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Donna Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Company(081602)(Middlesex County and Statewide)
Citation: Not availableDocket: A-16-18
Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey; September 11, 2019; New Jersey; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
The syllabus clarifies that it is not part of the Court’s official opinion and is intended solely for reader convenience, stating it has not been reviewed or approved by the Court. In the case of Donna Rowe v. Bell. Gossett Company, the Court evaluated the admissibility of statements made by defendants who settled with plaintiffs before trial and the jury's ability to allocate fault to these settling defendants. Ronald and Donna Rowe filed an asbestos product liability suit, claiming Ronald Rowe developed mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos products sold by the defendants. During discovery, defendants provided certified answers to interrogatories, and their employees were deposed. Universal, a named defendant, sought to admit excerpts from the settling defendants’ interrogatory responses and deposition testimonies, claiming these were admissible under N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1). The trial court admitted some evidence but excluded certain testimonies and parts of interrogatories. Universal argued for the jury to allocate fault to the settling defendants, which the trial court allowed, leading the jury to assign only 20% of the fault to Universal. The plaintiffs sought a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, contending Universal failed to present sufficient evidence for fault allocation. The trial court denied this motion and entered judgment for the plaintiffs. However, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court's decision, ruling the evidence was inadmissible under N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1) and N.J.R.E. 804(b)(1) due to the availability of the declarants. It also stated the evidence did not qualify as statements against interest under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25) but upheld the trial court's denial of the plaintiffs’ post-verdict motion. The Court granted Universal's petition for certification, affirming that excerpts from settling defendants' interrogatory answers and corporate depositions were admissible as statements against interest under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25). These statements, along with other trial evidence, established a prima facie case that the settling defendants shared some fault in the matter, allowing the jury to consider apportioning fault to them. The Comparative Negligence Act and the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law provide the framework for fault allocation among multiple parties contributing to a plaintiff's harm, enabling fault allocation to settling defendants. The precedent set in Young v. Latta allows a non-settling defendant to seek fault allocation against a settling defendant without having filed a crossclaim, provided they notify the plaintiff timely and prove their claims against the settling defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. Universal relied on evidence from depositions and interrogatory responses, which were deemed hearsay but admissible under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25) as statements against the declarant's interest. This rule does not require proof of the declarant's unavailability or additional reliability factors. In this case, the settling defendant's statements were adverse to their litigation positions, supporting claims related to successor liability, product involvement with asbestos, and warnings, thereby satisfying the admissibility criteria of N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25). The Court did not address the admissibility of evidence under specific New Jersey Rules of Evidence or court rules. The plaintiff did not file a cross-petition regarding the denial of her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, leaving Universal's prima facie showing concerning the fault of settling defendants unexamined by the Court. The trial court correctly permitted Universal to present evidence supporting the apportionment of fault to these settling defendants, and it was within the jury's discretion to accept or reject this evidence, resulting in the Court maintaining the jury's verdict. The Appellate Division's judgment was reversed, and the trial court's judgment was reinstated. The opinion was delivered by Justice Patterson, with concurrence from Chief Justice Rabner and Justices LaVecchia, Albin, Fernandez-Vina, Solomon, and Timpone. The case involved multiple defendants related to a personal injury claim, and it referenced the Comparative Negligence Act and Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law, which allow for the allocation of fault among settling co-defendants. In an asbestos product liability case involving plaintiffs Ronald and Donna Rowe, the trial court's judgment allowed for the allocation of fault to eight settling defendants, who had reached settlements prior to trial. Ronald Rowe was diagnosed with mesothelioma, allegedly due to exposure to asbestos products sold by these defendants. During the trial, the remaining defendant sought to introduce evidence from the settling defendants' interrogatory answers and deposition testimonies, which contained statements against their interests. The non-settling defendant argued for the admissibility of this evidence under several hearsay exceptions. Despite objections from the plaintiffs, the trial court admitted parts of the evidence, allowing the jury to allocate fault to the settling defendants. The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs but determined that the settling defendants shared some fault, thus reducing the plaintiffs' damages recovery. