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Henrikas Malukas v. William Barr
Citation: Not availableDocket: 19-1633
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; October 15, 2019; Federal Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Henrikas Malukas, a Lithuanian citizen, entered the U.S. on a tourist visa in 1992, which expired without renewal. He was convicted of weapons-related felonies in 1995 and sentenced to 52 months in prison, prompting immigration officials to initiate removal proceedings. Malukas, as the spouse of a U.S. citizen, sought discretionary relief, but both the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ruled that his criminal history outweighed his familial ties. The BIA issued a final removal order in July 2003, which Malukas did not contest judicially. He filed a motion for reconsideration that was denied in September 2003, again without judicial review. In 2018, Malukas filed a second motion to reconsider and an initial motion to reopen, arguing that the removal order was invalid due to a flawed "Notice to Appear" lacking a hearing date and time, referencing the Supreme Court case Pereira v. Sessions. He claimed this defect stripped the immigration judge of jurisdiction. The BIA denied the motion as both untimely and barred due to prior rulings, emphasizing that such a defect does not affect jurisdiction, a position supported by the Seventh Circuit in Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr. Malukas also requested the BIA to reopen his case sua sponte, but the court clarified that this request did not circumvent established time-and-number limits applicable to motions. The ruling further parallels federal collateral review laws, which also impose limits on successive petitions. Ultimately, Malukas's attempts to challenge the removal order were thwarted due to procedural bars and the BIA's adherence to established legal standards. A motion to recall a court of appeals' mandate is treated similarly to a petition for rehearing, as established in Calderon v. Thompson. In the case of Malukas, his motion for reopening or reconsideration was denied based on time and number constraints. The Board acknowledged Malukas's arguments regarding his rehabilitation and Lithuania's refusal to accept his return, but maintained that these did not warrant reopening on the merits. The Board’s reasoning for the denial satisfied the requirements set forth in Iglesias v. Mukasey, and it explicitly stated it would not have reopened the case without a motion, highlighting the rarity of sua sponte actions. Judicial review of the Board's decisions, particularly regarding sua sponte reopening, is limited; the Board has unfettered discretion under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) and Anaya-Aguilar v. Holder, making decisions not subject to judicial review. Although a court may assess whether the Board misunderstood an alien's request, it cannot review the merits of the decisions. The excerpt also notes the potential for the Supreme Court to clarify issues related to judicial review of discretionary decisions by the Board in upcoming cases. Ultimately, the petition for review of the Board's denial of Malukas's motion is denied, and the dismissal of the review regarding sua sponte reopening is based on lack of jurisdiction.