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Rex Frederickson v. Tizoc Landeros
Citation: Not availableDocket: 18-1605
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; November 25, 2019; Federal Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit heard the appeal of Rex A. Frederickson against Detective Tizoc Landeros regarding an alleged violation of Frederickson’s equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Frederickson claims Landeros obstructed his ability to update his sexual offender registration due to personal animus, preventing him from moving from Joliet to Bolingbrook, Illinois. The district court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to determine that Landeros acted out of personal dislike without a rational basis, thus denying Landeros’s motion for qualified immunity concerning the equal protection claim. The court also noted that Frederickson's right to police protection untainted by personal animus was clearly established, referencing a prior case (Hanes v. Zurick). While Landeros was granted qualified immunity on Frederickson's claims related to substantive due process for intrastate travel and procedural due process for registration under Illinois law, Frederickson did not challenge these findings on appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, noting that, due to the interlocutory nature of the appeal, they must accept Frederickson's version of events. The court clarified that Frederickson, a homeless individual with a prior sex crime conviction, was subject to strict registration requirements under the Illinois Sexual Offender Registration Act (SORA), which includes the obligation to report weekly to law enforcement and follow specific procedures when changing jurisdictions. The court assumed, without deciding, that SORA could impose ongoing notice requirements for homeless individuals. Frederickson's claim centers on alleged violations of his federal rights by Detective Landeros, specifically regarding the application of qualified immunity. For the first four years of Frederickson's residency in Joliet, his interactions with Detective Avila regarding SORA registrations were uneventful. However, upon Landeros's takeover in 2007, tension grew as Frederickson frequently questioned the constitutionality of SORA registration and made requests for minor changes, which Landeros found trivial. Their relationship deteriorated to the point where Frederickson began bringing witnesses to his registrations. Landeros reportedly expressed frustration over Frederickson's behavior, stating he had trouble with him compared to others he registered. Over the years, Landeros arrested Frederickson multiple times, including a notable arrest in 2008 for failure to register, leading to Frederickson's year-long incarceration before acquittal. In 2010, Landeros arrested Frederickson for driving with a suspended license, to which Frederickson pleaded guilty, though he claims he felt compelled to do so for a quicker release from jail. Frederickson does not contest his guilty plea or conviction, focusing instead on an equal protection claim. In January 2011, Frederickson informed Landeros of his impending move to Bolingbrook, which prompted Landeros to threaten arrest on unspecified grounds. Despite this, Frederickson moved and registered with Bolingbrook Police the following day. Bolingbrook accepted his registration, but transferring Frederickson's LEADS file from Joliet proved problematic. Joliet officials refused to transfer the file, claiming Frederickson's residence was "under investigation," a refusal that was noted as unprecedented by Bolingbrook officials involved in LEADS file management. The incident in question did not involve an arrest and therefore did not activate the Nieves rule. Landeros informed Detective Talbot that Frederickson was misrepresenting his residency status in Bolingbrook. Following this, the Bolingbrook Police Department circulated emails directing personnel to reject Frederickson's SORA registration, asserting he lived in Joliet and was not homeless. Frederickson initially registered in Bolingbrook on February 9, but while attempting to move his belongings from Joliet, he encountered difficulties with re-registration on February 16. Although he registered in Joliet that morning, he later traveled to Bolingbrook to register again but was denied by a police officer who instructed him to return to Joliet. Frederickson continued to reside in Bolingbrook, living in a truck, and attempted to register again on February 23 but faced additional demands from detectives that lacked legal basis, leading him to refuse compliance. His complaint against the detectives was also obstructed by the village clerk. Due to ongoing registration issues, Frederickson quit his job and returned to Joliet, where he repeatedly sought to register but was denied. He ultimately was indicted for failing to register by March 3, 2011, a conviction that was affirmed on appeal. The Appellate Court acknowledged that even if Frederickson's attempts to register were wrongly rejected, he still did not register by the required date. Frederickson challenges Landeros’s conduct prior to these events, not the conviction itself. The review of the district court's denial of qualified immunity is conducted de novo, focusing on whether the facts, viewed favorably to