State ex rel. Ames v. Brimfield Twp. Bd. of Trustees

Citation: 2019 Ohio 4926Docket: 2019-P-0017

Court: Ohio Court of Appeals; December 1, 2019; Ohio; State Appellate Court

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Brian M. Ames, representing himself, appealed a summary judgment from the Portage County Court of Common Pleas in favor of the Brimfield Township Board of Trustees regarding alleged violations of Ohio's Open Meetings Act (OMA), R.C. 121.22. Ames filed a verified complaint claiming 14 counts of improper executive sessions held by the Board, arguing that the meeting minutes failed to specify the exceptions allowing for non-public discussions as required by R.C. 121.22(G). His claims arose from a review of the minutes after a broader survey of public bodies. 

The Board denied any violations and both parties moved for summary judgment, presenting evidence including meeting minutes and a trustee's affidavit asserting compliance with OMA. The Board argued that while R.C. 121.22(G) necessitates a motion to enter executive session, it does not require a verbatim account of the exception in the minutes. The trial court sided with the Board, ruling that Ames did not prove a violation solely based on the minutes' lack of specificity. This judgment was subsequently reversed and remanded by the appellate court.

The Board's decision to enter alleged executive sessions was found to comply with the Ohio Open Meetings Act (OMA), which requires that the motion and vote for such sessions specify the approved purposes outlined in R.C. 121.22(G)(1). However, it is not mandated that the minutes include a verbatim account of the motion; a general reflection of the subject matter discussed suffices per R.C. 121.22(C). Ames filed an appeal, asserting that the Trial Court erroneously granted summary judgment for the Board while denying his request. The primary question for review is whether public meeting minutes must accurately demonstrate compliance with the OMA regarding motions and votes for executive sessions. 

Ames argues for a de novo standard of review, citing that the trial court found no OMA violation, whereas the Board contends that the standard should be abuse of discretion since Ames initiated the action in mandamus rather than directly under the OMA. However, when a trial court grants summary judgment, the appropriate standard of review is de novo, as established by case law. Summary judgment is a tool to avoid trials when no genuine issues of material fact exist, requiring the moving party to demonstrate the absence of such issues through evidence like depositions or affidavits. While a summary judgment can expedite justice, it must be applied carefully to ensure a party's right to a trial is protected in cases of conflicting facts.

The court is addressing whether the directive in R.C. 121.22(C), which requires that executive session minutes reflect only the general subject matter, mandates the inclusion of the specific exception under R.C. 121.22(G) for entering an executive session. The Ohio Open Meetings Act (OMA) aims to ensure accountability of elected officials by preventing secret deliberations on public issues. Under R.C. 121.22(A), public bodies must conduct official business in open meetings unless specifically exempted by law. R.C. 121.22(G) outlines the permissible exceptions for executive sessions, including matters related to public employee actions, provided a majority roll call vote occurs.

The Board claimed compliance with R.C. 121.22(G)(1) for 14 executive sessions held, which covers the appointment, employment, dismissal, and related actions of public employees or officials. However, the meeting minutes did not specify any of these exceptions. R.C. 507.04(A) mandates that township fiscal officers maintain accurate records of board meetings, and R.C. 504.09 allows the board to designate someone to take minutes. While the omission of details does not invalidate board actions, Ohio law does not require specific language in minutes. The Ohio Supreme Court has previously addressed the sufficiency of meeting minutes in a case concerning emergency declarations, indicating that general compliance may suffice without heightened specificity.

The relator's argument in the mandamus case was that there was no genuine emergency and that the minutes must specify the emergency reasons. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this, asserting the ordinance provided sufficient justification for its emergency status and clarified that there is no statutory requirement for council minutes to detail discussions on the emergency declaration. The court emphasized that the duty to create legal obligations in mandamus is a legislative function, not judicial.

The relevant statute, R.C. 121.22(C), mandates that minutes of public meetings must be prepared and available for public inspection, requiring only a general outline of discussions in executive sessions. A key issue was whether the minutes must indicate the specific reasons for entering executive session. The court affirmed that such specifics are necessary, citing the requirement that minutes reflect the statutory purpose for entering executive session to ensure transparency regarding the legality of non-public meetings.

In the Laughlin case, it was established that an emergency measure must prioritize public health and safety, which was not adequately demonstrated in the current case's minutes. The absence of documented reasons for the executive session made it impossible for the public to assess the legitimacy of the board's actions. This aligns with the Fifth Appellate District’s ruling that minutes must include the purposes outlined in R.C. 121.22(G)(1) for executive sessions. The interpretation of R.C. 121.22(C) must prioritize the Open Meetings Act's intent, ensuring that citizens should not need to resort to mandamus actions to verify lawful conduct by a board. Consequently, the Board's failure to include purposes for entering executive sessions constituted a technical violation of R.C. 121.22(C), entitling Ames to summary judgment on his claims.

The violations identified are primarily technical, centering on the Board's failure to provide specific statutory purposes for entering executive sessions in its meeting minutes, as required by R.C. 121.22(G)(1). Although the Board believed it was acting within legal bounds and in the public interest, Ames' complaint highlighted this lack of specificity. The Supreme Court of Ohio has ruled that using general terms does not fulfill the requirement for specificity in the statute. The Board's submitted materials, including meeting minutes and affidavits, did not adequately show the motions and votes related to the executive sessions or specify which statutory purposes justified their actions. The trustee's affidavit failed to identify which portion of R.C. 121.22(G)(1) was applicable. Consequently, the meeting minutes did not sufficiently outline the reasons for the executive sessions, undermining compliance with the Open Meetings Act (OMA). As a result, the court concluded that the Board's motion for summary judgment was erroneous, determining Ames' claim to have merit. The judgment from the Portage County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and the case is remanded for the trial court to rule in favor of Ames, enforce an appropriate injunction, and award fees due to the technical OMA violation.