RYAN N. EVANS, Movant-Appellant v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent-Respondent

Citation: 575 S.W.3d 779Docket: SD35635

Court: Missouri Court of Appeals; May 24, 2019; Missouri; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Ryan N. Evans, the Movant-Appellant, appeals the denial of his amended Rule 29.15 motion to vacate his convictions for child abuse and second-degree felony murder by the Circuit Court of Phelps County, presided over by Judge John D. Beger. The court affirmed the motion court's decision, finding it was not clearly erroneous. Evans had the burden to prove his claims by a preponderance of the evidence and the appellate review focused on whether the motion court's findings were clearly erroneous, presuming their correctness.

Evans was charged with second-degree felony murder linked to the abuse of an 18-month-old child, resulting in death, with events dating back to October 2006. An autopsy revealed that the cause of death was a closed head injury due to blunt trauma, classified as homicide. Prior to trial, Evans’ defense counsel, Mark Prugh, sought to exclude the autopsy results, arguing the performing doctor, Dr. Joshua Lanter, was not a certified child death pathologist as mandated by § 58.722. The trial court denied this motion, stating the statute only applied in cases of disagreement about the need for an autopsy. During the trial, Prugh did not object to Dr. Lanter’s testimony regarding the autopsy findings. The jury convicted Evans, leading to concurrent life sentences for child abuse and a 30-year sentence for second-degree murder. 

In his post-conviction motion, Evans alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming Prugh failed to object to Dr. Lanter's testimony based on his alleged statutory unqualification.

The motion court held an evidentiary hearing with Prugh as the sole witness, who opted not to object to Dr. Lanter’s testimony, believing that such an objection would likely be overruled and could inadvertently enhance the expert's credibility in the eyes of the jury. The court subsequently denied Evans' amended motion for post-conviction relief, determining that Prugh's decision was a reasonable trial strategy. Evans argued on appeal that Prugh's failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, requiring him to meet a two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington. The first prong demands showing that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, while the second requires proving that the failure prejudiced the defendant's case. Evans contended that because Dr. Lanter was allegedly unqualified under § 58.722, an objection could have altered the trial's outcome. The court disagreed, asserting that Evans did not demonstrate that Prugh's strategic decision was unreasonable or that he suffered prejudice, given that the interpretation of § 58.722 was incorrect—Dr. Lanter's qualifications did not render the autopsy results inadmissible. The court emphasized that failing to object to every potentially objectionable issue does not equate to ineffective assistance of counsel.

Section 58.722 pertains to the procedures following the death of a child under 18 years old, specifically regarding autopsy requirements. The statute mandates that if a child who qualifies for a certificate of live birth dies, the medical examiner must consult a certified child death pathologist to assess the need for an autopsy. In cases of disagreement regarding the autopsy necessity, the certified child death pathologist makes the final determination unless the child fatality review panel intervenes within twelve hours. Any disagreement must be documented in a report submitted to the child fatality review panel and included in the report to the department of social services.

In the case at hand, it was established that there was no disagreement about the autopsy's necessity, and therefore, Section 58.722 does not apply. As such, the argument that Dr. Lanter was unqualified to perform the autopsy is unfounded. The statute also outlines that the medical examiner is responsible for determining the necessity of an autopsy and performing it if qualified. Dr. Lanter, as an authorized pathologist under the supervision of Dr. Burch, met this requirement.

Furthermore, even if a certified child death pathologist were required, Section 58.722 does not impose sanctions for not adhering to this requirement, nor does it declare autopsy results invalid if performed by someone else. Evans did not claim any errors in Dr. Lanter's execution of the autopsy that would compromise its reliability. Thus, Section 58.722 is deemed directory, meaning it outlines required actions without stipulating consequences for non-compliance. Consequently, Evans’ argument to exclude the autopsy results is invalid, and trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for not raising a non-meritorious objection.

Evans failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome had his counsel objected to the autopsy results. Testimony from multiple medical professionals, based on their independent observations and treatments, established the causes of the Victim's injuries. A pre-death CT scan revealed a swollen brain with bleeding, and three treating doctors confirmed the presence of traumatic brain injuries indicative of child abuse leading to death. The jury had substantial evidence supporting this conclusion, rendering any potential error regarding the autopsy results non-prejudicial, as the information was cumulative to other admissible evidence. Consequently, the motion court did not err in rejecting Evans' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to Dr. Lanter's testimony and the autopsy-derived evidence. The trial court's judgment is upheld.