State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General And Reporter v. HRC Medical Centers, Inc.

Citation: Not availableDocket: M2017-02559-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; August 23, 2019; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The State of Tennessee initiated legal action against HRC Medical Centers, Inc., and its owners under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, claiming deceptive advertising related to hormone replacement therapy. The State sought judicial dissolution of HRC, restitution for consumers, and held the owners personally liable under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. The defendants' motions to dismiss, for summary judgment, and to remand the case were denied. The State successfully moved for summary judgment on liability and damages, resulting in a judgment of $18,141,750, reflecting consumer payments for the treatment. The defendants appealed the denial of their motions and the grant of summary judgment to the State. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's judgment. The case, filed on October 8, 2012, involved allegations of TCPA violations and included measures such as a temporary restraining order, a temporary injunction, and the appointment of a receiver over HRC's assets. An amended complaint added additional defendants, with further requests to freeze their assets and appoint a receiver.

On April 26, a temporary restraining order was issued by the trial court, appointing Mr. McLemore as receiver for the added defendants and their tangible and intangible assets. A temporary injunction against Bonnie Hale and Dixie Hale was issued on August 20. The State filed a second amended complaint on October 31, 2013, which is the basis for the current appeal. 

In the first count, the State alleged violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) under specific provisions of the Tennessee Code Annotated. The second count sought judicial dissolution of HRC under the Tennessee Business Corporation Act. The third count alleged violations of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.

The relief sought by the State included:
1. A declaration that the TCPA Defendants engaged in unlawful acts.
2. Temporary and permanent injunctions against these defendants to prevent further violations of the TCPA.
3. Orders to restore losses to affected individuals, including statutory interest and costs associated with administering restitution.
4. Disgorgement of profits gained from the alleged TCPA violations.
5. Civil penalties of up to $1,000 for each TCPA violation.
6. A judgment for the State covering investigation and prosecution costs, including attorneys' fees.
7. A declaration that certain contracts related to BHRT services in Tennessee are void, unenforceable, and uncollectable.

The defendants named in the complaint include several corporate entities and individuals, specifically identifying HRC Medical Centers, Inc., and various individuals involved in its management. References to "HRC" pertain to both the corporation and its individual officers, while "TCPA Defendants" includes HRC and specific individuals associated with its operations.

The court is permanently revoking the incorporated status of HRC Medical, the foreign business authority of HRC Management Midwest, and the medical license of Dan Hale in Tennessee. It will judicially dissolve HRC Medical as a corporation and oversee the winding up and liquidation of its business in compliance with state law. A receiver will be appointed to manage the assets and liabilities of HRC Medical and its related entities, as well as the personal assets of several individuals associated with these entities, to prevent asset dissipation and ensure compliance with any monetary judgments awarded to the State. Any transfers or obligations mentioned in the document are to be voided under Tennessee law. A temporary injunction is in place against the defendants to prevent the further disposition of their assets. Additionally, any assets transferred in violation of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) will be held in constructive trust for their rightful owners, with a judgment entered for those assets, which will also accrue up to 10% prejudgment interest. Finally, the corporate protections of the involved entities will be disregarded when assigning liability to their members or shareholders.

The Cardinal Revocable Trust, established by Defendant Dan Hale, was intended to conceal his financial ties to Defendant HRC Medical, particularly after scrutiny from regulatory agencies and media. The Trust is managed by Hale's daughter and contains spendthrift provisions that do not protect the Grantor. It grants Hale extensive powers, including the right to revoke the Trust, withdraw assets, and amend its terms. Under Tennessee law, if the Trust is found to have been created to defraud creditors, it can be terminated, and its assets could be used to satisfy Hale’s monetary liabilities.

In the legal proceedings, Dan Hale and Bonnie Hale, as well as HRC Medical Centers, Inc., filed separate answers to the Complaint. Following extensive discovery, a key issue on appeal involved the Defendants’ Motion for Administrative Remand, filed on January 23, 2014, requesting the case be sent back to the Division of Health Related Boards; this motion was denied by the court. The motion did not specify on whose behalf it was filed, though it was signed by counsel for Dan Hale and the other Hales.

