Gregory Barnes v. Board of Trustees of the Unive

Citation: Not availableDocket: 19-1781

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; January 2, 2020; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Gregory L. Barnes, an African American engineer at the University of Illinois Chicago (UIC), filed a lawsuit against the Board of Trustees of UIC and Mark Donovan, a former administrator, for racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This lawsuit arose after Donovan chose to promote a white applicant, Anthony Civito, over Barnes for the chief engineer position at the west campus, following the retirement of the previous chief engineer in late 2015. 

The court, presided over by Judge Virginia M. Kendall and later affirmed by Circuit Judges Ripple, Sykes, and St. Eve, upheld the district court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court concluded that Barnes failed to provide evidence to demonstrate that Donovan's rationale for selecting Civito was a pretext for racial discrimination. 

Barnes had been employed at UIC since 2008, initially as a plant operating engineer and later promoted to assistant chief engineer on the east campus. UIC's hiring process for chief engineers is governed by the State University Civil Service System (SUCSS), which requires candidates to take a civil-service exam and submit applications detailing their qualifications. Donovan was responsible for selecting interview candidates from a pool of eleven qualified applicants—two of whom were African American, including Barnes. Donovan interviewed all candidates without consulting personnel files or performance evaluations before ultimately selecting Civito, who had comparable experience to Barnes.

UIC initially promoted Civito, who expressed interest in moving to the west campus, which led to his transfer. Barnes, an engineer with experience from the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Governors State University, was promoted to assistant chief engineer at UIC in 2010. During his interview with Donovan, Barnes discussed strategies for cost-saving and maintenance improvements but did not bring any materials. Civito, in contrast, came prepared with extensive documentation and demonstrated a thoughtful approach to the role during his interview. After Donovan promoted Civito, Barnes filed a lawsuit alleging racial discrimination in the promotion process, claiming he was more qualified due to his extensive experience and better performance review scores compared to Civito. Both received an overall rating of "Meets Expectations" in their October 2014 reviews, but Barnes scored higher. Donovan stated he did not consider performance reviews in his decision, focusing instead on the interviews. The defendants sought summary judgment, asserting that Barnes could not prove Civito was less qualified or that Donovan's reasons for his promotion were a pretext for discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment, finding Barnes lacked sufficient evidence for a prima facie case of discrimination. The review of this decision is de novo, with all facts viewed in favor of the non-movant, and the legal standards for racial discrimination claims under Title VII and § 1983 are aligned.

The standard for summary judgment in discrimination cases requires evidence that a reasonable factfinder could conclude racial discrimination caused an adverse employment action, such as failure to promote. The McDonnell Douglas framework is applied, which necessitates that the plaintiff, Barnes, demonstrate: 1) membership in a protected class; 2) qualification for the position; 3) rejection for the position; and 4) that a non-protected class member who was not better qualified was hired instead. If a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the defendants to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their hiring decision. The defendants asserted that Civito was hired over Barnes because Donovan believed Civito had the strongest interview, showcasing relevant experience and ideas for the position.

Barnes contested this reasoning but did not provide evidence that Donovan's assertion was false, failing to establish that the hiring decision was pretextual. He criticized the interview process as unstructured and subjective yet did not demonstrate that these factors indicated discrimination. Additionally, Barnes pointed to a performance review where he scored higher than Civito, but both individuals received an overall rating of "Meets Expectations," indicating no substantial difference in qualifications. Thus, this evidence did not support an inference of pretext in the defendants' hiring decision.

Donovan testified that he did not consider performance reviews when making hiring decisions, believing them ineffective as performance indicators. This stance is not assessed for wisdom regarding pretext, which focuses solely on truthfulness. Barnes has criticized the hiring process but failed to provide evidence that it concealed racial discrimination. He claims discriminatory failure to promote him to chief engineer, citing a lack of African American promotions in UIC's history. However, evidence of an employer's practices regarding protected classes must directly challenge the specific reasons given for an employment decision to be relevant. Allegations of a broader history of discrimination do not suffice to invalidate a single decision. Barnes did not counter evidence that Donovan had previously promoted African Americans or encouraged their applications for chief engineer. Moreover, Barnes did not pursue a disparate-impact theory, which would require identifying specific discriminatory practices linked to statistical disparities. He also did not establish that intentional racial discrimination was a consistent pattern at UIC. The district court ruled that the Eleventh Amendment barred Barnes's § 1983 claim against the Board of Trustees, which is considered part of the state and not a "person" subject to damages under § 1983. Although Barnes sought an injunction against discrimination, he did not pursue this avenue, negating any claim under Ex parte Young. Consequently, the district court's summary judgment is affirmed.