Gregory Barnes v. Board of Trustees of the Unive

Citation: Not availableDocket: 19-1781

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; January 2, 2020; Federal Appellate Court

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Gregory L. Barnes, an African American engineer at the University of Illinois Chicago (UIC), filed a lawsuit against the Board of Trustees of UIC and Mark Donovan, a former administrator, alleging racial discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The claim arose when Donovan promoted a white candidate, Anthony Civito, over Barnes for the chief engineer position of the west campus. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, which Barnes appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, noting that Barnes failed to provide evidence showing that Donovan’s reason for selecting Civito was a pretext for discrimination.

Barnes was initially hired in 2008 and later promoted to assistant chief engineer on the east campus. To qualify for the chief engineer position, candidates must take a civil-service exam and meet minimum qualifications as determined by the State University Civil Service System (SUCSS). In late 2015, after a vacancy arose, UIC’s human resources department identified eleven candidates, including Barnes, who ranked among the top three scores. Donovan, responsible for the hiring decision, chose to interview all candidates without consulting personnel files or performance evaluations. Ultimately, he selected Civito, who had similar qualifications and experience as Barnes. Civito had expressed interest in the west campus role due to its unique challenges, leading to his selection over Barnes.

Barnes worked as an engineer at the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Tower from 1992 to 2005, progressing from apprentice to operating engineer by 1999. After working as a power plant engineer at Governors State University, he joined UIC in 2008 and became assistant chief engineer in 2010. During his interview with Donovan, Barnes emphasized his plans to save money and improve maintenance processes, but did not bring any materials. In contrast, Civito, who was interviewed for about 20 minutes, arrived prepared with various documents and demonstrated a strong understanding of operational processes. Following the interviews, Donovan promoted Civito, leading Barnes to file a lawsuit alleging racial discrimination, claiming he was more qualified based on his experience and higher performance review scores. Despite both candidates receiving the same overall rating in their performance reviews, Barnes scored higher than Civito in specific metrics. Donovan, however, did not consider performance reviews in his decision, focusing solely on the interview performance. The defendants sought summary judgment, arguing that Barnes failed to prove Civito was less qualified or that Donovan’s rationale for promoting Civito was a cover for discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment, finding Barnes lacked sufficient evidence for a prima facie discrimination case and that Donovan's reasons were legitimate and nondiscriminatory. The appellate review of this decision follows a de novo standard, considering all facts favorably for Barnes. The legal standards for racial discrimination claims under Title VII and Section 1983 are consistent.

The standard for summary judgment in discrimination cases requires evidence that would allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that racial discrimination was the cause of an adverse employment action, specifically a failure to promote. To establish a prima facie case for a failure-to-promote claim, the plaintiff, Barnes, must demonstrate that: 1) he belongs to a protected class, 2) he was qualified for the position, 3) he was rejected for the position, and 4) someone outside the protected class who was not better qualified was hired instead. If Barnes meets this standard, the burden shifts to the defendants to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their hiring decision. The defendants claimed that Donovan, the decision-maker, believed Civito was the best candidate based on his interview performance and proposed plans for the position.

Barnes contested this by denying that Civito was the best choice but failed to provide evidence that Donovan's assertion was false, which is necessary to establish pretext. Barnes criticized the interview process as unstructured and subjective, arguing it was unfair, but this does not equate to proving discrimination. Furthermore, Barnes attempted to show pretext by citing a performance review where he scored higher than Civito. However, since both received an overall rating of 'Meets Expectations' and had positive comments, this does not demonstrate a significant difference in qualifications to support an inference of pretext.

Donovan testified that he did not rely on performance reviews for his hiring decision, believing them ineffective as performance indicators. This decision's wisdom is not under scrutiny for pretext, which pertains only to the truthfulness of the employer's stated reasons. Barnes has criticized the hiring process but failed to present evidence of racial discrimination linked to that process. He claims discrimination in not being promoted to chief engineer, citing UIC's history of underpromoting African Americans and the absence of an African American chief engineer. While an employer's treatment of protected classes can indicate pretext or discrimination, it must specifically undermine the employer's justifications. General allegations of ongoing discrimination do not suffice to challenge individual employment decisions. Although Barnes contends that Donovan's promotion of Civito continued a discriminatory trend, he did not refute evidence that Donovan had previously promoted African Americans and encouraged their applications for chief engineer positions. Barnes did not pursue a disparate-impact theory to substantiate his claims regarding UIC's promotion history and has not demonstrated that intentional discrimination was a systemic issue at UIC. The district court ruled that the Eleventh Amendment barred Barnes's § 1983 claim against the Board. Barnes did not contest this ruling, and it was clarified that sovereign immunity prevents such claims against state entities. The Board, as part of the state, is not considered a "person" under § 1983. Although Barnes sought an injunction against discrimination, he did not actively pursue it, thus lacking a claim under Ex parte Young. Consequently, the district court's summary judgment is affirmed.