Com. v. Dip, S.

Citation: 2019 Pa. Super. 307Docket: 1054 EDA 2019

Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania; October 16, 2019; Pennsylvania; State Appellate Court

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In an interlocutory appeal, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania challenges the trial court's denial of its Motion to Disqualify Judge Scott DiClaudio, citing concerns over an appearance of impropriety due to Judge DiClaudio's long-term relationship with his domestic partner, DP, a former Assistant District Attorney. DP had filed a charge of racial discrimination against the district attorney's office after leaving her position. The appeal is not focused on the specifics of the criminal case against Sita Dip but rather on the conflict between the district attorney's office and Judge DiClaudio.

Judge DiClaudio has been serving in the Criminal Division since his election in 2015 and had never presided over cases involving DP during her tenure. After DP's departure in February 2019, the charge of discrimination became public, leading to the Commonwealth's recusal motion filed on April 11, 2019. The Commonwealth's arguments were based on the appearance of bias due to DP’s allegations, not on any specific acts of partiality. They also claimed Judge DiClaudio had engaged in improper ex parte communications regarding DP’s employment and the recusal motions.

During hearings on April 9, 10, and 12, 2019, Judge DiClaudio acknowledged the existence of DP's charge and admitted to prior conversations with district attorney's office employees but contested the claims regarding their content. Ultimately, he held the recusal motions under advisement while the Commonwealth pursued recusal across all cases before him. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's decision, indicating no abuse of discretion occurred.

Judge DiClaudio noted several instances suggesting an appearance of impropriety by the district attorney's office but ultimately denied the Commonwealth’s recusal motions in multiple cases, including the Appellee's case on April 12, 2019. When asked if he could be fair, Appellee affirmed his impartiality. Following the denial of the recusal motion, the Commonwealth sought to certify the ruling for interlocutory appeal, which Judge DiClaudio refused to consider. The Commonwealth then filed a notice of appeal and requested to halt proceedings, but Judge DiClaudio proceeded with the trial preparations despite the police witness's unavailability, necessitating a continuance.

The Commonwealth's subsequent motions to certify the ruling and to stay the trial were also denied, leading to an emergency stay granted by this Court. The trial court later issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) order, and the Commonwealth filed a statement of complaints. The trial court's Rule 1925(a) opinion was issued on August 12, 2019. The Commonwealth’s appeal raises two questions: whether the trial court erred by not disqualifying itself due to a complaint related to employment discrimination against the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, and whether it abused its discretion by not referring disputed factual issues to another judge given its personal knowledge of those facts. 

Recusal standards require the requesting party to demonstrate bias or prejudice that casts doubt on the judge's impartiality. A judge must evaluate their ability to preside over a case fairly and consider the potential for an appearance of impropriety that could undermine public confidence in the judiciary. A judge's determination to hear a case is a personal decision, generally reviewed for abuse of discretion, with an underlying presumption of fairness and competence among judges. The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates judges to apply the law impartially, while the concept of impartiality is often defined in principle rather than specifics.

Impartiality for judges involves resisting external influences rather than being devoid of them. Judges must not allow personal interests or relationships—such as family, social, political, or financial ties—to affect their judicial conduct. The mere existence of potential influences does not automatically imply bias; however, recusal is mandated when substantial doubts about a judge's impartiality arise. Impartiality is questioned when circumstances could reasonably lead a significant portion of the public to doubt it. The appearance of impropriety alone can warrant disqualification, particularly if a reasonable person might perceive bias.

Judge DiClaudio asserted his impartiality concerning cases involving the district attorney's office and considered that his relationship with DP did not create an appearance of impropriety, as the filing of a racial discrimination charge by DP would not lead an average person to suspect judicial misconduct. The Commonwealth's second claim involved a Recusal Motion related to DP's charge but lacked supporting witness evidence during hearings, despite Judge DiClaudio's invitations to present such evidence regarding alleged ex parte communications.

While a judge typically decides their own recusal motions, there are instances when referral to another judge is necessary, particularly when allegations suggest bias from personal relationships or improper communications. The general requirement is that the party seeking recusal must demonstrate that their claims are not frivolous to warrant further consideration.

The matter at hand is distinct from Mun. Publications, Inc. Judge DiClaudio's disagreement with the Commonwealth regarding his conversations with district attorney's office members did not occur in a witness capacity at an evidentiary hearing, nor did it involve credibility determinations. The Commonwealth did not present any witnesses to the trial court, relying instead on speculation that Judge DiClaudio would act like Judge Snyder in Mun. Publications, Inc. The court maintains that judges are presumed to be honorable and competent unless proven otherwise. Therefore, it is assumed that Judge DiClaudio could have received witness testimonies to evaluate the Commonwealth's allegations. If those testimonies contradicted the Commonwealth's claims, Judge DiClaudio could have disregarded the allegations without making credibility assessments.

The Commonwealth's position that actual bias on Judge DiClaudio's part is not an issue makes the truth of the allegations less significant than their appearance, provided they are not entirely frivolous. However, the Commonwealth failed to present any evidence to substantiate its claims regarding Judge DiClaudio's ex parte communications, hindering his ability to assess the validity of these allegations. Consequently, the trial court acted correctly in not ordering an evidentiary hearing before another judge.

