Laura Kelly-Patel v. Dave Wensel and Mike Wensel, and Bank of Old Monroe

Citation: Not availableDocket: ED107572

Court: Missouri Court of Appeals; October 1, 2019; Missouri; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Laura Kelly-Patel appeals a judgment by the Missouri Court of Appeals that set aside a default judgment previously entered in her favor against Bank of Old Monroe. The original default judgment, awarded after Bank failed to respond to garnishment interrogatories, was vacated by the trial court, which found good cause and a meritorious defense from the Bank regarding the garnishment process. The trial court's decision was based on the claim that Kelly-Patel did not follow Supreme Court Rules for obtaining a proper judgment. Following a series of motions and hearings, including Kelly-Patel's notice of appeal and a request to have a January 2019 order clarified as a judgment, the Court ultimately found that a final, appealable judgment now existed as per Rule 74.01(a). Despite this, Bank subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, citing the lack of a final judgment, which Kelly-Patel addressed in her appellate brief. The appeal was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The court addressed a motion to dismiss by the Bank, noting that under Rule 74.05(d), a motion to set aside a default judgment is an independent proceeding eligible for immediate appellate review. However, such a judgment must comply with Rule 74.01(a) to be appealable, meaning it must be a final judgment. The trial court's original January 2019 order did not meet this requirement, but the March 18 order retitled it as a judgment using the nunc pro tunc process under Rule 74.06(a). Although the nunc pro tunc process typically cannot convert an order into a judgment, it can proceed if the trial court clearly intended to finalize the judgment for appeal purposes. The court determined that the January 10 order was intended to be final and appealable, thus denying the Bank's motion to dismiss.

In her first point on appeal, Kelly-Patel claimed the trial court erred in setting aside the default judgment because the Bank's motion lacked verification and supporting evidence for good cause and a meritorious defense. The court agreed, reviewing the trial court's decision for abuse of discretion. It noted that Missouri public policy favors resolving cases on their merits, granting broader discretion to trial courts when setting aside default judgments. Rule 74.05(d) requires a motion to state facts that establish a meritorious defense and good cause. The final judgment was established with the March 18 order, which rendered Kelly-Patel's notice of appeal premature; however, it is treated as filed immediately after the judgment became final per Mo. R. Civ. P. 81.05(b).

Bank improperly attempted to challenge the merits of the trial court's decision to set aside a default judgment and the garnishment action in its motion to dismiss, which was focused on the absence of a final, appealable judgment. The court did not consider the CFO's affidavit attached to Bank's motion, as it was not presented to the trial court and did not pertain to the narrow issue at hand. For a motion to set aside a default judgment, relevant facts demonstrating good cause and a meritorious defense must be provided; bare conclusory statements do not satisfy the pleading standard under Rule 74.05(d). Such a motion must be verified or supported by affidavits or sworn testimony. Even if factual allegations exist, the motion cannot be granted without proper verification. The moving party has the burden to demonstrate entitlement to set aside the judgment. In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by granting Bank's motion, which lacked verification or supporting affidavits, mirroring the precedent established in Plasmeier v. George, where a similar situation resulted in an abuse of discretion due to insufficient evidence. Bank's assertion that the legal file was adequate evidence was rejected, as it contradicted Missouri law requiring verified motions or supporting testimony. Ultimately, Bank's motion contained vague claims that failed to establish good cause or a meritorious defense.

Bank's motion to set aside a default judgment against it was denied due to insufficient pleading. The motion, which consisted of four paragraphs, quoted Rule 90.08 without providing supporting facts, highlighted procedural timelines under Rule 90.07(c), pointed out that exceptions were served at the wrong branch, and claimed that Bank had provided information to Kelly-Patel’s counsel regarding interrogatory answers. However, these assertions were deemed conclusory and failed to demonstrate good cause or a meritorious defense, thereby not meeting the requirements set forth in Rule 74.05(d). Consequently, the trial court's judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for reentry of the default judgment in favor of Kelly-Patel. 

The document further clarifies that reliance on an earlier jurisdictional analysis is misplaced following the Supreme Court's ruling in J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, which differentiated between statutory limitations and jurisdictional authority. It states that a circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction remains intact regardless of procedural missteps, thus Kelly-Patel’s failure to comply with Rule 90 does not affect the trial court's ability to hear the case. The legal analysis emphasizes that statutory procedural failures do not undermine a court's subject matter jurisdiction, only its ability to issue a judgment in a specific case.