DAMIEN MICHAEL BARAJAS, Movant-Respondent v. STATE OF MISSOURI

Citation: 565 S.W.3d 760Docket: SD35358, SD35359

Court: Missouri Court of Appeals; January 15, 2019; Missouri; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the motion court's judgment that granted Damien Michael Barajas post-conviction relief under Rule 24.035. The State contended that the motion court erred in granting relief based on an alleged erroneous statement by plea counsel regarding the completion date of the Hope Home program. The State argued that this claim was waived since Barajas did not raise it in his PCR motion, and additionally asserted that plea counsel had informed the court of the correct completion date. The appellate court found merit in the State's first point, which rendered the second point moot, leading to the reversal of the motion court's judgment and the denial of Barajas's PCR motion.

Factual background reveals that Barajas was charged with first-degree robbery and additional felonies in 2015 and 2016, subsequently being released under house arrest. After violating release conditions, he was re-incarcerated but later accepted into the Hope Home program, a nine-month faith-based initiative. Barajas pleaded guilty to all charges in December 2016, expressing satisfaction with his counsel's representation. The court accepted a recommendation for a twelve-year sentence for robbery and lesser concurrent sentences for the other felonies, contingent on successful completion of the Hope Home program. At sentencing in June 2017, the court adjusted the completion date based on a letter from Pastor Alarid, leading to a ten-year sentence for robbery and seven years for each additional felony, all to run concurrently. Shortly after sentencing, Barajas's new counsel filed a PCR motion alleging ineffective assistance of plea counsel for several reasons, including a failure to provide relevant supervision reports to the court.

Defendant's plea counsel is criticized for several failures, including not presenting evidence of the defendant's progress in the Hope House program and neglecting to seek a continuance for the defendant to complete the program before sentencing. Additionally, the counsel did not provide evidence regarding the collateral consequences of a lengthy sentence on the defendant's family or the defendant's achievements since his release from jail in September 2016. During the post-conviction relief (PCR) evidentiary hearing, plea counsel asserted he regularly communicated with the defendant and believed the State had a strong case for first-degree robbery. His strategy focused on obtaining a favorable plea or probation. He submitted letters from Pastor Alarid about the defendant's progress in the Hope Home program and argued for proceeding with sentencing in June 2017 due to the defendant's prior violations.

Pastor Alarid confirmed that the Hope Home program is nine months long and noted that the defendant had an unapproved visit with family, resulting in a thirty-day dismissal and a new completion date of January 2018. The defendant testified he entered the program in September 2016 and believed the court postponed his sentencing to assess his progress. He indicated he communicated effectively with his counsel throughout the program, admitting that he stated in court that his counsel had fulfilled his requests.

The motion court found that plea counsel provided ineffective assistance by inaccurately stating the defendant's completion date for the Hope Home program, leading to the vacating of the defendant’s sentences and the ordering of a new sentencing hearing. The court's findings on post-conviction relief are reviewed for clear error, presuming the motion court's conclusions are correct unless a significant mistake is evident. The State argues that the motion court erred in granting relief, claiming the issue of the completion date was waived since it was not raised in the defendant's initial motion.

Movant failed to address the State’s claims in his responding brief, violating Rule 24.035, which mandates that all known claims for post-conviction relief must be included in the motion and that any not listed are waived. The motion court denied all five claims in Movant’s post-conviction relief (PCR) motion, finding them unsupported by factual allegations demonstrating outcome-determinative prejudice resulting from plea counsel’s actions. Specifically, claims regarding counsel's decision not to seek a continuance and not to call a witness were deemed matters of professional judgment and did not constitute ineffective assistance.

However, the motion court granted relief based on an error made by plea counsel regarding Movant’s program completion date, which was significant enough to satisfy both prongs of the Strickland v. Washington test for ineffective assistance of counsel. Despite this, the error was not a claim raised in Movant’s PCR motion, meaning it was waived. The court’s grant of relief on a basis not directly presented in the motion was considered a clear error, as the motion court should have confined its decision to the claims explicitly raised. Consequently, Movant’s PCR motion should have been denied.

The court has reversed the motion court's judgments that granted Movant’s Post-Conviction Relief (PCR) motion in Greene County Circuit Court cases 1731-CC00905 and 1731-CC00906. Under Rule 84.14, the appellate court denies Movant’s PCR motion in both cases. The opinion is authored by Gary W. Lynch, with concurrence from Don E. Burrell, Jr. and Nancy Steffen Rahmeyer. The court's decision on the State's first point renders the consideration of the second point moot. Although Movant claims that the motion court's Order implies reliance on incorrect information regarding the completion date of a program attended by Movant, he does not substantiate this assertion with evidence or further argument. An independent review of the record reveals no supporting evidence for the claim that plea counsel misstated the completion date, which was reported as January 2018. Rule 84.14 allows the appellate court to render judgments on trial court decisions, and the court has determined that final resolution is appropriate in this case.