David Livingston Funchess v. Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Corrections, State of Florida, R.C. Dugger, Superintendent, Florida State Prison

Citations: 788 F.2d 1443; 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 24499Docket: 86-3259

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; April 21, 1986; Federal Appellate Court

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David Livingston Funchess was convicted in 1975 by a Duval County jury on two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. After exhausting state remedies, he filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, which was denied. The Eleventh Circuit Court affirmed this decision. As of April 22, 1986, Funchess was scheduled for execution. He sought state habeas relief and a stay of execution, which were denied by the Supreme Court of Florida. Following further unsuccessful attempts for relief in the Circuit Court of Duval County, Funchess returned to the federal district court, where his petition was dismissed, and his stay of execution request was denied.

On appeal, Funchess raised six issues: 1) his competency to stand trial and be sentenced due to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); 2) possible misinformation provided to the jury regarding their sentencing responsibilities; 3) limitations on presenting non-statutory mitigating factors due to his attorney's beliefs; 4) claims of racial and sexual discrimination in the imposition of his death sentence; 5) the constitutionality of execution by electrocution; and 6) the constitutionality of the death qualification process in his case. Funchess argued that PTSD, diagnosed in 1982, was not recognized at the time of his trial and resentencing, which he contended affected his mental competency.

In 1986, Dr. Smith reaffirmed his diagnosis of severe Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) for Funchess after reviewing new affidavits detailing Funchess’ behavior post-Vietnam. Funchess had filed his initial federal habeas corpus petition in July 1982, followed by an amended petition that was denied in November 1984. At the time of these filings, Funchess was diagnosed with PTSD, yet he failed to raise this issue in his petitions. Consequently, the court found that his claim of incompetency was barred due to the abuse of the writ doctrine, as he did not show that the omission was unintentional or due to neglect. 

Additionally, Funchess’s second claim regarding Caldwell v. Mississippi, asserting that the prosecutor's closing arguments diminished the jury's sense of responsibility, was deemed without merit. His third claim, which alleged that he was deprived of mitigating evidence due to ineffective assistance of counsel, was also rejected as it had been previously adjudicated. Finally, Funchess's claims of unconstitutional application of the Florida death penalty due to racial and sexual discrimination were dismissed. The court noted that his arguments relied on previously rejected statistical evidence and that the record did not substantiate his allegations of particularized discrimination during his trial.

Petitioner's claim that death by electrocution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is rejected based on the precedent set in Spinkellink v. Wainwright, which determined that such punishment does not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The decision in Spinkellink relied on In Re Kemmler, which upheld electrocution as a constitutional method of execution. Other cases, such as Sullivan v. Dugger, further affirm this position. 

Funchess also claims that excluding jurors opposed to the death penalty compromised his right to a fair trial and led to a biased jury. Although the Eighth Circuit has accepted this argument in Grigsby v. Mabry, the Eleventh Circuit consistently disagrees, having not stayed executions based on this issue since it has been resolved in favor of existing precedents. 

The dismissal of Funchess' habeas corpus petition is confirmed, and his request for a certificate of probable cause is denied. A limited stay of execution is granted until noon on April 22, 1986. Funchess was convicted for the brutal murder of two individuals during a robbery, and the trial court characterized the crimes as exceptionally heinous. The procedural history of the case has been previously detailed and will not be reiterated. It is unclear whether Funchess sought certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court following this ruling. Additionally, competency to stand trial was addressed in earlier decisions, concluding that Funchess was competent based on psychological evaluations and his involvement in trial preparation.