On December 18, 2014, the State sought partial summary judgment against HRC and the Hales regarding liability under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The State supported its motion with undisputed facts and evidence from media sources. In response, the Hales contested the sufficiency of the State's evidence and procedural compliance, leading to multiple filings, including a Sur-Reply. A hearing on the motions occurred on June 3, 2015, with the court later granting the State's motion in part and denying the Defendants’ motion.

On March 2, 2017, the State filed a Damages Motion, seeking $18,141,750 in consumer redress against HRC and the Hales, as well as permanent injunctions to prevent further unlawful conduct and misleading representations related to BHRT, supported by various materials and depositions.

On March 16, 2017, HRC and the Hale Defendants filed for summary judgment, contending the State could not prove its claims. They raised three main arguments: (1) insufficient expert proof, (2) non-liability under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), and (3) failure of the State to mitigate damages. HRC specifically alleged that the State’s attorneys violated Rule 11 by asserting claims of 'irreparable harm' without proper expert documentation, particularly regarding medical causation. The trial court ultimately ruled in favor of the State on July 17, awarding $18,141,750 in damages against the defendants and issuing a permanent injunction against their unlawful conduct. 

On December 7, the court issued an Agreed Order certifying the judgment as final. The defendants appealed, questioning the trial court's decisions to grant the State summary judgment and restitution under the TCPA, deny their motions to dismiss based on pre-suit notice provisions of the Tennessee Healthcare Liability Act (HCLA) and TCPA, and reject their motion to remand the case to Health Related Boards. The appeal also addressed concerns about the State's Rule 26 disclosures and the testimony admissibility of Dr. Ted Louis Anderson. 

Regarding pre-suit notice, HRC argued the case constituted a health care liability action requiring written notice to be given to the healthcare provider at least sixty days before filing, a claim the trial court denied. HRC reiterated this argument on appeal, while the State maintained that the case involved deceptive business practices under the TCPA, not health care liability. The appeal also considered the legal sufficiency of the complaint under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02, emphasizing that the review focuses on the complaint’s adequacy rather than the evidence's strength.

The Complaint, over 150 pages, is a civil law enforcement action initiated by the State of Tennessee, represented by Attorney General Robert E. Cooper, Jr., under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) to safeguard consumers and the commercial marketplace. The State seeks to dissolve Defendant HRC Medical Centers, Inc. for its ongoing fraudulent business practices. The Complaint outlines allegations regarding HRC's medical treatments and advertising, specifically targeting their promotion of a 'bioidentical hormones' cocktail. 

Key allegations against HRC include deceptive advertising practices, false claims in advertisements, use of fabricated quotes from studies, failure to disclose risks and side effects, and reliance on deceptive consumer testimonials. HRC is also accused of accepting advance payments from consumers under a no-refund policy without proper knowledge of the treatment's appropriateness or consumer responses. 

The Complaint presents three causes of action: 
1. Violations of specific TCPA sections due to deceptive advertising.
2. Judicial dissolution of HRC under section 48-24-304.
3. Violations of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.

The excerpt references the case Proctor v. Chattanooga Orthopaedic Group, which established that the TCPA applies to the business aspects of medical practices, emphasizing the distinction between consumer protection claims and medical malpractice claims. The court reversed a trial ruling, affirming that misleading practices can form the basis of a TCPA claim without alleging professional malpractice standards.

The trial court affirmed that the State's complaint is primarily about alleged deceptive business practices under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), rather than health care liability. The complaint does not claim that HRC was negligent in administering bio-identical hormone replacement therapy (BHRT) but focuses on deceptive advertising practices that misrepresented BHRT to consumers. Since the case does not qualify as a health care liability action, the State was not required to provide pre-suit notice as mandated by section 29-26-121(a)(1), justifying the court's denial of HRC's motion to dismiss.

Regarding pre-suit notice under the TCPA, the State is required to provide at least 10 days' notice before legal action unless it determines that such a delay would significantly impair the TCPA's objectives. HRC argued that the State failed to explain its decision not to provide notice. However, the State asserted in its complaint that the Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs found that a delay would substantially impair the TCPA's purposes. Additionally, an Assistant Attorney General stated that the risks associated with HRC’s misleading claims about BHRT warranted immediate action to protect consumer health, leading to a request for a temporary restraining order without prior notice. Thus, the State adhered to the TCPA's requirements by opting to explain why notice was not given.

