DWIGHT LAUGHLIN v. DEWAYNE PERRY and ELLEN FLOTTMAN

Citation: Not availableDocket: SD35589

Court: Missouri Court of Appeals; June 10, 2019; Missouri; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Dwight Laughlin was convicted and sentenced to 40 years in prison for burglarizing a U.S. post office, but his convictions were later voided by the Missouri Supreme Court, which found that exclusive jurisdiction over offenses on federal property lay with the United States. Laughlin subsequently sued his public defenders, Dewayne Perry and Ellen Flottman, for negligence, claiming they failed to assert the jurisdictional challenge he had requested. An expert witness, Arthur Benson, provided testimony indicating the public defenders were negligent, leading to a jury verdict of $600,000 in favor of Laughlin.

On appeal, the public defenders raised two points. The second point, which argued that there was no evidence of negligence, was dismissed as it relied solely on their own evidence—which must be ignored in this context—and acknowledged Benson's testimony of negligence. The court emphasized that if any evidence supports the jury's judgment, opposing evidence does not negate it.

Additionally, the public defenders contended they should be granted official immunity from malpractice claims. This issue remains unresolved in Missouri law, with prior cases indicating a lack of blanket immunity for public defenders. Historical rulings have recognized official immunity for public employees acting within the scope of their duties, protecting them from liability for negligence during discretionary acts. The court indicates the need for further examination of the immunity issue, as no recent Missouri case has clarified this doctrine for public defenders.

Official immunity protects individual government actors from personal liability while making decisions in their official capacities, allowing them to prioritize public safety without fear of repercussions. In Missouri, official immunity has existed since before defendants were entitled to counsel at public expense, a right established by Gideon v. Wainwright in 1963. Initially, the Missouri bar bore the financial burden for providing counsel until legislation in 1972 created the Public Defender Commission, implementing a system of public defenders and appointed counsel. Unlike some states, Missouri does not equate official immunity with sovereign immunity, which applies only to governmental entities, not individual public officials acting on behalf of the state.

Legislation did not clarify public defenders' liability for negligence, as the role did not exist at common law, and the Supreme Court ruled against public-defender immunity in Ferri v. Ackerman, while allowing states to define their own immunity laws. Various state courts have reached differing conclusions regarding public-defender immunity; however, the general consensus remains that neither court-appointed nor private attorneys are immune from malpractice liability. Missouri law, particularly after the establishment of the State Legal Expense Fund in 1983, emphasizes that this fund is the exclusive remedy for claims against state employees, limiting other civil actions related to their official duties.

No state officer or employee is personally liable for actions taken in their official capacity. Relevant statutes, specifically 105.711 and related provisions, ensure that the Attorney General defends these officials, while a designated Fund is responsible for any financial judgments against them. The law explicitly states that these officials are not individually liable and limits further legal actions against them, establishing the Fund as the sole means for claim recovery. This framework reflects a legislative intent to protect the state from financial exposure due to employee negligence while preserving the rights of victims. The court expresses reluctance to introduce additional immunity that could harm victims without benefiting negligent public defenders. The judgment is affirmed.