Americans United for Separation of Church and State Robert L. Maddox, Individually and as Executive Director of Americans United for Separation of Church and State American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. Robert C. Campbell, Individually and as General Secretary of the American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. American Council of Christian Churches of California Edgar R. Koons, Individually and as President of the American Council of Christian Churches of California American Humanist Association Frederick Edwards, Individually and as Executive Director of the American Humanist Association Church of the Brethren Robert W. Neff, Individually and as General Secretary of the Church of the Brethren Council on Religious and Civil Liberty Institute of Women Today the National Association of Evangelicals Billy A. Melvin, Individually and as Executive Director of the National Association of Evangelicals National Association of Laity Joseph T Skehan, Individually and as President of the National Association of Laity Natio

Citation: 786 F.2d 194Docket: 85-1309

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; April 24, 1986; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The case involves multiple appellants, including various religious organizations and individuals, who filed a lawsuit against President Ronald Reagan and several U.S. government officials. The appellants are notably groups advocating for the separation of church and state, including Americans United for Separation of Church and State and the American Humanist Association. The legal proceedings were held in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, with arguments presented on January 16, 1986, and a decision rendered on March 21, 1986. A petition for rehearing was subsequently denied on April 25, 1986. The legal representation included Earl W. Trent, Jr. for the appellants and Richard K. Willard, among others, for the appellees. The case number is 85-1309, and the judges presiding over the case included Circuit Judges Seitz and Gibbons and District Judge Gerry.

Americans United for Separation of Church and State and additional plaintiffs appealed a judgment dismissing their amended complaint against the President of the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the U.S. Ambassador to the Vatican. The complaint sought declarations that congressional actions permitting and funding diplomacy with the Vatican violated the First Amendment, and that the President's diplomatic recognition of the Vatican exceeded his Article II powers and violated both the First Amendment and the Fifth Amendment's liberty clause. Additionally, the plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction against funding the Vatican diplomatic mission and against the Ambassador's activities. The district court dismissed the case based on the plaintiffs’ lack of standing and the non-justiciability of the controversy, a decision the appellate court affirmed.

The amended complaint included Americans United as a nonprofit aimed at upholding civil and religious liberties, alongside twenty religious organizations, twelve officials, and seventy-one clergy members. Plaintiffs claimed citizenship, federal taxpayer status, and voting rights. The complaint traced U.S. relations with the Vatican from the appointment of a consul in 1797 to a suspension of diplomatic relations in 1867 due to religious worship restrictions in Rome. Congress enacted legislation in 1867 to cease funding an American legation in Rome, effectively ending relations. The Lateran Treaty of 1929 recognized the Vatican City as a sovereign state. From 1939 until 1984, various U.S. Presidents appointed personal representatives to the Vatican, who served without salary and did not require Senate confirmation. In 1983, Congress repealed the earlier funding restriction, allowing for the establishment of an American Legation at Rome, leading to the Senate's confirmation of William A. Wilson as Ambassador in 1984, with funding provided for his role.

The amended complaint argues that appointing a diplomatic representative to the Vatican contravenes presidential powers under Article II of the Constitution, asserting that the Vatican is not a state eligible for diplomatic recognition. It further claims that establishing diplomatic relations with the Vatican constitutes an unconstitutional establishment of religion under the First Amendment and creates a preference for one religious group over others, thus violating the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 

The plaintiffs assert standing based on several injuries, including: unequal access to the Executive Branch compared to the Roman Catholic Church; the influence of the Church's political beliefs on government; the competitive advantage gained by the Church in the religious sphere; potential interference by the President in Church matters; the unique diplomatic protections afforded to the Papal Nuncio; indirect pressures to conform to governmental policies; perceptions of second-class status for non-Catholic religious adherents; and risks to their foreign mission work due to the intertwining of U.S. political interests with the Church.

The District Court dismissed the complaint on two grounds: first, plaintiffs failed to demonstrate particularized injury necessary for standing; second, issues of diplomatic relations are constitutionally designated to the Executive Branch, rendering them nonjusticiable. The court noted that while the Vatican is a sovereign entity governed by the Roman Catholic Church, this unique status does not invoke the constitutional protections the plaintiffs claim, as no other religious organization shares such a position.

Plaintiffs must demonstrate that their injuries stem from actions by the President and Congress that are distinct from the Vatican's unique international status. The district court's dismissal of the complaint is examined through the lens of standing, with plaintiffs claiming standing in three capacities: as taxpayers, as citizens and voters, and as victims of stigmatization. 

