Syed Umar Husainy v. Granite Management, LLC, and Jaffa Varsity 1, LLC

Citation: Not availableDocket: 18A-PL-2752

Court: Indiana Court of Appeals; September 17, 2019; Indiana; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Syed Umar Husainy leased an apartment managed by Granite Management, LLC and owned by Jaffa Varsity 1, LLC. Granite sued Husainy for eviction due to alleged nonpayment of rent and breach of contract. In response, Husainy counterclaimed against Granite for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment and violations of landlord habitability statutes. A jury ruled against Granite on its breach of contract claim and in favor of Husainy on both his breach of covenant and statutory claims, allowing him to seek attorney’s fees. Although Husainy requested nearly $60,000 in fees, the trial court awarded him only $2,000. Granite and Jaffa contested the jury’s verdicts, leading the trial court to partially grant their motion to correct error by vacating the breach of covenant verdict but upholding the statutory claim.

Husainy appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in vacating the breach of covenant claim verdict and in the fee award, while also claiming judicial bias. In a cross-appeal, the Appellees contested the denial of their motion regarding the statutory claim. The court affirmed the denial of the Appellees' motion on the statutory claim, reversed the grant of their motion on the breach of covenant claim, and deemed the attorney's fee award inadequate, remanding for further proceedings. Husainy’s bias claim was determined to be waived. 

Husainy began leasing the apartment in 2007, signed a lease from May 31, 2016, to May 31, 2017, and was charged $725 monthly rent with a security deposit of $605. In January 2017, Granite sought eviction in small claims court for $1,280.50 in unpaid rent and fees, prompting Husainy to demand a jury trial and file counterclaims. The case was transferred to a plenary docket, and a special judge was selected after Husainy requested a change of judge. Husainy vacated the apartment in May 2017 but did not receive his security deposit due to outstanding unpaid charges exceeding $2,750.

Claims set for trial included Granite's action against Husainy for nonpayment of rent and breach of contract, Husainy's claims against Appellees for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, violation of Indiana Code Section 32-31-8-5 concerning habitability, and violation of Indiana Code Section 32-31-3-12 regarding the return of a security deposit. A jury trial commenced on August 22, 2018. Evidence presented indicated that a septic overflow at the Varsity Building was attributed to plumbing clogs allegedly caused by Husainy, who denied flushing cleaning wipes and claimed he faced multiple building issues, including lack of heat and water service interruptions.

During closing arguments, Husainy's counsel contended that without a signed lease, there was no contract breach. For the habitability claim, counsel initially sought $50 but suggested the jury determine the appropriate amount, while for the security deposit claim, they argued Husainy was entitled to the return of his deposit unless he caused damages. The jury ruled against Granite on its breach of contract claim but in favor of Husainy on the breach of covenant claim, awarding $4,500, and also found for Husainy on the habitability claim, awarding $605 and allowing for attorney's fees.

Appellees filed a motion to correct errors, claiming the jury’s decisions were unsupported by evidence. The trial court partially granted this motion, vacating the covenant breach verdict but upholding the habitability claim and awarding Husainy $2,000 in attorney’s fees. Husainy appealed, and Appellees cross-appealed. Husainy sought to strike the cross-appeal as untimely, but the court found the trial court’s actions were timely, denying his motion.

The trial court's granting of Appellees’ motion to correct error regarding the breach of covenant claim was deemed an abuse of discretion, as it contradicted the evidence and circumstances presented. The review of such rulings is based on whether they align with the facts and logic of the case.

A motion to correct error allows a court to address prejudicial mistakes. Under Trial Rule 50(A), if issues in a jury trial lack sufficient evidence or the verdict is clearly erroneous, the court can withdraw those issues and enter judgment accordingly. When assessing a motion for judgment on the evidence post-verdict, the trial court must only consider evidence favorable to the non-moving party and reasonable inferences from it, entering judgment only if no substantial evidence supports the claim. The covenant of quiet enjoyment protects a tenant's rights, and eviction is not required for damage recovery from a landlord's breach. In Husainy's case, he claimed breach due to poor maintenance. To recover damages, Husainy needed to prove a contract existed, his performance, the Appellees' failure, and resultant damages. The jury found the Appellees liable for $4,500, but the trial court later ruled the verdict unsupported by evidence, noting Husainy showed no actual damages and only cited inconvenience. Damages are typically determined by a jury, and an award is upheld if supported by evidence, regardless of its certainty. The Appellees argued that Husainy's claim involved a contractual relationship, asserting that damages should reflect actual loss, measured by the difference in value between what the tenant was entitled to and what was received.