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s judgment, ruling that the admitted evidence was improperly allowed. However, the court upheld the admissibility of the evidence as statements against interest, affirming that the statements made by the settling defendants were contrary to their interests and credible enough to be believed true. This led to the conclusion that the trial court correctly permitted the jury to decide on the allocation of fault. The Appellate Division's judgment was reversed, and the trial court's judgment, including the jury’s allocation of fault, was reinstated. Additionally, Ronald Rowe, diagnosed with mesothelioma in March 2014, claimed his condition resulted from over three decades of exposure to asbestos while working with various automotive parts. Rowe testified about his exposure to asbestos during his career as a boiler serviceman from 1954 to 1985, detailing his use of asbestos-containing products while mixing dry furnace cement, maintaining boilers, and handling heating equipment. This exposure included working with various asbestos-containing components such as boilers, furnaces, and insulation. The plaintiffs initiated an asbestos product liability lawsuit against twenty-seven defendants, alleging claims for strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranties, while seeking compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, and other relief. Donna Rowe included a per quod claim. Among the defendants, Hilco, Inc. was alleged to be the successor to Universal Engineering Co., Inc., a seller of asbestos-containing cement, but Hilco denied this claim and its liability. The case was assigned to a Law Division judge for centralized management of asbestos cases, following established court rules for discovery and procedures. Universal Engineering filed a standard answer asserting crossclaims for contribution and indemnification against other defendants. Discovery included certified interrogatory answers from defendants about their corporate history, asbestos product sales, and warnings issued regarding asbestos exposure. Plaintiffs' counsel utilized depositions of corporate representatives from prior cases and designated evidence for trial from interrogatory responses and deposition transcripts, while Universal identified disputed evidence in its designations. Plaintiffs settled their claims against eight defendants before trial: Borg Warner Morse Tec, Burnham, Dana Companies, ECR International, Honeywell International, Peerless Industries, Trane US, and Weil-McLain. As a result, Universal was the sole remaining defendant at the trial's start. Universal served notices in lieu of subpoena to the settling defendants, requesting their corporate representatives to appear at trial. Six of these defendants informed Universal that their representatives were unavailable as they resided outside New Jersey, while the other two could not produce a representative. On the second day of trial, plaintiffs sought to prevent Universal from presenting evidence regarding the settling defendants' fault, arguing that Universal had not disclosed its evidence or expert testimony related to medical causation. Universal countered that it would rely on plaintiffs’ disclosed documents and the testimony of their expert in occupational medicine. The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion, allowing for its renewal after evidence presentation. Universal sought to admit excerpts from the settling defendants’ interrogatory answers and deposition testimonies as evidence, claiming they were admissible under various New Jersey Rules of Evidence. Plaintiffs objected, arguing that the evidence was inadmissible against them and that Universal had not shown the corporate representatives' unavailability. The trial court partially granted Universal's request, admitting the interrogatory answers as statements by a party opponent, and deemed the corporate representatives of six settling defendants unavailable, allowing their deposition testimonies as prior testimony from unavailable declarants. The trial court excluded deposition testimony from Honeywell and Trane’s corporate representatives, citing their availability to testify as they were based in New Jersey. It also ruled against admitting certain defendants' interrogatory answers and deposition testimony from Universal, deeming them speculative or irrelevant to the trial's liability theories. Universal's counsel presented excerpts from the settling defendants’ interrogatory answers and cross-examined the plaintiffs’ expert regarding Ronald Rowe's asbestos exposure from products other than Universal's dry cement. At the trial's conclusion, plaintiffs moved to prevent the jury from allocating fault to the settling defendants, arguing Universal failed to provide sufficient evidence for such allocation. Universal's counsel countered by offering to clarify how the jury could reasonably allocate fault based on Rowe's exposure to the settling defendants' products. The trial court determined that Universal had indeed provided enough factual proof to justify fault allocation and denied the plaintiffs’ motion. The court instructed the jury on the plaintiffs' settlement with the settling defendants and emphasized that the jury should not speculate on the settlements' reasons or amounts. It outlined Universal's burden of proof regarding the settling defendants and noted that any fault attributed to them would reduce the plaintiffs’ recovery. The jury ultimately ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding $1,500,000 in damages, broken down into specific amounts for Rowe’s and Donna Rowe’s losses. The jury found that all eight settling defendants had significantly contributed to Rowe's asbestos exposure and injuries. It allocated fault as follows: Universal (20%), Borg Warner (5%), Burnham (14%), Dana (6%), ECR (9%), Honeywell (14%), Peerless (12%), Trane (10%), and Weil-McLain (10%). Following the verdict, the plaintiffs filed for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, a new trial, arguing that the 20% fault assigned to Universal was unjust given the evidence presented against it. Plaintiffs sought to vacate the jury's allocation of fault to the settling defendants, arguing that their statements in interrogatories and depositions were improperly admitted, leading to insufficient evidence for fault apportionment. The trial court denied this motion, noting that Universal's claims relied on both the settling defendants' statements and Ronald Rowe's testimony regarding exposure, as well as expert testimony. Following the jury's apportionment, the trial court entered a judgment for the plaintiffs amounting to $304,252.70. After the trial, Ronald Rowe passed away from mesothelioma, prompting his widow, Donna Rowe, to appeal the judgment. In her appeal, she contended that the settling defendants' statements were hearsay and challenged the denial of her motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's judgment, remanding for a new trial on fault apportionment, ruling that the disputed evidence was inadmissible under N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1) as Universal did not use it against the settling defendants. Additionally, the Appellate Division found the evidence inadmissible under N.J.R.E. 804(b)(1) because the declarants were not "unavailable." The court also determined the statements did not meet the criteria for statements against interest as outlined in