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James R. Davis v. Courtney Thompson (mem. dec.)

Citation: Not availableDocket: 19A-JP-1506

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; December 17, 2019; Indiana; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Memorandum Decision outlines the appeal by James R. Davis regarding the dismissal of his paternity action for G.N., a child born less than 300 days after his divorce from Courtney Thompson. The court, under the jurisdiction of the Indiana Court of Appeals, affirms the dismissal. Key facts include that during their divorce proceedings, Thompson misrepresented her pregnancy status, which Davis did not correct. G.N. was born on May 30, 2014, after their marriage was dissolved on November 5, 2013. Christopher Nunn signed a paternity affidavit claiming fatherhood of G.N. Despite informal visitation and child support payments, Davis lost contact with G.N. following Thompson's remarriage in 2017. 

Davis filed a Verified Petition to establish paternity on February 12, 2019, claiming a statutory presumption of paternity since G.N. was born within the 300-day window post-divorce. A hearing was held on March 14, 2019, where the trial court ordered DNA testing, which subsequently revealed a "zero percent possibility" of Davis being G.N.'s father. As a result, the trial court dismissed Davis's petition on May 28, 2019, leading to the current appeal.

In reviewing paternity rulings, appellate courts do not reassess evidence or witness credibility but focus on the evidence favorable to the trial court's judgment. The ruling will not be disturbed if the evidence supports it. Legal questions raised in an appeal are reviewed de novo, without deference to the trial court’s conclusions. 

Davis faces a significant challenge appealing a negative judgment, which occurs when the party with the burden of proof loses. Such judgments are only reversed if they are contrary to law, requiring the appellant to demonstrate that the evidence overwhelmingly supports a different conclusion than that of the trial court.

Davis contends that the trial court incorrectly dismissed his petition, arguing he is presumed to be the father under Indiana Code section 31-14-7-1(1), despite DNA test results showing he is not G.N.'s biological father. He also claims that Nunn's paternity affidavit does not refute this presumption. 

Paternity can be established through legal action or a paternity affidavit. A man is presumed to be a child's biological father if he was married to the mother during the child's birth or within 300 days after marriage dissolution, or if a genetic test shows at least 99% probability of paternity. This presumption can be rebutted by compelling evidence, such as a DNA test indicating high probability of paternity from another man combined with corroborating evidence of a sexual relationship with the mother during the conception period. Additionally, courts are required to grant DNA testing requests in paternity actions.

Davis contends that the DNA test results should not negate the presumption of paternity due to Thompson's alleged falsehood regarding her pregnancy during the dissolution hearing and his acquiescence to that falsehood, rendering the DNA results and Nunn's paternity affidavit irrelevant. He cites JO. W. v. JE. W., where the court upheld paternity despite the husband's claims of fraud due to his silence during the dissolution proceedings. The court noted that silence, combined with the presumption of paternity under Indiana law, typically establishes paternity. However, the court distinguishes JO. W. from Davis's case, as Davis's deception at the dissolution hearing undermines his claim of paternity. The court emphasizes that DNA evidence disproves Davis's paternity and that he cannot base his claim on Thompson's false statement, which he supported. Consequently, the court rejects Davis's argument, affirming the trial court's dismissal of his petition. Additionally, Davis's argument regarding Nunn's paternity affidavit is deemed waived due to lack of cogent argument and relevant legal authority. Thompson's request for Davis to cover her appellate attorney fees is also denied.