Granite was obligated under the lease agreement to provide water and gas services. Husainy reported frequent interruptions in both cold and hot water, leading him to buy bottled water and use facilities outside his residence due to inadequate heating. He documented these issues through emails to Granite representatives. The cost of bottled water was approximately $5 to $6 per case, and he estimated purchasing it over 10 to 20 times. The jury awarded Husainy damages equivalent to six months' rent, including parking fees, which was deemed supported by the evidence of service interruptions. The trial court was found to have abused its discretion by granting a motion to correct an error regarding Husainy’s breach of quiet enjoyment claim, leading to a reversal and remand to reinstate the jury’s verdict. However, the court did not abuse its discretion concerning Husainy’s claim under Indiana Code Section 32-31-8-5, which outlines a landlord's responsibilities for maintaining rental premises in a habitable condition. Husainy alleged Jaffa’s failure to meet these obligations resulted in damages. Under Indiana Code Section 32-31-8-6, a tenant must notify the landlord of noncompliance and allow a reasonable time for repairs before taking action. If successful, the tenant can recover actual and consequential damages, attorney’s fees, and other appropriate remedies. Landlord liability begins when they are notified of noncompliance and fail to address it within a reasonable timeframe.

Husainy was awarded $605 in damages for his claim under Section 32-31-8-5. Appellees argued that he did not provide sufficient evidence of notice of unremedied defects to Granite. However, evidence showed that Husainy’s maintenance requests were addressed promptly, and he could not identify any requests that went unanswered. The key issue was whether Granite remedied a violation of Section 32-31-8-5 in a timely manner. On April 25, 2017, a Granite representative informed residents of a potential hot water outage while Husainy highlighted a prior lack of hot water. Further communications indicated delays in repairs, which led to Husainy asserting that the inadequate hot water situation persisted for weeks.

Additionally, Husainy described a significant leak from a main pipe in January 2017, which took over a week to repair, creating hazardous conditions in the stairwell without proper safety measures. He documented the flooding with photos and videos, supporting the claim that Granite had knowledge of the leak and failed to maintain safe conditions as required by Section 32-31-8-5(3).

Appellees challenged the jury's $605 damage award, claiming it lacked evidentiary support, but it was linked to Husainy’s security deposit. The jury likely viewed this as an appropriate remedy for Granite's failures. The trial court was found not to have abused its discretion in denying Appellees' motion to correct errors on Husainy’s claim.

However, the court did abuse its discretion by awarding only $2,000 in attorney’s fees to Husainy, who had requested $59,020.67 under Section 32-31-8-6(d)(1)(B), which allows for attorney’s fees if warranted.

Indiana follows the American Rule, mandating that each party pays their own attorney fees unless there is an agreement, statutory provision, or contrary rule. The trial court possesses broad discretion in awarding attorney fees, with appellate review focusing on potential abuse of that discretion. A reduction of a reasonable fee request based solely on the judgment amount is considered an abuse of discretion.

The trial court noted that the litigation primarily revolved around Granite/Jaffa’s claim for damages rather than Husainy’s claim regarding landlord statutory duties, which received minimal attention. Husainy’s claim was deemed unreasonable, as he sought $59,020.67 in attorney fees after receiving a judgment of only $605. The court emphasized that Husainy’s legal fees were his responsibility under the American Rule.

Granite initiated the lawsuit for $1,280.50 over alleged rent and maintenance charges, leading to a countersuit by Husainy who sought a jury trial. Despite offers to settle, Appellees pursued attorney fees aggressively. Husainy's counsel highlighted the escalating legal costs and expressed concern over potential fees if Appellees had won. 

Although Appellees did not prevail, Husainy’s counsel submitted an affidavit for $59,020.67 in fees, supported by testimony from attorney John Stuckey, who deemed the amount reasonable given the circumstances. Husainy argued that the trial court’s fee award was insufficient to cover the costs of litigation and did not align with the public policy goal of ensuring equal access to the courts, particularly for successful plaintiffs.

The court agrees with Husainy's assertion that the trial court improperly limited the fee award based on the counsel's requested verdict. The counsel's choice to seek a minimal recovery was a strategic decision, and the jury should determine the value of Husainy’s claim. The court reverses the decision and remands it for the trial court to reassess Husainy’s fee request, considering the factors outlined in Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(a), including time and labor, difficulty of legal questions, customary fees, results obtained, and the lawyer's experience.

Additionally, since the jury’s verdict on Husainy's Section 32-31-8-5 claim is upheld, the trial court must also evaluate the reasonableness of appellate attorney's fees. Husainy's claim of judicial bias is deemed waived, as it was not raised until appeal. The court does not address this bias claim but reminds the trial judge to maintain decorum and courtesy in court proceedings. The decision is partly affirmed, partly reversed, and remanded for further proceedings.