Shannon Shamar Cousett v. Commonwealth of Virginia

Citation: Not availableDocket: 0967181

Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia; November 4, 2019; Virginia; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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On February 6, 2017, Shannon Shamar Cousett was indicted in Virginia Beach Circuit Court on multiple charges, including rape of T.H., abduction of I.P., and two counts of burglary. The alleged offenses occurred on August 6, 2016. Cousett sought to sever the charges related to T.H. from those related to I.P., but the circuit court denied this motion. Following a bench trial on December 5, 2017, Cousett was convicted on all counts and sentenced to a total of 50 years and 365 days in prison, with 10 years suspended. On appeal, Cousett contends that the circuit court erred by not severing the charges, arguing that the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that justice did not require separate trials and did not meet specific criteria outlined in the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. 

The factual background includes T.H.’s account of waking up to an unknown man assaulting her and her subsequent pursuit of the assailant, who was later identified as Cousett by a neighbor, N.B. N.B. observed a man matching Cousett’s description near T.H.’s apartment just before the incident. Additionally, shortly after the assault on T.H., Cousett was reported to have entered I.P.'s unlocked apartment. I.P. described him as an African-American male of average height wearing dark clothing.

I.P. reported that Cousett entered her apartment, latched the door, and threatened her with a 'shh' before physically assaulting her by punching her on the right side of her head multiple times. After I.P. managed to unlatch the door, Cousett fled the scene. Although she could not identify him in a photo lineup, I.P. recognized Cousett as her attacker during the preliminary hearing and trial. Police Officer William Patrick Ahern, Jr. later found a white drawstring bag containing a cell phone, cash, and Cousett’s identification card near the convention center, which also had two red spots believed to be blood.

On February 6, 2017, a grand jury indicted Cousett on various charges from incidents on August 6, 2016, including one count of rape and burglary concerning T.H., and one count of abduction, burglary, and assault against I.P. Cousett requested to separate the charges involving T.H. from those involving I.P., but the circuit court denied this motion. Cousett pleaded not guilty to all charges, leading to a bench trial on December 5, 2017, where the Commonwealth presented eight witnesses.

Among the testimonies, Cynthia James, a security officer, observed police retrieving the bag and noted an African-American male inquiring about it that night. Officer Ryan Daniel Coon testified about a consensual encounter with Cousett days before the incidents, but had no contact with him on the night of the attacks. At the trial's conclusion, Cousett’s motions to strike the evidence were denied, and he was found guilty of all charges. On May 30, 2018, he was sentenced to fifty years and 365 days in prison, with ten years suspended. An appeal followed this decision.

The analysis addresses the standard of review regarding the trial court's discretion to join multiple offenses for a single trial under Rule 3A:10(c). The circuit court's decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion, while legal interpretations of the Rules are assessed de novo. For offenses to be joined, the Commonwealth must demonstrate that either the offenses meet the criteria of Rule 3A:6(b) or that both the accused and the Commonwealth’s attorney consent. In this case, the accused, Cousett, did not consent, necessitating the Commonwealth to prove the requirements of Rule 3A:6(b) and that justice did not warrant separate trials.

Rule 3A:6(b) allows for joinder if offenses arise from the same act or are part of a common scheme or plan. The Supreme Court of Virginia distinguishes between a "common scheme"—crimes sharing unique features suggesting they were committed by the same individual as part of a pattern—and a "common plan," which involves crimes aimed at achieving a specific goal. Both must be closely connected in time, place, and method of commission.

Cousett contests the joinder on two grounds: he argues that there was insufficient evidence of a common scheme or plan and claims that justice necessitated separate trials due to alleged improper reliance on identification evidence from a different case. The Commonwealth contends that the offenses constituted a common scheme but only supports this claim without addressing other aspects of Rule 3A:6(b). The analysis concludes that while the offenses were temporally and spatially connected, they lacked sufficient similarities in the means of commission to establish a common plan.

Insufficient points of commonality exist between the actions of the perpetrator in the T.H. and I.P. cases to justify a joint trial. Although both incidents involved Cousett entering apartments through unlocked doors, the nature of the offenses differs significantly. The Commonwealth failed to demonstrate a common scheme, as there was no evidence that Cousett intended to assault I.P. when he fled immediately upon her opening the door, unlike his actions with T.H. The circuit court's decision to join the trials was erroneous because the similarities cited do not meet the criteria outlined in Rule 3A:6(b) and Purvis v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 298, 306 (2000).

Despite this error, a reversal is not mandated as it does not affect substantive rights per Rule 3A:2(a). The standard for assessing non-constitutional error is whether substantial justice was achieved and whether the trial parties had a fair trial. The introduction of inadmissible evidence can confuse offenses and undermine the presumption of innocence, particularly in jury trials. However, in bench trials, judges are expected to disregard such evidence unless clear evidence suggests otherwise. The court must assess whether each count's evidence would have been admissible in separate trials to determine if the error was harmless.

In a bench trial context, the refusal to sever offenses is deemed harmless unless there is clear evidence that the trial court improperly considered inadmissible evidence or misapplied the harmless error doctrine. In this case, evidence of crimes against victim I.P. and her identification of Cousett would have been admissible in a separate trial concerning charges involving T.H. under Virginia Rule of Evidence 2:404(b), which allows for the admission of other crimes evidence to establish identity, motive, opportunity, or a common scheme. Although the method of entering the apartments did not justify joinder as a common scheme, the similarities in the incidents—specifically the timing, location, and suspect description—would have been relevant to proving identity in separate trials.

Cousett did not contest the sufficiency of evidence, and thus it is presumed that the circuit court properly considered only relevant evidence for each charge. The erroneous refusal to sever the trials is harmless unless there is evidence showing the court improperly considered evidence from one case in convicting on the other. The details provided by I.P. were relevant for corroborating the identity of T.H.'s rapist. After reviewing the case, it is concluded that both parties received a fair trial and substantial justice was achieved. Consequently, while the circuit court erred in denying the motion to sever, this error was harmless, leading to the affirmation of Cousett’s convictions. The document also highlights that judicial economy may not justify joinder when the parties do not consent, as per Rule 3A:10(c), which mandates that offenses must be related to the same act or transaction to allow for joint trials. Absent clear evidence to the contrary, the presumption remains that judges and juries adhere to legal standards regarding the consideration of other crimes evidence, rendering any error in joinder harmless.