The assessment of the Commonwealth's first claim now focuses on the existence of the racial discrimination charge, acknowledged by Judge DiClaudio but not included in the record. The claim argues this charge is enough to suggest the court abused its discretion by not recusing itself due to potential impropriety. The relevant standard for disqualification was whether a significant minority of the community could question Judge DiClaudio's impartiality based on his relationship to DP. It is clear that the charge of racial discrimination does not implicate Judge DiClaudio as a party or potential witness in related litigation. The Commonwealth contends that a judge should disqualify themselves when a close family member files such a charge against counsel for a party appearing before them, due to potential questions regarding impartiality.

The assessment of the trial court's application of the Significant Minority standard reveals that polling the lay community is impractical for determining a significant minority and suggests that the standard excludes professional legal opinions, which may view judicial impartiality differently than the average layperson. Consequently, the Significant Minority standard sets a low threshold for establishing an appearance of impropriety. The Court's review of the trial court's decision is highly deferential, focusing on whether there was an abuse of discretion, which requires the exercise of judgment free from bias or arbitrary action. Abuse of discretion occurs when a judgment is manifestly unreasonable or influenced by partiality or prejudice. The Commonwealth's argument for recusal, largely based on its interpretation of the Significant Minority standard and the assertion that Judge DiClaudio's relationship with DP inherently creates an appearance of impropriety due to racial discrimination allegations, is not deemed obvious by the Court. The Commonwealth claims the trial court applied an incorrect standard by focusing solely on actual bias rather than the appearance of impropriety. However, the trial court's Rule 1925(a) opinion indicates it considered the potential appearance of impropriety. It distinguishes the Significant Minority standard from the Judicial Code of Conduct by asserting both use a reasonable person standard to evaluate perceptions of judicial impartiality. The record supports that the trial court considered more than just actual bias when evaluating the recusal motion.

The Commonwealth argues that judges must disqualify themselves if they are involved in litigation against a party's legal representative or if a family member is the legal adversary of an attorney appearing before them. However, this claim is not universally applicable, as recusal is not governed by a strict formula but rather by whether a reasonable person would perceive a judge's impartiality as compromised. In this case, the Commonwealth did not present compelling precedent to support its assertion of abuse of discretion regarding Judge DiClaudio’s impartiality, particularly concerning his domestic partner's racial discrimination charge against the district attorney's office. The cited cases, including McFall and Czuprynski, do not substantiate the Commonwealth’s claims, with the latter emphasizing a case-by-case analysis for recusal rather than a blanket rule. Furthermore, the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that a significant minority of the community would reasonably question the judge's impartiality, leading to the conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to disqualify itself. The court affirmed the trial court's order.

A judge denied a recusal motion in a criminal case despite having previously been prosecuted by the district attorney, leading to a suspension of the judge’s law license, which was only recently reinstated before his appointment. The Indiana appeals court reversed the trial court's denial of the recusal motion. Key distinctions were made regarding Judge DiClaudio's situation, emphasizing that he is not a party to current litigation against the district attorney's office, unlike other referenced cases. Judge DiClaudio is in a romantic relationship with DP, who has filed a racial discrimination charge against the district attorney's office, potentially leading to litigation, yet there is no indication that the judge would be personally involved in such litigation. The Commonwealth alleged that Judge DiClaudio might financially benefit from DP's claims, but failed to provide evidence supporting this assumption or demonstrating significant intermingling of their finances. Additionally, allegations of the judge's bias based on courtroom conduct and communications with a prosecutor were not substantiated, as the Commonwealth did not present evidence or witness testimony to support these claims. Overall, the court found that the record did not support assertions of bias or partiality against Judge DiClaudio.

Granting the recusal motions in case J-M08001-19 would effectively remove Judge DiClaudio from the Criminal Division, as the district attorney's office is involved in nearly all cases there. Unlike typical recusal requests, this situation involves broader implications for the judge's role. The Commonwealth's refusal to present witnesses to support allegations of misconduct against Judge DiClaudio contributes to a charged atmosphere, similar to the context in Abu-Jamal. The judge's perceived combative tone, exemplified by his comments on the district attorney's office, could be interpreted as an attempt to clarify legal standards rather than evidence of bias.

The Commonwealth's assertion that these comments are irrelevant suggests a disagreement over their relevance rather than clear instances of partiality, contrasting with cases like Rhodes and White, where biases were more overt. Judge DiClaudio's conduct is seen as less than ideal but understandable given the circumstances. There is no reasonable basis to assume that he would favor a criminal defendant or act against an assistant district attorney due to a racial discrimination charge filed by a relative. Moreover, the cases before him are unrelated to the potential discrimination litigation.

The nature of the district attorney's office, which represents the Commonwealth across nearly all criminal matters in Philadelphia, increases the potential for conflicts of interest compared to typical law firms, though it also provides a greater capacity for managing such conflicts. While there are unique considerations regarding bias, they do not warrant Judge DiClaudio's recusal in this instance.

The district attorney's office can assign unrelated assistant district attorneys to Judge DiClaudio's courtroom, which differs from a previous case (Brewton) where conflicts were direct. The separation between Judge DiClaudio and those involved in the racial discrimination charge is sufficient to conclude that the Commonwealth did not demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Recusal Motion. The mere filing of a racial discrimination charge and the judge's responses to recusal motions do not inherently indicate a lack of impartiality or necessitate an evidentiary hearing. The court affirms the decision without prejudice, allowing the Commonwealth to further develop the record if desired. Jurisdiction is relinquished, and judgment is entered.