The State certified that delaying legal proceedings would substantially impair the act's purposes, supported by General Harrell’s certification and exhibits showing potential consumer harm from the advertisements in question. The court found that the State complied with section 108(a)(2) and was not required to provide prior notice before initiating action. HRC's Motion for Administrative Remand, which argued that the State failed to exhaust mandatory administrative remedies by not filing its claim under the TCPA with the Health Related Boards, was denied by the trial court. The court ruled that it could not remand to a forum that lacked jurisdiction over the underlying actions and reaffirmed that the Health Related Boards' jurisdiction is not exclusive or preemptive regarding the State's TCPA claims. HRC contended that the State had a statutory obligation to present claims to the Health Related Boards before filing suit but acknowledged that no statute mandates such submission. HRC claimed the trial court abused its discretion by not remanding the case; however, the court found no incorrect legal standard was applied or unreasonable decision made. The court reiterated that the suit was appropriately filed under the TCPA, with no role for the Health Related Boards in this context.

The legal standard for reviewing lower court decisions is established through various cases, emphasizing that appellate courts should not second-guess the discretion of the trial courts but rather apply an abuse of discretion standard. This standard does not shield lower court decisions from rigorous appellate review. 

In addressing motions for summary judgment, a moving party can prevail only if no genuine issue of material fact exists, as defined by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04. A fact is considered material if it pertains directly to the claim or defense involved. A genuine issue arises when a reasonable jury could favor one side based on that fact. To clarify disputes, the moving party must submit a concise statement of material facts, each supported by specific record citations. The opposing party must respond to each fact, either agreeing or demonstrating a dispute with cited evidence.

On appeal, evidence is viewed favorably for the non-moving party, with all reasonable inferences drawn in their favor. The appellate court conducts a de novo review of summary judgment rulings, without presuming the correctness of the trial court's decision.

Regarding the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), it prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in trade but does not define these terms. Courts determine the standards for what constitutes an "unfair" or "deceptive" act, and to succeed under the TCPA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant engaged in such conduct and that it caused harm.

Ascertainable loss of money or property, as defined under Tennessee law, includes various forms of value. In its initial summary judgment motion (the "Liability Motion"), the State alleged that HRC violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) through false and misleading advertisements. HRC countered that the State lacked sufficient evidence to prove these violations. The court partially granted the State's motion, ruling HRC had violated the TCPA in five specific ways: 1) claiming BHRT was “completely” safe; 2) asserting BHRT had “no side effects”; 3) stating BHRT could replicate hormone levels from a user's youth; 4) advertising that BHRT was produced by an FDA-approved compounding pharmacy; and 5) failing to disclose material connections to testimonial providers in its ads. The court also ruled on personal liability, granting summary judgment against Don Hale and Dan Hale, but not against Dixie Hale. The State supported its motion with a comprehensive Rule 56.03 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, which included 249 statements, responses from HRC, and affidavits from HRC customers, while HRC contested seventeen facts related to liability, including claims about the safety and side effects of BHRT. The court will assess whether these contested facts present a genuine issue that would prevent summary judgment.

BHRT was manufactured in an FDA-approved facility. The State alleges that HRC violated the TCPA by claiming its BHRT treatment was completely safe, providing specific citations for each assertion. HRC has the burden to either accept these facts as undisputed, agree they are undisputed for summary judgment purposes, or show they are disputed with specific evidence. Out of HRC's seventeen responses, only four included citations to support their claims. The State outlined potential side effects of BHRT for both men and women, which HRC denied, asserting that side effects associated with its BHRT are not unique to their treatment. HRC's denial is supported by statements from Dr. Anderson, who claimed BHRT is the “preferred” therapy due to its benefits. While HRC acknowledges that BHRT has side effects, it argues that these side effects are not exclusive to its treatment. Therefore, the State's assertions regarding side effects are deemed undisputed for summary judgment purposes. Furthermore, the State contends HRC falsely advertised that its BHRT had no side effects. HRC denies this claim, arguing that the statement is overly broad and that side effects were disclosed in advertising materials.

