the trial justice's decision, affirming that the parties intended to enter into a written contract and that any preliminary work by the plaintiff was at its own risk. The court further noted that the plaintiff's claim of a binding oral agreement was inconsistent with the extensive negotiations and the absence of defendant representatives at key meetings, ultimately affirming the lower court's judgment.

Legal Issues Addressed

Existence of Oral or Implied-in-Fact Contracts

Application: The court determined that no oral or implied-in-fact contract was established between the parties due to a lack of mutual assent and objective intent to be bound prior to signing a written contract.

Reasoning: The trial justice’s findings supported the conclusion that the parties did not intend to be bound by an oral contract, and her decision reflected a proper application of contract law.

Quasi-Contract and Promissory Estoppel Theories

Application: The court found that the defendant was not liable under quasi-contract or promissory estoppel theories since there was no promise or equitable circumstances justifying such relief.

Reasoning: Consequently, the trial justice concluded that no oral or implied-in-fact contract existed and that the defendant was not liable under quasi-contract or promissory estoppel theories.

Requirement for a Written Contract

Application: The court found that the parties intended to enter into a written contract, and the absence of such a document precluded the formation of any binding agreement.

Reasoning: It was clear to the trial justice that both parties intended to finalize a written agreement, noting ongoing negotiations that included various offers and counteroffers.

Role of Objective Intent in Contract Formation

Application: The court emphasized the requirement for objective intent to be bound in the formation of contracts, noting that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate such intent by the defendant.

Reasoning: A party's objective intent is essential in determining whether an offer or acceptance exists in contract law. This intent is assessed through external manifestations, particularly in the context of oral agreements.

Standard of Review on Appeal

Application: The appellate court upheld the trial justice's decision, giving great weight to factual findings unless clearly erroneous or based on overlooked material evidence.

Reasoning: On appeal, the standard of review accords great weight to the trial justice's factual findings, which will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous or based on overlooked material evidence.