Frederickson, demonstrate a constitutional violation and if that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. The analysis requires a precise definition of the constitutional right in question, specifically the class-of-one equal protection theory, which Frederickson asserts. This theory applies when a public official acts out of spite or an improper motive against an individual without any rational basis for their actions. The Supreme Court's precedent in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech establishes that a successful class-of-one claim requires the plaintiff to show intentional differential treatment from similarly situated individuals without rational justification. The inquiry centers on whether the state actor, Landeros, discriminated against Frederickson without a rational basis, rather than whether Landeros had a duty to facilitate Frederickson's registration transfer. The court emphasizes that the plaintiff must provide facts that plausibly illustrate official actions lacking rational support, as arbitrary discrimination is impermissible under the Fourteenth Amendment. A party can assert a "class-of-one" claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that arbitrary and irrational actions, devoid of a rational basis, differentiate the claimant from the general population. Such claims can arise from malicious or irrational law enforcement actions, as established in cases like Esmail v. Macrane. The analysis must determine whether the claimant, Frederickson, can show that Landeros’s treatment of him lacked a rational basis, focusing on the established right to equal police protection free from personal animus. The relevant legal precedent, including Olech and earlier cases, confirms that the right to even-handed police protection was recognized before Landeros's actions in 2011. Although the dissent questions the breadth of previous rulings, Frederickson's specific allegations—claiming that Landeros acted solely out of animus—require proof that he was treated differently than similarly situated individuals without any rational justification. To succeed, Frederickson must present evidence for a jury to conclude that his treatment was intentionally disparate and lacked a rational basis. The excerpt addresses the uncertain legal standard for class-of-one equal protection claims, specifically whether a plaintiff must demonstrate differential treatment by police without rational basis or also prove personal animus or improper motivation. The court favors a definition that recognizes a clearly established class-of-one claim involving government actors who treat a citizen differently for vindictive or harassing reasons. Class-of-one claims often involve personal stakes or histories between the parties that indicate a lack of rational basis for the differential treatment. Examples of such claims include cases where personal animosity from prior legal disputes influences government actors’ decisions. The text emphasizes that while identifying a similarly situated comparator may be beneficial, it is not a strict requirement if clear animus is evident. Past rulings indicate that arbitrary government action can establish a lack of rational basis and animus without needing direct comparisons to other individuals. In the current case, the facts suggest that Frederickson faced unjust government interference related to his registrations, highlighting a situation that aligns with previously recognized arbitrary actions without needing to establish a comparator. No law enforcement officer involved reported experiencing similar obstructions, reinforcing the perception of unjust treatment in Frederickson's case. Bolingbrook officials confirmed that Frederickson’s registration is the only one ever denied by the village. Landeros allegedly encouraged city employees to obstruct Frederickson’s attempts to file complaints. The legal precedent indicates that Frederickson is not required to identify another individual who faced similar discriminatory treatment to support his claim. Instead, he has clearly identified his harasser, provided plausible motives, and detailed questionable actions. Landeros argues he was unaware of any wrongdoing, claiming no established law prohibits an officer from investigating a homeless sex offender’s residency or delaying file transfers during such investigations. However, the essence of Frederickson’s claim is whether Landeros arbitrarily exercised his authority to deny Frederickson equal treatment, which could reflect personal animus. Qualified immunity does not necessitate a comprehensive list of potential abuses of power for liability to be established. The complexity of the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) does not obscure the principles governing class-of-one equal protection claims. A hypothetical scenario illustrates that even if a statute is applied correctly, discriminatory practices based on personal vendettas or characteristics, such as race, still constitute equal protection violations. Past cases have acknowledged that equal protection violations can exist independently of due process violations. Frederickson's right to register as a sex offender and file complaints with local authorities was clearly established and should not have been obstructed by police acting out of personal animus. The district court agreed