Kayla Willis v. City of Seattle

Citation: Not availableDocket: 18-35053

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; November 28, 2019; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Ninth Circuit Court upheld the district court's denial of class certification in a case involving the City of Seattle and the Washington State Department of Transportation's procedures for removing unauthorized encampments and personal property from city-owned land. The plaintiffs, including individuals and organizations, alleged that the defendants' "sweeps" policy led to the destruction of property, violating both the U.S. and Washington State Constitutions regarding unreasonable seizure and due process. The court determined that the plaintiffs did not provide adequate evidence or demonstrate a common practice that applied to all proposed class members, thus supporting the district court's discretion in denying certification. Judge Christen partially concurred and partially dissented, agreeing that the plaintiffs failed to establish common questions for their as-applied claims but arguing that distinct facial challenges to the defendants' cleanup policies merited consideration. She called for a remand to the district court to address these facial claims, which were not discussed in the original order denying class certification.

Multi-Departmental Administrative Rules 08-01 and 17-01 govern the removal of unauthorized encampments and personal property on city-owned property in Seattle, while similar procedures are established by the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) for state properties. Appellants, four individuals living on public property, seek to represent a class of about 2,000 similarly situated individuals in an appeal regarding the district court's denial of their motion for class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. They allege that the City of Seattle and WSDOT engaged in unlawful 'sweeps' of encampments, violating due process and the unreasonable seizure clauses of both the U.S. Constitution and the Washington State Constitution. 

Although the district court acknowledged that the Appellants met the numerosity requirement of Rule 23, it determined that they did not adequately demonstrate a common practice applicable to all class members or meet all requirements of Rule 23(a). The court's ruling on class certification is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. To qualify for class action status, the lead plaintiffs must satisfy four Rule 23(a) criteria: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation. Commonality requires showing that all class members experienced the same injury and that claims can be resolved collectively. The determination must reveal whether a single policy or practice exposes class members to a substantial risk of harm, which serves as the cohesive element for the class.

Allegations of individual mistreatment lack the evidentiary support necessary to demonstrate a systemic issue or policy of wrongdoing. The court noted that mere threadbare allegations do not establish commonality for class action purposes under Rule 23(a). Appellants failed to provide sufficient evidence or identify a common practice relevant to their claims for class certification. Although they presented various bases for asserting commonality, including the handling of personal property and the conduct of "sweeps," they did not identify a specific, uniform practice affecting all proposed class members. The court found no evidence indicating that each Appellant experienced the same actions or injuries linked to the MDARs or WSDOT Guidelines. Furthermore, Appellants acknowledged the variability of each sweep, undermining their argument for class certification. The court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class action certification, emphasizing that Appellants' challenge did not constitute a facial challenge to the MDARs or WSDOT Guidelines. A facial challenge, which argues that a law is unconstitutional in all applications, is more difficult to prove. Appellants listed five questions concerning potential violations of constitutional rights related to the seizure of personal property, but these did not adequately support their claim for commonality.

Five factual or legal questions posed by Appellants do not challenge the constitutionality of any written law or policy. These questions pertain to the Defendants’ alleged routine destruction of personal property, which Appellants argue occurs with disregard for their own regulations. However, Appellants have not asserted that these regulations themselves present a common question of fact or law. They also did not claim that Defendants’ policies are unconstitutional in all relevant contexts, which is necessary for a facial challenge. Appellants recognize that the alleged unconstitutional pattern or practice is part of a typical course of conduct, and deviations from this conduct do not negate class certification. They argue that the risk posed by Defendants' actions to all unhoused persons in Seattle establishes commonality, dismissing the relevance of a facial challenge to this argument.