N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25). Despite this, the Appellate Division upheld the trial court's denial of the plaintiffs' motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, but advised a more thorough review of evidence against each settling defendant on remand. The Supreme Court granted Universal’s petition for certification and allowed various entities, including Honeywell, to participate as amici curiae. Universal contends that the Appellate Division did not adequately respect the trial court's evidentiary rulings regarding asbestos litigation. It emphasizes that the trial court, with extensive experience, judiciously evaluated the evidence and excluded much of what Universal wished to present. Universal claims that it proved the corporate representatives were unavailable as per N.J.R.E. 804(a)(4), making their statements admissible under N.J.R.E. 804(b)(1), and that these statements also qualified as those by a party-opponent under N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1) and as statements against interest under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25). Amici curiae, including NJDA and Honeywell, support Universal’s position, arguing that the disputed evidence was rightly admitted and that the Appellate Division's ruling undermines fair fault allocation under the Comparative Negligence Act and Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law. In contrast, the Plaintiff argues that the Appellate Division correctly applied the Rules of Evidence when attributing fault to a settling defendant, asserting that Universal failed to demonstrate the unavailability of the settling defendants' representatives, rendering N.J.R.E. 804(b)(1) inapplicable. The Plaintiff also claims that the settling defendants' interrogatory answers and deposition testimonies were incorrectly admitted as they were against the plaintiffs rather than the settling defendants, and argues that the Appellate Division rightly determined that these did not qualify as statements against interest under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25). Amicus NJAJ concurs with the Plaintiff, asserting that the statements were inadmissible under N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1) or Rule 4:16-1(b) since they were not against the declarants but against the plaintiffs, and did not meet the criteria for prior testimony under N.J.R.E. 804(b)(1) or statements against interest under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25). The review of the Appellate Division’s decision involves assessing whether the trial court's evidentiary rulings were an abuse of discretion, requiring a clear error of judgment to warrant reversal. While evidentiary rulings are generally entitled to deference, legal interpretations by the trial court are reviewed de novo without special deference. The Comparative Negligence Act and the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law establish the legal framework for fault allocation among multiple parties contributing to a plaintiff's harm. The Comparative Negligence Act outlines the process for trial courts to allocate damages among tortfeasors, requiring a factfinder to first assess the total value of damages and then determine each party's negligence as a percentage, summing to 100%. This promotes fairness by ensuring that each party pays only for the injuries they caused. The jury is tasked with making good-faith allocations based on evidence, rather than the collectability of damages. The Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law provides that joint tortfeasors—those jointly or severally liable for the same injury—have a right to contribution, aiming for equitable sharing of judgment burdens and preventing arbitrary victim selection by plaintiffs. This law seeks to ensure that responsibilities are shared according to equity and justice. Together, both statutes implement New Jersey’s approach to fair damage apportionment among plaintiffs and defendants, ensuring that damages align with the factfinder's fault allocation and promote loss distribution in proportion to each party's culpability. The legal framework also allows for fault allocation to settling defendants without regard to settlement amounts, ensuring comprehensive liability management. Before the enactment of the Comparative Negligence Act, a non-settling defendant could only obtain a credit for a settling defendant's share of the verdict if a crossclaim was filed against that defendant. However, in the case of Young, the court ruled that a non-settling defendant can seek a fault allocation to a settling defendant without having filed a crossclaim, provided that the plaintiff receives "fair and timely notice" of this intent. The court emphasized the importance of this notice for the plaintiff's ability to prepare for trial and conduct discovery effectively. Furthermore, defendants must assert their positions early and utilize discovery rules to gather necessary evidence. If a defendant fails to present expert testimony or adequately allege the fault of a co-defendant before trial, they may be barred from attributing fault to that co-defendant later. Additionally, court rules reinforce that a non-settling defendant must provide timely notice to the plaintiff about the liability issues concerning the settling defendant and has the burden of proving their claims against that defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. For a jury to allocate liability to a settling defendant, the non-settling defendant must provide prima facie evidence of claims against the settling defendant. If there is no proof of negligence by the settling defendant, as established in Mort v. Besser Co. and Young v. Latta, the jury should not assess fault against that defendant. After a settlement, parties may change their strategies; plaintiffs may downplay the settling defendant's culpability, while non-settling defendants may argue that the settling defendant is primarily liable for the plaintiff's harm. This dynamic poses challenges for the trial court in enforcing rules and determining evidence admissibility regarding the settling defendant's fault. The court also examines the admission of specific evidence from the settling defendant's interrogatory answers and deposition testimonies. Rules permit the use of depositions for contradiction or impeachment, but in this case, Universal aimed to use these materials as affirmative evidence of fault, necessitating compliance with the Rules of Evidence. As the disputed statements qualify as hearsay, they are generally inadmissible unless exceptions apply. Hearsay is defined as statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted and is only admissible