Jeanne H. Olofson v. Scott W. Olofson, In His Capacity As Personal Representative Of The Estate Of Tom W. Olofson

Citation: Not availableDocket: WD81882

Court: Missouri Court of Appeals; June 18, 2019; Missouri; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Jeanne H. Olofson appealed the Missouri Court of Appeals' decision affirming the trial court's dismissal of her Motion to Set Aside the Judgment of Dissolution based on alleged fraud, following the death of her ex-husband, Tom W. Olofson. The appeal arose from a 2014 dissolution petition after 55 years of marriage, where the couple's Epiq stock was the primary asset, with Tom receiving approximately $29 million worth and Jeanne about $14.5 million. The trial court's Judgment and Decree of Dissolution, issued on March 1, 2016, incorporated their settlement agreement. After Epiq was sold for $16.50 per share in September 2016, Jeanne filed her fraud motion on February 23, 2017, claiming Tom misrepresented the company's sale status during depositions and failed to disclose important financial information and compliance with discovery requests. The court ruled that Tom's death did not revive her motion, leading to the affirmation of the trial court's judgment dismissing her claims.

Jeanne claimed that Epiq failed to produce documents in response to a subpoena, only disclosing public documents and citing Securities and Exchange Commission regulations against further disclosure. She alleged that during negotiations for her Separation Agreement, Epiq received a preliminary bid, which Tom knew about, indicating an imminent sale of Epiq at over $13.50 per share. Jeanne contended that Tom's noncompliance with discovery and false statements during his deposition amounted to fraud under Rule 74.06(b). After Tom filed a memorandum opposing Jeanne's motion, he passed away on April 8, 2017. A motion to substitute his Estate was granted on June 9, 2017. Subsequently, Tom's Estate moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction due to Tom's death, that no justiciable controversy remained, and that Jeanne's motion was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. The trial court determined that Jeanne's request to reallocate marital property was legally impossible and that it could only set aside the dissolution judgment, which it could not do because it would involve adjudicating a moot controversy. The court concluded that setting aside the judgment would create a scenario where the lawsuit would abate upon Tom's prior death, removing the authority to act further. Consequently, the court granted Tom's Estate's motion and dismissed Jeanne's Rule 74.06 motion. The appellate court will review the dismissal de novo, focusing on whether the pleadings support a claim for relief. If any facts presented could establish a claim, the dismissal would be inappropriate.

Jeanne appeals the trial court's decision to grant Tom's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, arguing that her Rule 74.06 Motion is neither moot nor abated by Tom's death. She contends that under Missouri law, abatement does not apply after a judgment dissolving a marriage has been entered, and that her claims of fraud regarding the division of the marital estate warrant Rule 74.06 relief. It is established that a court's order on marital property distribution is a final order and not subject to modification, as affirmed in Young v. Young, 273 S.W.3d 86 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008). Rule 74.06 allows for a decree of dissolution and any property division to be set aside for specific reasons, including fraud. However, it explicitly states that it does not permit modifications to part of a judgment. Jeanne's assertion that she can seek relief solely from the property division without affecting the entire dissolution judgment contradicts established case law, which maintains that relief under Rule 74.06 requires vacating the entire judgment. Her references to Essig v. Essig and Alexander v. Sagehorn to support her position are deemed misplaced, as those cases involved different circumstances, particularly with the parties still alive and specific requests to set aside the entire decree. Thus, Jeanne's arguments do not align with the requirements and limitations set forth by Rule 74.06.

In *Alexander v. Sagehorn*, the wife initiated an equity action to overturn the property division in a dissolution decree due to claims of fraud. The trial court agreed and modified the property distribution. This ruling occurred in 1980, before the adoption of Rule 74.06, meaning it cannot serve as precedent for relief under that Rule. The wife's reliance on *Hemphill v. Quigg*, which involved a similar request to set aside a dissolution decree by an insane woman after her husband’s death, is also misplaced as it predates Rule 74.06 and does not support her arguments.

Jeanne contends that the entire decree could be set aside and then reinstated with only the property division altered. However, the *In re Marriage of Ulmanis* case clarifies that Rule 74.06(b) does not allow for such selective relief without affecting the entire judgment, as established by *Settles v. Settles* and *Spicuzza v. Spicuzza*. Consequently, Jeanne can only seek to nullify the entire dissolution judgment and relitigate all related issues. 

The doctrine of abatement typically halts proceedings after a party's death, as outlined in *Linzenni v. Hoffman*, which states that jurisdiction ceases when one party dies during a case. Although Jeanne argues that abatement shouldn't apply since the dissolution was ordered before Tom's death, her interpretation is challenged by *Linzenni*, where the Supreme Court determined that a final judgment on the dissolution had been entered prior to death, allowing the trial court to allocate marital property subsequent to the dissolution order.

If a trial court has issued a formal judgment dissolving a marriage but has not addressed property division, the doctrine of abatement does not apply, allowing the case to proceed despite one party's death, as established in Linzenni and affirmed by McMilian and Simpson. However, applying Rule 74.06(b) in the current case necessitates setting aside the dissolution judgment, effectively nullifying it and abating any further proceedings on marriage dissolution or property division. Since there was no valid judgment at the time of Tom's death, the court lacks authority to proceed, rendering Jeanne's request for property redistribution moot. Consequently, the trial court correctly granted Tom's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, affirming that it lacked authority to act posthumously and dismissing Jeanne's motion. The trial court's judgment is upheld.