Rabinovich v. Maimonides Med. Ctr.

Citation: 2019 NY Slip Op 8724Docket: 2019-00565

Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York; December 3, 2019; New York; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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In Rabinovich v. Maimonides Medical Center, the Appellate Division, Second Department addressed the appeal concerning a medical malpractice claim. The plaintiff, Deborah Rabinovich, alleged injuries resulting from an adverse reaction after donating blood at Maimonides Medical Center on August 13, 2015. Following the e-filing of a summons with notice on September 18, 2017, the defendant demanded a complaint, which detailed claims of negligence against the medical center, including failure to adhere to state protocols and conduct proper medical assessments.

The defendant moved to dismiss the case under CPLR 3012-a(a)(1) for the plaintiff's failure to file a certificate of merit, asserting that the allegations required medical expertise to assess the standard of care. Conversely, the plaintiff argued that the claims constituted ordinary negligence, as the interaction was with a hospital employee rather than a medical doctor, thereby exempting it from the medical malpractice standards, including the certificate of merit requirement.

The court's opinion focused on distinguishing between ordinary negligence and medical malpractice, emphasizing the implications this distinction has for compliance with CPLR 3012-a. The ruling ultimately denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, suggesting that the nature of the allegations could be interpreted as ordinary negligence rather than requiring specialized medical evaluation.

The Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, ruling that a certificate of merit was unnecessary because the complaint involved simple negligence. However, the authors of the excerpt argue that the case does not pertain solely to simple negligence. Instead of dismissal, they advocate for an extension of time for the plaintiff to meet the requirements of CPLR 3012-a, which mandates a certificate of merit in actions for medical malpractice. This certificate must confirm that the attorney has reviewed the case facts and consulted a relevant licensed professional, concluding the action has a reasonable basis. The statute aims to deter frivolous lawsuits, thereby reducing costs associated with medical malpractice litigation.

Certain exceptions allow attorneys to bypass these requirements, such as inability to obtain necessary consultations before the statute of limitations expires, or if they have made three unsuccessful attempts to consult different professionals. If an attorney intends to rely solely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, no certificate is required. Furthermore, if medical records are requested but not provided, the certificate need not be filed until 90 days post-receipt of those records. Pro se plaintiffs are exempt from the statute's requirements.

The complexity of CPLR 3012-a is limited, and the consulted professional does not need to be the same individual later used as an expert witness. The excerpt notes that if a claim is based on ordinary negligence rather than medical malpractice, CPLR 3012-a does not apply. The distinction between medical malpractice and ordinary negligence is nuanced, as medical malpractice is a subset of negligence without a strict dividing line.

The determination of whether conduct is classified as medical malpractice or ordinary negligence hinges on the type of duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant. Medical malpractice involves acts requiring specialized medical knowledge, while ordinary negligence pertains to conduct assessable through common experience. A claim is categorized as ordinary negligence when jurors can rely on everyday experiences to evaluate the lack of due care. Conversely, claims involving professional skill and judgment fall under medical malpractice. Specifically, a negligent act by a healthcare provider that relates to medical treatment qualifies as medical malpractice.

In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant failed to adequately screen for health issues, obtain medical history, monitor the plaintiff's condition, and manage potential adverse reactions during a blood donation. These allegations are closely tied to medical treatment and necessitate medical judgment, indicating they sound in medical malpractice, not ordinary negligence. The complexities of determining eligibility for blood donation and recognizing adverse reactions require specialized medical knowledge, thus moving the case beyond the realm of common knowledge. The cited precedent, Muniz v American Red Cross, supports the notion that similar claims necessitate expert medical testimony to establish malpractice.

In Martuscello v Jensen, the plaintiff alleged a fall from an examination table due to insufficient supervision. In related cases, such as Smee v Sisters of Charity Hosp. of Buffalo, similar claims were made regarding falls resulting from a lack of supervision in medical settings. The discussion emphasizes that a blood bank must have a medical director overseeing blood collection, highlighting the connection between phlebotomy and medical malpractice. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that a formal doctor-patient relationship is necessary under CPLR 3012-a for medical malpractice claims. It noted that claims stemming from a phlebotomist's actions could still be classified as medical malpractice, as established by previous rulings where malpractice standards applied to non-physician medical service providers. The statute of limitations for medical malpractice (2½ years) applies to negligent conduct by non-physicians, contrasting with the 3-year period for ordinary negligence. The court disagreed with the lower court's view that no certificate of merit was necessary due to ordinary negligence classification but agreed that the complaint should not be dismissed. CPLR 3012-a lacks provisions for dismissal due to noncompliance regarding certificate of merit, unlike CPLR 3012(b). The ruling allows the plaintiff's attorney an opportunity to comply with CPLR 3012-a, which is deemed applicable to this case.

The plaintiff's attorney's failure to file a certificate of merit is deemed to be the result of a good faith belief that CPLR 3012-a did not apply to the case. The court decides to extend the plaintiff's time to serve a certificate of merit to 60 days following the service of this opinion and order, as the defendant's motion sought further relief. If the plaintiff fails to comply with both the statute and the court's order, the Supreme Court may dismiss the complaint at its discretion. The order is modified to grant the defendant's motion in part, allowing an extension for the plaintiff to file the certificate of merit while denying the motion in all other respects. The modified order is affirmed without costs, with the plaintiff's time to serve the certificate extended as specified.