William Stephens v. Union Pacific Railroad Company

Citation: 935 F.3d 852Docket: 18-35908

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; August 28, 2019; Federal Appellate Court

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment favoring Union Pacific Railroad in a negligence suit brought by William and Norma Stephens, who alleged that secondary asbestos exposure from the plaintiff's father, a former employee of Union Pacific, caused William's mesothelioma. The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether any asbestos exposure linked to Union Pacific was a substantial factor in causing the illness. The substantial-factor test under Idaho law necessitates proving substantial exposure to asbestos over a significant period. The plaintiffs' reliance on expert testimony was deemed insufficient, as the experts could not substantiate that William was regularly exposed to asbestos due to his father's employment. Additionally, the court rejected the assertion that Union Pacific had waived objections to the expert testimony. Ultimately, the court ruled that the lack of evidence regarding regular asbestos exposure from Union Pacific precluded the plaintiffs from establishing a valid negligence claim.

Jurisdiction over Stephens's appeal is established under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, with the court reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. The court affirms the district court’s decision. To oppose a summary judgment motion, a nonmoving party must provide evidence that a reasonable jury could use to return a favorable verdict. Evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

The court considers whether Stephens provided adequate evidence of asbestos exposure, a necessary element for a negligence claim under Idaho law, which requires demonstrating a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury. Stephens's testimony indicates he visited his father’s workplace, where asbestos insulation was used, but he is the sole source of evidence regarding exposure. Although Union Pacific admitted the use of asbestos-containing products and the likelihood of asbestos dust release during major overhauls, they also stated there is no record of steam engines being repaired at the relevant site, challenging the sufficiency of Stephens's evidence.

Moreover, to establish liability, Idaho law necessitates that the plaintiff shows the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the injury, rather than merely a but-for cause. The substantial-factor test is more lenient than the but-for test, allowing for multiple contributing factors to the injury. However, despite this liberal standard, the court concluded that Stephens did not create a genuine issue of fact regarding whether any exposure was a substantial factor in causing his disease, affirming summary judgment.

The substantial-factor test in asbestos claims requires proving that the injured party had significant exposure to asbestos over a substantial period, as established in McIndoe v. Huntington Ingalls Inc., 817 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2016). Minimal exposure is inadequate; a high level of exposure must be shown to infer that asbestos was a substantial factor in the injury. While McIndoe pertained to federal maritime law, it reflects common-law principles applicable in Idaho, which would likely adopt similar tort causation standards. The Restatement (Third) of Torts supports that liability cannot arise from "fleeting or insignificant encounters" with asbestos, aligning with Idaho's reliance on the Restatement (Second) of Torts in prior decisions.

The court seeks to determine if Stephens demonstrated that his exposure to asbestos from Union Pacific was sufficiently sustained and intense to be a proximate cause of his mesothelioma. To establish causation, Stephens presented testimonies from two experts: Dr. William Longo, who indicated significant airborne asbestos exposure from his father's work clothes, and Dr. Andrew Churg, who attributed Stephens' mesothelioma to exposure from the Union Pacific roundhouse. However, the district court deemed these opinions insufficient, emphasizing that expert testimony must be based on sufficient factual evidence rather than unsupported assumptions. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702(b), expert opinions must rely on facts or data that the expert has observed or been made aware of, and speculation is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. A critical assumption in both experts’ analyses was that Stephens frequently encountered asbestos.

Dr. Longo and Dr. Churg provided expert opinions linking Stephens’s disease to his father's exposure to asbestos at work, asserting that this exposure led to contamination at home and secondary exposure for Stephens. However, both experts acknowledged a lack of knowledge regarding the extent of the father's exposure at work, undermining their conclusions about regular exposure at home. Stephens’s own testimony indicated limited and infrequent observations of asbestos-related activity, which did not sufficiently establish the frequency of his exposure to asbestos dust. 

Additionally, while Stephens referenced Union Pacific's admissions about regular maintenance of asbestos-containing steam engines, these did not clarify the frequency of such work at the specific Weiser roundhouse. Union Pacific contested the admissibility of Dr. Churg’s testimony, highlighting the core issue of insufficient evidence regarding events at the Weiser roundhouse during the relevant time frame. 

The case law cited indicates that expert testimony must be based on established facts rather than assumptions, and that federal law governs the admissibility of such evidence in diversity cases. Ultimately, without proof of regular exposure to asbestos from Union Pacific, Stephens could not establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the causation of his disease and could not succeed on his negligence claims. The court affirmed the decision.