Prior to signing any contracts, prospective patients received a detailed multi-page "informed consent" form that required their signature on each page, allowing them to review the information at home. In contrast, Dr. Anderson’s practice involved only verbal discussions documented in patient charts. Discussions about potential side effects by HRC-affiliated medical professionals occurred post-sale. HRC contended that it fulfilled informed consent requirements before accepting payment; however, the State argued that HRC's advertising omitted significant side effects of bioidentical hormone replacement therapy (BHRT), only citing minimal side effects in promotional materials. The court found that HRC did not provide sufficient evidence to dispute these claims or demonstrate that side effects were adequately disclosed in their advertisements. The State further maintained that any notification of side effects after patient contact does not negate the deceptive nature of the initial advertisement, referencing relevant legal precedents. Additionally, the State asserted that HRC misrepresented that its BHRT was manufactured in an FDA-approved facility, while the compounding pharmacies used were not FDA approved.

Defendant HRC misrepresented its compounding pharmacy as FDA-approved in advertisements, a claim for which Defendant Dan Hale accepted responsibility. In his affidavit, Hale asserted that HRC never intended to violate the law and was unaware of any legal violations, claiming that a Nashville law firm was engaged to ensure compliance, including improvements to website disclosures and patient information regarding risks and side effects of bioidentical hormone replacement therapy (BHRT). HRC's promotional materials for BHRT stated that pellets were bio-engineered from natural ingredients by an FDA-approved compounding pharmacy, which HRC claimed was one of only two such pharmacies in the U.S. However, HRC faced quality-control issues with the pellet compression from its suppliers. In response to allegations related to compounding pharmacies, HRC denied the relevance of these claims, lacking substantial evidence to support their materiality. Notably, Dr. Ted Anderson, during deposition, stated he was unaware of any compounding pharmacy issues. The complaint included admissions from HRC acknowledging the inaccurate labeling regarding FDA approval, with Hale explaining his misunderstanding of the FDA labeling complexities. Additionally, the complaint referenced quality-control problems known to HRC’s employees regarding pellet consistency and absorption.

HRC failed to meet its burden under Rule 56.03 by not providing evidence that a reasonable jury could resolve facts in its favor, as established in Perkins, 380 S.W.3d at 80. The facts presented in paragraphs 112 through 115 lack expert opinion as required by Tennessee Rules of Evidence 703. HRC's claim that these facts are immaterial does not excuse its responsibility to demonstrate, with evidence, whether the facts are disputed or undisputed. The State supported its motion for summary judgment with an adequately substantiated statement of undisputed material facts, while HRC did not establish a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Consequently, the court will determine if the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Regarding the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), the courts are instructed to interpret it by aligning with the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) interpretations under the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA). To prove a deceptive advertising claim under section 5(a) of the FTCA, three elements must be established: 1) the advertisement conveyed a representation through express or implied claims; 2) the representation was likely to mislead consumers; and 3) the misleading representation was material. The document acknowledges HRC's quality-control issues with the compounding pharmacies used for pellet supply, particularly with Solutions Pharmacy and initially with MasterPharm. However, MasterPharm, which is PCAB accredited, rectified its quality control issues effectively. A third-party review indicated that MasterPharm’s products outperformed those of Solutions Pharmacy in compression and formulation aspects. Finally, the document references 15 U.S.C. section 45(a)(1), which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in commerce, and outlines the FTC's distinction between express and implied advertising representations as relevant to the case.

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) distinguishes between express and implied claims in advertising. Express claims directly state the representation, making their intent clear, while implied claims can suggest a representation without stating it outright, ranging from near-synonyms to more ambiguous language. Advertisements can be deemed likely to mislead under two theories: the falsity theory, where the plaintiff must prove the message is false, and the reasonable basis theory, where the plaintiff must demonstrate the advertiser lacked sufficient evidence to support the claim. An example illustrates this distinction: a direct claim of 30 miles per gallon for a car with poor mileage is express deception, while advertising the car as "the Miser" implies misleading information. Misleading interpretations of statements will generally be construed against the advertiser, particularly when the advertisement contains an express claim that clarifies its meaning. Additionally, advertisers are liable for false or unsubstantiated endorsements and must disclose any material connections with endorsers that could influence consumer perception. A claim is material if it contains information significant enough to affect consumer decisions, with a presumption of materiality applied to express claims.