that Frederickson's claims were sufficient to overcome summary judgment regarding a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Evidence indicated that Officer Landeros lacked an objective basis for preventing Frederickson's move to Bolingbrook and that his actions were driven by personal animus. Testimonies from law enforcement officers revealed that Landeros's conduct was unprecedented, as no other jurisdiction had ever refused a LEADS file transfer under similar circumstances. Landeros claimed he was investigating Frederickson's move, but substantial evidence, including his own admissions, contradicted this rationale. He acknowledged no reason to doubt Frederickson’s homelessness in Bolingbrook and indicated his usual policy was to register homeless offenders regardless of accurate information. Landeros deviated from these policies in Frederickson's case, suggesting a significant departure from established standards relevant to Equal Protection claims. Furthermore, Landeros's comments during deposition indicated potential dishonesty regarding his reasons for obstructing registration, which a jury could interpret as pretextual, reflecting personal bias rather than legitimate investigatory motives. The presence of these factual disputes means the matter cannot be resolved at this stage of the appeal. SORA does not mandate police investigations into a resident's change of address before transferring a LEADS file; it requires annual investigations into offenders' provided information. Landeros's claim that Frederickson’s failure to "register out" of Joliet warranted investigation could be viewed as pretextual, given evidence that such requirements are often waived. Merely violating state law would not substantiate Frederickson's class-of-one equal protection claim; however, allegations suggest Landeros engaged in misconduct to obstruct Frederickson’s registration and access to the complaint process. This issue parallels problems under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where administrative remedies may be deemed unavailable due to affirmative misconduct by prison officials. If such misconduct prevents prisoners from using administrative remedies, the exhaustion requirement is excused. Frederickson has presented sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to determine whether Landeros intentionally impeded his access to registration processes, despite the district court recognizing factual disputes regarding Frederickson’s compliance with registration requirements. The interlocutory appeal is not suitable for resolving these factual disputes. A jury could find that Landeros’s decision to block Frederickson's registration lacked a rational basis and that there was no legitimate need to investigate his move. Landeros has not provided any conceivable rational basis for his treatment of Frederickson, which could lead a trier of fact to conclude that his actions were arbitrary. The Supreme Court's Olech decision indicates that a class-of-one claim hinges on evidence of irrational government behavior, while also cautioning against a standard that could subject every discretionary decision by government actors to challenge. To avoid unintended consequences and adhere to the rational-basis test, a rule was established requiring a "class-of-one" plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant intentionally deprived them of equal protection for personal reasons unrelated to their official duties. Frederickson's allegations meet this requirement, as animus serves as strong evidence of irrational government conduct. An example of such irrational behavior includes police withdrawing protection out of malice or bribery, which Frederickson argues applies to his case against officer Landeros. Frederickson and Landeros had a contentious relationship, with Landeros allegedly harassing Frederickson and threatening or executing arrests without probable cause. Frederickson highlighted instances where Landeros threatened to arrest him when he attempted to relocate and where Landeros failed to amend Frederickson's registration status, actions that lacked any probable cause. Although a jury may not find malice in every interaction between a police officer and a citizen, the cumulative evidence could lead a rational jury to conclude that Landeros acted out of personal animus against Frederickson. Consequently, the district court's denial of qualified immunity for Landeros was affirmed, allowing Frederickson's claims to proceed. In dissent, Judge Easterbrook noted that Frederickson, a sex offender required to register frequently due to his lack of a fixed address, claimed Landeros's refusal to transfer his registration records from Joliet to Bolingbrook was driven by personal dislike. This led to Frederickson's subsequent arrest and conviction for failing to register. Landeros contended he was entitled to qualified immunity, prompting a review of whether the constitutional requirement to facilitate such a transfer was clearly established in 2011. Frederickson's potential constitutional claims against Landeros face significant hurdles. The First Amendment theory, alleging retaliation for speech, fails because his arrest was based on probable cause, as established in Nieves v. Bartlett (2019). Frederickson's gaps in registration led to a conviction, which a state appellate court