The burden of proof for class certification lies with Appellants, who must show compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Courts should avoid preemptively addressing constitutional issues or creating broad constitutional rules beyond the specific facts at hand. The dissenting opinion misinterprets Appellants’ motion for class certification, suggesting that it adequately presented a facial challenge to certain guidelines. Appellants merely noted in passing that some actions were taken under official policies and made vague assertions about the policies lacking procedural safeguards, without clearly articulating how these deficiencies create common injuries for class members. The district court, therefore, did not err in refraining from addressing the facial challenge during the class certification motion, as it was more appropriately raised in the context of a preliminary injunction motion. Even if the dissent's interpretation of Appellants' motion were correct, the claims would not constitute a valid facial challenge.

Appellants argue that the Guidelines grant excessive discretion to employees but fail to demonstrate a common injury to the constitutional or statutory rights of all class members, which is necessary for class action under Dukes. The district court's denial of class certification was upheld, as the Appellants did not provide adequate evidence of a common practice affecting the proposed class. Circuit Judge Christen concurs in part and dissents in part, noting that while the plaintiffs did not establish common questions for their as-applied claims, they did raise distinct facial challenges to the defendants' camp cleanup policies that were not addressed in the order denying class certification. The judge emphasizes that the district court recognized these facial constitutional claims related to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, asserting that the definitions within the Updated Encampment Rules are unconstitutional. The City conceded that the facial challenges were common but argued they lacked merit, which the judge disputes, stating that the merits of the claims should not influence the decision on class certification per Rule 23. The judge concludes that the plaintiffs articulated valid facial challenges, warranting a reevaluation of class certification.

Plaintiffs contend that the City’s official policies lack necessary procedural safeguards to protect the rights of individuals living outdoors during enforcement sweeps, and they argue that these policies allow for arbitrary enforcement and excessive discretion without adequate oversight. The majority opinion initially claims that plaintiffs did not present a facial challenge, but later acknowledges that such claims were indeed raised, though it asserts that the court was not required to address them. The majority suggests that plaintiffs' facial arguments were either misplaced or mentioned only in passing. However, it is asserted that the district court correctly identified plaintiffs' facial challenges in both their operative complaint and motion for class certification. 

The majority references City of Los Angeles v. Patel, stating that plaintiffs failed to claim the policies are unconstitutional in all applications, which is a requirement for a facial challenge. Yet, plaintiffs specifically alleged that even with adherence to guidelines, the sweeps would remain unconstitutional, thereby asserting that the policies are unconstitutional in every application. The court emphasizes that plaintiffs do not need to use specific language to convey their claims, as the operative complaint satisfied the requirement of providing fair notice to defendants.

Plaintiffs also argue that the policy permitting the destruction of property valued under $100 is unconstitutional in all relevant applications. The brief from civil procedure professors supports the notion that due process challenges to governmental policies are suitable for class certification, as they pose systemic questions affecting a group reliant on those policies. The majority disputes the presence of a cognizable argument regarding the $100 policy in the complaint, but it is noted that the complaint contains explicit references to various policies deemed unconstitutional by plaintiffs, including inadequate notice provisions under the MDAR and WSDOT Guidelines.

The complaint highlights a policy that permits the destruction of property valued under $100, which contradicts notice requirements and poses significant risks to individuals storing their belongings. The majority disputes the plaintiffs' argument that this policy grants excessive discretion to employees clearing camps, failing to clarify why such a facial challenge does not present a common question under Rule 23(a). Plaintiffs assert that the policy is unconstitutionally vague and raises broader systemic issues regarding its legality. They differentiate their case from Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, emphasizing that they do not claim discriminatory application but rather challenge the policy's constitutionality in its entirety. The plaintiffs argue that due process rights are violated by the failure to store seized property valued under $100, leading to severe consequences such as loss of identification and medication. This situation illustrates the potential for class action litigation to address substantial harms caused by government policies. The district court denied class certification based on a perceived lack of evidence for the plaintiffs' as-applied challenges but did not address whether their facial claims posed common questions for certification. Consequently, remand is necessary for the district court to evaluate this critical issue regarding the facial challenges.