Implied claims in advertising are considered material if there is evidence of the seller’s intent to make such claims, especially when they pertain to health and safety concerns relevant to reasonable consumers. Express claims and deliberately implied claims aimed at inducing purchases are also presumptively material. In a legal case, the State contended that HRC's advertisements misled consumers under both falsity and adequate substantiation theories, with the trial court ruling that some advertisements were deceptive based on the falsity theory. The court found that HRC violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by claiming its bioidentical hormone replacement therapy (BHRT) was "completely safe" and had "no health risks," which were determined to be misleading as BHRT is not entirely safe. This misrepresentation satisfied the criteria for deceptive advertising claims. Additionally, the court noted that HRC advertised BHRT as having "no side effects," while omitting known side effects, further supporting the claim of deception under the TCPA. HRC did not successfully rebut the presumption of materiality regarding these claims.

Possible side effects of Defendant HRC’s Bioidentical Hormone Replacement Therapy (BHRT) for women include deepening of the voice, dysfunctional uterine bleeding, hypertension, hair loss, clitoral hypertrophy, unwanted facial hair, acne, weight gain, and fluid retention. Endometrial hyperplasia, a condition that may precede endometrial cancer but can also be benign, is another potential side effect. Menopausal women may experience menstrual or menstrual-like bleeding as a side effect. For men, side effects of testosterone (an anabolic steroid) in BHRT include acne, hypertension, erythrocytosis, testicular atrophy, and azospermia, with gynecomastia (development of female-like breasts) also being a concern. Both men and women may experience increased hemoglobin and hematocrit levels, which could elevate the risk of blood clots, strokes, heart attacks, and other cardiovascular issues.

Defendant HRC's marketing materials, such as brochures distributed in Tennessee, inadequately disclosed side effects, only mentioning increased breast sensitivity and spotting, which is managed with progesterone. The court noted that HRC's advertising claimed that BHRT would restore hormone levels to those typical of consumers in their twenties and thirties, a claim that was deemed deceptive as it suggested hormone levels would be elevated to unnatural levels. Furthermore, HRC, along with its representatives, failed to adequately disclose possible side effects and dangers in various promotional ads.

Naturally derived Amor VieTM therapy claims to restore hormone levels akin to those in a person's early 20s, as opposed to merely aiming for mid-life or senior adult levels. Paragraph 497 of the Complaint asserts that testosterone levels for men in their twenties and thirties typically range from 200 to 700 ng/dL, while the defendants countered that normal levels could be as high as 1200 ng/dL, which the court found did not create a material fact dispute precluding summary judgment. The trial court noted that Dan Hale, representing HRC, misleadingly claimed that BHRT could make hormones "exactly like" those of younger individuals. Despite admitting that BHRT intended to elevate hormone levels beyond natural ranges for younger adults, Hale argued that the primary goal was symptom relief, a point reiterated in the advertisements. The court agreed that HRC's advertisements were misleading, as they suggested BHRT would restore optimal hormone levels of youth, while Hale acknowledged that the treatment aimed to achieve unnatural hormone levels. Additionally, HRC made false claims regarding FDA approval of its compounding pharmacy, which were not disputed and thus violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The trial court concluded that these representations were misleading and lacked a reasonable factual basis, further supporting the finding of TCPA violations.

The Trial Court concluded that HRC violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by failing to disclose material connections between endorsers and HRC. It was established that HRC used endorsements from individuals with ties to the company, without the necessary disclosure as mandated by 16 C.F.R. section 255.5, which is significant since the endorsements pertained to health-related products. The lack of disclosure is deemed material under the law, aligning with precedents that classify such actions as deceptive and unlawful under the TCPA.