upheld, negating his federal relief chances since he must show the law was "clearly established" in his favor. The Fourth Amendment claim, suggesting that retaliatory motives influenced his registration and led to custody, is similarly undermined by the requirement of probable cause, making the officer's intent irrelevant under Whren v. United States (1996) and Hartman v. Moore (2006). A Due Process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, asserting deprivation of the ability to transfer his registration, is thwarted by Beley v. Chicago (2018), which determined that the Due Process Clause does not grant a right to register as a sex offender; registration is a mandated duty, not a right. Even recasting the argument under the Equal Protection Clause does not provide relief, as registration remains a burden rather than a benefit. Frederickson's abandonment of challenges to his arrests and custody limits his potential damages claims, as the risk of prosecution for non-registration, rather than the status itself, constituted his primary concern. Thus, he has relinquished any viable theory for damages. Registration is considered a duty rather than a right, as established in Beley. The Fourteenth Amendment does not recognize violations of state law as breaches of federal constitutional rights, supported by various case law, including Snowden v. Hughes and Wilson v. Corcoran. Federal law does not dictate specific locations for sex offender registration within a state; thus, any requirements for Frederickson's registration in Bolingbrook stem from Illinois law. The claim that Landeros failed to follow Illinois law does not constitute a "clearly established" constitutional violation, as Frederickson's obligation to register was dictated by state law. The argument that violations of state law imply constitutional violations lacks a rational basis under the Equal Protection Clause, as public employees are expected to adhere to state law. The assertion that Frederickson was treated unequally by Landeros introduces a "class of one" equal protection claim, suggesting that the right to police protection free from personal animus is universally applicable. This reasoning potentially circumvents established legal precedents, such as Nieves and Hartman, while failing to demonstrate that any of these legal arguments were clearly established as of 2011. A class-of-one equal-protection claim is a specific type of equal-protection claim that must adhere to the distinction between violations of state law and constitutional violations. The author expresses skepticism about the validity of this legal theory, referencing cases such as Nieves and Hartman, which focused on public employee liability rather than merely the nomenclature of liability theories. The author asserts that a violation of state law cannot form the basis for a constitutional claim, emphasizing that personal animus does not automatically render a public official's actions unconstitutional when grounded in probable cause or state law. The author challenges the notion that there has always been a right to police protection free from personal bias, questioning why this issue was unresolved in prior Supreme Court cases like Hartman and the 2012 decision in Reichle. Furthermore, a past case, Del Marcelle v. Brown County, is cited as an example where the claim based on personal animus was rejected, suggesting that the legal understanding of such claims was not clearly established at that time. The author argues that the assertion of a right to police protection devoid of personal animus is overly broad and lacks the specificity required to be considered "clearly established" under Supreme Court precedents. The conclusion drawn is that judicial disagreements on constitutional questions should shield police from liability, as it would be unfair to penalize them for acting based on contested interpretations of the law. A series of Supreme Court decisions indicate that rights must be defined with specificity, providing clear guidance to officers in particular situations. The statement that everyone is entitled to “police protection uncorrupted by personal animus” lacks the necessary specificity to serve as a basis for damages under §1983, as it does not inform officers on procedural duties like transferring LEADS files or registering sex offenders. The notion of "official action uncorrupted by personal animus" is an aspirational ideal rather than a governing rule. The opinion critiques a proposed variant asserting that individuals have a “right to register as a sex offender” without police obstruction, highlighting that previous rulings, specifically Beley, have denied such a right. The colleagues suggest that the Equal Protection Clause establishes this right, yet fail to cite any precedents supporting this claim. Furthermore, it notes that Frederickson was not blocked from filing complaints, as he could have pursued action through local police or courts but did not. The right of access to courts exists but was not obstructed by Landeros. The phrase “by a police officer who acts exclusively out of animus” could be rephrased to reflect a violation of state law, yet such violations do not necessarily equate to constitutional breaches. Ultimately, the concept of acting without personal animus remains too vague to establish a clearly defined federal right.