if allowed by the rules of evidence or other law, with some exceptions based on reliability. N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25) establishes an exception to the hearsay rule for statements made against a declarant’s interest, allowing their admission in both civil and criminal cases. Such statements are admissible if they are contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary, proprietary, or social interests or if they subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability. A reasonable person would not make such statements unless they believed them to be true. In criminal cases, these statements are admissible only if the accused is the declarant. The rationale behind this exception is the belief that individuals do not typically admit to unfavorable facts, thus rendering these statements inherently trustworthy. The admissibility of a statement under this rule does not depend on extrinsic evidence of the declarant’s reliability or their availability; it is solely based on the self-incriminating nature of the statement. A statement can be considered against interest even if the declarant does not testify at trial. The determination of whether a statement is against the declarant's interest is contextual, considering the entirety of the statement rather than isolated remarks. Additionally, statements that may be self-serving do not negate their admissibility if they are plausibly against the declarant’s penal interest. To qualify as a statement against interest, the statement must have been contrary to the declarant’s interest at the time it was made. Civil liability concerns can also satisfy this requirement, and the declarant is not required to be a party to the action for the statement to be admissible. In State v. West, 145 N.J. Super. 226, 233-34 (App. Div. 1976), the court evaluated the admissibility of interrogatory answers and deposition testimony under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25) as statements against interest. It determined that the declarant was the settling defendant, rather than an individual employee or officer, with responses certified by an agent or authorized representative binding the defendant. The court emphasized that admissibility hinges on whether the statements were detrimental to the settling defendant's financial or legal interests, rather than the interests of the certifying individual. The court identified three significant adverse impacts of the statements on the settling defendants' positions in asbestos litigation. Firstly, six settling defendants were implicated as successors to entities that manufactured or sold asbestos products, with statements in their interrogatories and depositions addressing this liability. These statements were deemed contrary to their interests and indicative of potential civil liability, as they articulated corporate history and structure. Secondly, parts of the settling defendants' responses supported claims that they or their predecessors produced or sold asbestos-containing products. These assertions also suggested potential exposure to asbestos for individuals using those products, further undermining the defendants' legal standing and supporting the plaintiffs' allegations. The court concluded that the nature of these statements was such that a reasonable person would not have made them unless they believed them to be true, thus satisfying the criteria for admissibility under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25). Interrogatory answers and deposition testimony from settling defendants Burnham, ECR, Peerless, Trane, Borg Warner, and Dana revealed that these companies sold asbestos-containing products without warnings about asbestos exposure during a relevant time frame. Such statements were deemed to be against the defendants' interests, suggesting that any reasonable person in their position would not make those statements unless they believed them to be true. In contrast, settling defendants Honeywell and Weil-McLain claimed to have provided asbestos-related warnings starting in the 1970s, although they acknowledged selling products without such warnings in earlier years relevant to the cases. The excerpt references legal principles regarding statements against interest, particularly emphasizing that mixed exculpatory and incriminatory statements do not negate their admissibility. The Appellate Division previously held that the defendants' failure to warn was just one aspect of a larger liability picture, which the current argument disputes, asserting that no rule requires a statement to address all elements of liability for it to be admissible under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25). The Appellate Division's ruling that certain statements were inadmissible under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25) is rejected. The settling defendants acknowledged both the existence of asbestos-containing products sold without warnings and their role in manufacturing or selling these products during the relevant period. The court clarifies that N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25) is not limited to statements addressing novel issues or those that serve as the sole proof of a claim. Therefore, the evidence presented by the settling defendants in their interrogatory answers and depositions complied with this rule and was admissible. The plaintiff challenged the trial court's denial of her motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, arguing that Universal did not provide sufficient evidence to allocate fault to the settling defendants. The Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's claim that the jury ignored evidence of asbestos exposure, affirming the trial court's denial of her motion. However, it noted that the trial court did not adequately scrutinize the evidence presented by Universal regarding fault allocation, indicating that Universal lacked proof of asbestos exposure for some settling defendants and advising a reassessment on remand. Universal's petition for certification contended that the Appellate Division misjudged the evidence supporting its fault allocation. The plaintiff did not cross-petition on her denied motion but deemed the Appellate Division's comments on Universal's evidence as non-binding. As the Appellate Division's affirmation of the trial court's denial is unchallenged, the issue of Universal's proof regarding settling defendants' fault is not before the Court. Ultimately, the trial court’s decision to allow Universal to present its evidence was correct, leaving the jury's verdict intact. The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and the trial court's judgment is reinstated.