HRC also contended that for a medical practice to be considered deceptive, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the practice is "unfair," as per the TCPA. HRC referenced promotional claims regarding their hormone replacement therapy (BHRT) and the FDA approval status of their compounding pharmacies, asserting that the absence of proof of "substantial harm" from patients negated a TCPA violation. However, the statute does not require proof of substantial harm for deceptive practices to be actionable; it only necessitates that the acts are either deceptive or unfair. The court clarified that the interpretation of the TCPA does not mandate that deceptive acts cause substantial harm for them to be deemed unlawful.

HRC's motion was based on the argument that the State could not prove a violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). However, undisputed facts confirmed that HRC did violate the TCPA, allowing the State to be granted summary judgment as a matter of law. The court's decision to affirm this summary judgment renders HRC's motion irrelevant. Under 15 U.S.C.A. section 45(n), the Commission cannot label an act or practice as unfair unless it causes substantial injury to consumers that cannot be reasonably avoided and is not outweighed by countervailing benefits. Public policy can be considered in determining unfairness but cannot be the primary basis for it.

In the State's second motion for summary judgment regarding damages, it sought a consumer redress award of $18,141,750 against HRC and its associates, along with a permanent injunction against their unlawful conduct. HRC's response included attempts to reargue liability and claimed that the State did not mitigate damages. The trial court found no genuine issues of material fact and granted the State's motion, awarding the damages and issuing the injunction per Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-18-108, while denying HRC's motion.

The State's Rule 56.03 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts included 102 statements, of which HRC admitted 88 without qualification, admitted one with an assertion of immateriality, and partially or fully denied two. HRC objected to ten statements as inadmissible and irrelevant. Nonetheless, the court found that the statements not fully admitted did not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding damages, thus supporting the summary judgment. The term "consumer redress award," used by the court, is not defined in the FTCA or TCPA. The discussions regarding certain paragraphs in the Rule 56.03 statement related to advertisements and the number of consumers affected, with the damages calculated based on Tennessee consumers' payments. Affidavits from HRC customers supported the State's claims regarding payments and refunds.

HRC objected to statements claiming that the side effects associated with its bio-identical hormone replacement therapy (BHRT) could not be substantiated by layman observations, as no medical expert established a causal link between HRC patients and any harm. HRC supported its position with materials including the Complaint, Dr. Ted Anderson's affidavit, and disclosures from experts Drs. Liu and Finkelstein, asserting that these related solely to liability, not damages, thus failing to create a genuine issue of material fact to prevent summary judgment. HRC’s arguments did not raise material issues regarding customer payments or refunds and were focused on liability rather than damages.

The only relevant evidence presented by HRC concerning damages included Don Hale’s supplemental affidavit, which stated that neither HRC nor the Hales received any warning letter prior to the action, suggesting HRC would have modified its advertising if contacted. The State’s response to an interrogatory asked about consumer financial harm indicated that consumers suffered losses equal to the total payments made to HRC for BHRT, minus any refunds, plus statutory interest. Pricing details for HRC’s BHRT were provided, showing $3,450 per year for men and $2,950 for women as of 2010 and 2011, respectively.

The trial court found all necessary elements of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) claim established and awarded $18,141,750, calculated using a specific formula based on the median price of BHRT and the number of consumers, minus refunds. HRC did not pursue post-judgment relief.

HRC argues on appeal that the trial court erred in accepting "gross totals received" as the restitution amount without evidence of specific, calculable direct losses due to alleged deceptive practices. HRC claims the trial court did not fulfill its obligations under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04, which requires courts to state legal grounds for their decisions. The appellate court found that the trial court complied with Rule 56.04, as the legal basis for the order was established through liability findings. According to Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-18-108(b)(1), the court has the authority to restore losses incurred by unlawful practices. The trial court based its findings on affidavits from consumers and used undisputed figures in its calculations. HRC's concerns about the administration of the award and the state's alleged failure to mitigate damages by not notifying HRC prior to pursuing relief were addressed; the court ruled that the state had no such duty. Citing relevant case law, the court affirmed that mitigation of damages is irrelevant when seeking equitable relief. HRC's arguments regarding the exclusion of Dr. Anderson's affidavits and the timeliness of Rule 26 disclosures for other experts were also dismissed, as the state’s motions for summary judgment were primarily supported by HRC's own advertisements and admissions. The appellate court ultimately affirmed the trial court's judgment without finding error.