1. **Taxpayer Standing**: The plaintiffs argue that as taxpayers, they have the right to challenge federal expenditures, specifically related to Mr. Wilson's salary and embassy costs. However, established precedent from *Frothingham v. Mellon* indicates that individual taxpayers lack the standing to contest federal appropriations unless they can show a direct and specific injury caused by the enforcement of a law, rather than a generalized grievance shared by the public. The court clarified that the ability to contest the constitutionality of congressional acts is contingent upon demonstrating a tangible injury linked to those acts.

Plaintiffs argue that the Frothingham rule does not govern their standing in this case, claiming eligibility for the Flast v. Cohen exception, which allows challenges to federal expenditures that establish religion. The Flast exception departs from Frothingham but is limited; it applies only to expenditures authorized by the taxing and spending clause of the Constitution. The plaintiffs in Flast challenged financial support for religious schools, which the Court ruled unconstitutional under the general welfare clause. Chief Justice Warren emphasized that taxpayer standing requires a logical connection to the legislative enactment in question and the specific constitutional violation alleged. The plaintiffs do not contest an expenditure grounded solely in Article I, Section 8, Clause 1. Instead, the repeal of a prohibition against a mission in Rome and the appropriation for foreign missions relate to the government's exclusive power over foreign affairs, as outlined in Article I, Section 10, Clause 1. The Flast decision restricted taxpayer standing to challenges based on the taxing and spending clause, reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, which noted that Flast does not extend to Executive Branch actions. Consequently, the plaintiffs lack a sufficient interest as taxpayers to challenge expenditures for a diplomatic mission to the Vatican, and their challenge to diplomatic recognition is even further removed from their taxpayer status.

Citizen standing is not established in the plaintiffs' complaint, as the alleged injuries do not infringe upon specific rights conferred by citizenship, which are limited primarily to voting and holding public office. The Supreme Court has consistently dismissed claims of citizen standing based solely on the general right to have government operate according to the Constitution. Consequently, the plaintiffs lack a protectable interest to challenge government actions related to fund expenditure or diplomatic recognition.

The plaintiffs also attempt to assert standing based on claims of adverse stigmatization due to their exclusion from benefits of diplomatic recognition enjoyed by the Vatican and the Roman Catholic Church. However, they fail to demonstrate a causal link between their alleged injuries and the governmental actions they challenge. Their claims suggest that diplomatic recognition would give one church greater access to the Executive Branch, but they do not provide a rationale for why such access through diplomatic channels would be significantly different from other forms of communication. Additionally, they argue that recognition would lead to undue influence over the Roman Catholic Church, but again, do not explain how diplomatic communication would be more intrusive than other forms of contact.

While the plaintiffs argue that their status as religious adherents differentiates them from citizens with generalized grievances, this distinction does not sufficiently set them apart from the citizen standing issues identified in prior cases, such as Valley Forge. Thus, their claims for standing remain unpersuasive.

Plaintiffs assert that opening diplomatic relations with the Vatican grants its representatives certain federal benefits not available to their church representatives. This disparity arises because the Vatican possesses territorial sovereignty, a factor that may enhance its standing in the religious sector, though this is speculative. The complaint lacks clarity on how this diplomatic recognition affects the competitive landscape of religious organizations. The Supreme Court recognizes that non-economic injuries like stigmatization can warrant legal action; however, such claims must not be merely speculative and must demonstrate direct harm to the plaintiffs. They must show that the stigmatization results from discriminatory conduct that denies them equal treatment. Additionally, the injury must be likely to be remedied by a favorable ruling. The plaintiffs' claims of "direct and palpable injuries" are deemed insufficient to establish standing against the actions regarding funding and diplomatic recognition. Furthermore, even if any plaintiff had standing, justiciability remains a concern. The complaint essentially seeks judicial review of the President's decision to recognize the Vatican diplomatically, which involves determining whether the Vatican qualifies as a sufficiently independent territorial sovereignty and whether its governing regime merits recognition.

The President's resolution of questions regarding diplomatic relations is a political decision that is not subject to judicial review, as established in several key Supreme Court cases (e.g., National City Bank v. Republic of China, United States v. Pink, Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States). This principle is supported by Baker v. Carr, where Justice Brennan highlighted the constitutional commitment of certain issues to specific branches of government. The Constitution grants the President the exclusive power to receive ambassadors and appoint public ministers, reinforced by historical practice. Legal challenges related to the establishment of diplomatic relations fall within the Executive Branch's exclusive authority. Consequently, even if a plaintiff could demonstrate standing, federal courts lack the ability to provide the requested relief. The district court's dismissal of the complaint was correct, and the judgment will be upheld. Additionally, the issue of the President's constitutional authority to establish diplomatic relations with a church is not addressed in this case.